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LEX TALIONIS 



LEX TALIONIS 



An Analysis of the Forces whose Resultant 
Produced the Treaty of Versailles 



By WARREN HILLS 



Fleet-McGinley Company, Printers 

Baltimore, Md. 

1922 



V v 



Copyright, 1922 

Fleet-McGinley Company 

Baltimore, Md. 



SEP - 1 

,JI.A681595 



■>' 



PREFACE 


AT the instance of the Supreme War Council the 
-Z jf supervision by the respective governments of the 
Associated Nations over the control of news, which 
had been highly developed during the war, was per- 
petuated during the period of the Peace Conference. 
Under the policy followed at Paris many facts of his- 
torical importance remained undisclosed at the time. 

Since the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, how- 
ever, much information has been published piecemeal, 
as it were, which is of great value to the historian who 
would describe the events of the seven months follow- 
ing the Armistice. 

Deductions from the facts, as made in the follow- 
ing pages, are the author's. The facts themselves are 
such as have been available for many months to any 
student who cared to make researches through the files 
of the daily and periodical press in England, on the 
Continent, and in the United States. 

WARREN HILLS 



Baltimore, Md., September I, IQ22. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



CHAPTER PAGE 

I. — The American Peace 9 

II. — The Peace Agreement 37 

III. — The Entente Peace 66 

IV. — American-Entente Solidarity 102 

V. — The Second Armistice Renewal 135 

VI. — The Peace Conference 163 

VII. — Germany 193 

VIII. — The Interlude 213 

IX — The Final Six Weeks 228 

X. — The Signing of the Treaty 258 



LEX TALIONIS 



CHAPTER I. 

The American Peace. 

THE purpose of this book is to state the issues of 
the Great War as they were officially proclaimed, 
to set forth the character of the agreement which 
terminated hostilities, and to disclose the forces whose 
resultant produced the Treaty of Versailles. 

Three years have passed since hostilities ceased, 
and one begins to grow impatient with enthusiasms 
which were normal when the hazards of war were 
upon us, but which, if kept alive under artificial stimu- 
lation, retard the clearing of the vision which the lapse 
of the years should bring. 

Old Caspar told little Willemina much about the 
glorious victory of Blenheim, but could not answer her 
question "what they killed each other for?" 

In the hope, then, that the analysis which follows 
may pursue the methods of sound mental processes, 
and escape the flaws attributable to too great, or too 
little, emotional sensitiveness in its treatment of the 
facts, the story will be told without effort at embellish- 
ment and as accurately as may be. 

In 1 9 14 the United States had no cause of quarrel 
with any of the nations of Europe. When war on a 
major scale began there its causes were not generally 
understood here, but there was more general sympathy 



io Lex Talionis 

with the Entente Nations than with the Central Em- 
pires. President Wilson urged neutrality "in thought 
as well as deed." It seemed to be his judgment at that 
time that the fundamental principles of government for 
which the United States stood were not jeopardized by 
the struggle in Europe. 

In 19 1 6 the President sought to draw forth an ex- 
pression of war aims from both sides, with a view to 
peace negotiation. At that time the protests of the 
United States against submarine depredations upon 
neutrals had been heeded, and depredations were not 
resumed again until February, 19 17. On this occasion 
the President declared that the general objects which 
statesmen on both sides had in mind were virtually the 
same, as stated in general terms to their own people and 
to the world, but that the concrete objects for which the 
war was being waged had never been set forth. It was 
suggested that the terms upon which the belligerents on 
one side and the other would deem it necessary to 
insist might not be so irreconcilable as some had feared. 

This method of making public statements of war 
aims was thereafter insisted upon by President Wilson, 
and was for some time opposed by the spokesmen of 
the Central Empires, one of whom at a later date 
deprecated the use of "public statements which we 
shout to each other from the speaker's tribune." They 
expressed the desire for a conference in some neutral 
country based upon "a certain degree of mutual con- 
fidence in each other's honesty and chivalry." 

The reply of the Entente Nations expressed the view 
that the time had not yet come when a peace which 



The American Peace i i 

would be of lasting benefit could be secured. A specific 
declaration was made, however, that Belgium, Servia 
and Montenegro must be evacuated and restored, in- 
vaded portions of France, Russia and Roumania evac- 
uated, with reparations, and that in the reorganization 
of Europe the principle of nationalities must be recog- 
nized. 

On January 22, 19 17, in addressing Congress on 
the subject of his peace proposals of 19 16, when the 
immensity of the devastation was becoming clearer, the 
President stated that he took, it for granted that the 
peace must be followed by some definite concert of 
powers, which would make it virtually impossible that 
any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again; 
that the United States must add their authority 
and power to that of other nations to guarantee peace 
and justice throughout the world. He declared against 
a new balance of power, and advocated that a super- 
national authority be created, based upon the organized 
major force of mankind; and outlined some of the 
settlements afterwards comprised in the Fourteen 
Points. 

The depredations of the German submarines against 
American commerce on the high seas, which were re- 
sumed in February, 19 17, and persisted in against re- 
peated protests by the American Government, afforded 
a casus belli under a principle which the United States 
had never been slow to defend, and they declared war 
against Germany in April, 19 17. 

From this date the aloofness of neutrality was put 
aside by the American Government, and intimate and 



12 Lex Talionis 

sympathetic relations were entered into with the gov- 
ernments of Great Britain, France and Italy. Their 
individual war aims became a matter of greater interest 
to the American Government and the American people, 
and their distinguished representatives who came to 
this country to inform us were warmly welcomed. Tech- 
nical advisers from the French and British Armies 
taught us the science of trench warfare, and their states- 
men and financiers kept our Government advised at 
Washington. 

The European nations had been engulfed in the 
desperate struggle for more than two years and a half, 
and these visitors to America bore the impress of it. 
Most of the military advisors carried the marks of 
wounds; all felt a deadly hatred of the enemy. It was 
a revelation to the Americans in training to learn that 
in trench warfare no quarter was given, and that 
wounded enemies on the ground were to be dispatched. 

Every effort was made by the British, French and 
Italian Governments and peoples to strengthen the ties 
of sympathy between themselves and the United States, 
and to impart to the American people a sense of the 
cruel and treacherous character of the enemy with which 
they were now dealing. The quality of the European 
hatreds was something theretofore unknown in Amer- 
ican psychology; it was an exotic watered by a prop- 
aganda which utilized without restraint every stimulus 
that might make it grow. 

Day by day full reports of the terrible and heroic 
struggle were spread before the American readers, the 
emotional stimulus constantly increased in intensity, 



The American Peace 13 

and in 191 8 produced and sent to France the great 
military force known as the A. E. F. 

In August, 1917, the United States, then being a 
belligerent, the President replied to a proposal for 
peace made by His Holiness, the Pope of Rome, declin- 
ing it as in substance a return to the status quo ante 
bellum. 1 

In the Autumn of 19 17 Georges Clemenceau suc- 
ceeded Ribot as Premier of France, and a lack of co- 
operation among the allies which had hitherto pre- 
vailed was overcome by the creation of the Supreme 
Allied War Council, consisting of the Prime Minister 
and a military representative of each government. 

On November 29 a plenary session of an Inter- 
Allied Conference was held in Paris, in which sixteen 
nations were represented. Colonel E. M. House was 
the chairman of the American delegation. The pur- 

1 In this reply the President set forth the menace of the vast military 
establishment controlled by the irresponsible German Government, 
and stated that this power was not the German people but the ruthless 
master of the German people; that to deal with it in the way proposed 
would only involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of 
its policy, and that a peace must be based upon the faith of all the 
peoples involved. 

Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establish- 
ment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, he said, was deemed 
inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a 
peace of any kind, least of all an enduring peace. 

"We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as 
a guarantee of anything that is to endure unless explicitly supported 
by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German 
people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be 
justified in accepting." 



14 Lex Talionis 

pose of the conference was to bring about coordination 
of effort and to present a united front to the enemy 
on the question of terms of peace. 

The President, in his fifth annual message to Con- 
gress, on December 4, 19 17, at a time when Italy was 
hard-pressed, recommended a declaration of war 
against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and laid 
stress upon the principle that autocracy must be shown 
the utter futility of its claims to power or leadership in 
the modern world. 2 

In this message, in speaking of the common judgment 
of the nations, the President's words indicated that he 
spoke for the allied governments also, and this was 
confirmed when ten days later Mr. Lloyd George, in 
a speech before the lawyers at Gary's Inn declared 
Great Britain to be in accord with the statement of war 
aims made by President Wilson. 

In addressing the Commons in December, Mr. Lloyd 
George stated that British peace terms included the 

2 "When this force is checked and defeated we shall at last be free 
to do an unprecedented thing, and this is the time to avow our purpose 
to do it. We shall be free to base peace upon generosity and 
justice to the exclusion of all selfish claims to advantage even on 
the part of the victors." 

"When autocracy is defeated, when the German people have 
spokesmen whose word we can believe, and when those spokesmen 
are ready in the name of their people to accept the common judgment 
of the nations as to what shall henceforth be the bases of law and 
of covenant for the life of the world, we shall be willing and glad 
to pay the full price for peace and pay it ungrudgingly. We know 
what that price will be. It will be full, impartial justice — justice 
done at every point, to every nation that the final settlement must 
affect — our enemies as well as our friends." 



The American Peace 15 

restoration of territory occupied by Germany, with repa- 
rations, and that the future of the German colonies 
should be based upon the wishes of the native races. 3 
After Lloyd George's speech to the Trades Unions, 
he allowed President Wilson to become the exclusive 
spokesman for the Allies in dealing with Germany. His 

3 The day before the President's speech of January 8, 1918, was 
delivered, Lloyd George, in an address to the Trade Unions said: 

"We are not fighting a war of aggression against the German 
people. Their leaders have persuaded them that they are fighting 
a war of self-defense against a league of rival nations bent on the 
destruction of Germany. The destruction or disruption of Germany 
has never been a war aim with us. Most reluctantly, and quite un- 
prepared, we were forced to join in the war in self-defense, in defense 
of violated law in Europe. The British people have never aimed 
at the breaking-up of the German peoples or the disintegration of 
their state. Our wish is not to destroy German greatness, Germany's 
great position in the world, but to turn her aside from schemes of 
military domination to devote her strength to the beneficent tasks of 
the world. 

"We are not fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary, or to deprive 
Turkey of its Capital or the rich lands of Asia Minor and Thrace 
which are predominantly Turkish. 

"We are not fighting to destroy the German constitution, although 
we consider a military autocratic constitution a dangerous anachro- 
nism. Our viewpoint is that the adoption of a democratic constitution 
by Germany would be the most convincing evidence that her old 
spirit of military domination had indeed died in the war, and it would 
be much easier for us to conclude a broad democratic peace with her. 
But that is a question for the German people to decide. 

"The days of the Treaty of Vienna are long past. We can no 
longer submit the future of European civilization to the arbitrary 
decision of a few negotiators, striving to secure by chicanery or per- 
suasion the interests of this or that dynasty or nation. Therefore, 
government with the consent of the governed must be the basis of 
any territorial settlement. For that reason, also, unless treaties are 
upheld, it is obvious that no treaty of peace can be worth the paper 
on which it is written." 



1 6 Lex Talionis 

only expression thereafter on war aims or peace terms 
was contained in an address to the American soldiers 
in France on July 5, 19 18, in which he said that if the 
Kaiser and his advisors were prepared to accept the 
four points mentioned by the President in his speech 
at Mt. Vernon the day before they could have peace 
immediately. 

The collapse of the resistance of the Soviets against 
the armies of the Central Empires resulted in the assem- 
bling of a peace conference at Brest-Litovsk on Decem- 
ber 22, 1917, followed after long negotiations by the 
signing of a peace treaty on March 4, 19 18, involving 
the cession of much territory and the payment of a 
heavy indemnity. 

These negotiations furnished the occasion of the 
President's address to Congress on January 8, 19 18, 
which contains the Fourteen Points, and is the first 
document which forms a part of the actual agreement 
by which hostilities were brought to an end. 

The President's speech of January 8, 1918, adverted 
to the parleys then in progress at Brest-Litovsk, which 
had been watched in the hope that it might be possible 
to extend them into a general conference with regard 
to terms of peace and settlement. It stated that the 
representatives of the Central Powers had first pre- 
sented in that meeting an outline of settlement which, 
if less definite than that of the Russians, seemed sus- 
ceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific pro- 
gram of practical terms were added; that that program 
proposed no concession at all, either to the sovereignty 
of Russia or to the preferences of the populations, but 



The American Peace 17 

meant in a word that the Central Empires were to keep 
every foot of territory their armed forces had occupied, 
as a permanent addition to their territories and their 
power. The President thought that the general prin- 
ciple of settlement first suggested had originated with 
the more liberal statesmen of Germany and Austria, 
while the concrete terms came from the military leaders; 
that the spirit of the settlement did not represent the 
spirit of the German Reichstag as manifested in July, 
19 1 7, but that of the military leaders who resist and 
defy that intention, and insist upon conquest and sub- 
jugation. 

It is in response to the need for definition of principle 
and of purpose, therefore, as shown by the results 
of the Brest-Litovsk parleys, that the speech of January 
8 sets forth the fourteen conditions of peace 4 which, 
inasmuch as the general preliminary terms of the Brest- 

4 The Fourteen Points were: 

1. Open covenants and open diplomacy. 

2. Freedom of navigation upon the seas. 
Removal of economic barriers ; equality of trade. 

4. Reduction of armaments guaranteed. 

5. Impartial adjustment of colonial claims. 

6. Evacuation of Russian territory; a free Russia. 

7. Evacuation and restoration of Belgium with unlimited sover- 

eignty. 

8. Evacuation of French territory ; restoration of Alsace-Lorraine. 

9. Readjustment of Italian boundaries along lines of nationality. 

10. Autonomy for peoples of Austria-Hungary. 

11. Evacuation and restoration of Roumania, Servia, and Monte- 

negro; Servia accorded access to sea; relations in Balkan 
states determined upon historical lines of allegiance and 
nationality, with international guarantees of territorial 
integrity. 



1 8 Lex Talionis 

Litovsk Treaty had been nullified by the specific pro- 
gram of practical terms afterwards added, were clearly 
intended to present terms so plain and specific that in 
any final peace settlement additional and inconsistent 
provisions could not be included. 

In addition to the Fourteen Points the speech 
included clearly-stated principles for the guidance of 
the peace negotiators. 5 

12. Turkish sovereignty maintained, but subject nationalities to 

be free and autonomous, with Dardanelles opened under 
international guarantees. 

13. Independent Poland guaranteed; access to sea. 

14. Association of nations. 

6 Among the statements of principles to be accepted are the fol- 
lowing: 

"It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace when 
they are begun shall be absolutely open, and that they shall involve 
and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. 

"We are willing to fight until such arrangements and covenants 
are achieved, but only because we wish the right to prevail and 
desire a just and stable peace, such as can be secured only by 
removing the chief provocations to war, which this program removes. 

"We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing 
in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement of 
distinction or of learning or of pacific enterprise, such as have made 
her record very bright and enviable. We do not wish to injure her 
or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not 
wish to fight her, either with arms or with hostile arrangements of 
trade, if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other 
peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law 
and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality 
among the peoples of the world, the new world in which we live, 
instead of a place of mastery. 

"Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modi- 
fication of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, 
and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealing with her or 



The American Peace 19 

On January 24 the German Chancellor, Count von 
Hertling discussed this speech in the Reichstag. He 
expressed general agreement with the first five of the 
fourteen points, refused to permit interference by the 
Entente in Russian affairs, and disclaimed a purpose of 
forcible annexation of Belgium, but refused to discuss 
the Belgian question until the Entente should admit that 
the integrity of the territory of the Central Empires 
was the only possible foundation for peace negotia- 
tions. 6 



our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when 
they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military 
party and the men whose creed is imperial dominion. 

"We have spoken now surely in terms too concrete to admit of 
any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through 
the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to 
all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms 
of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or 
weak. Unless this principle is made a part of its foundation no part 
of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the 
United States could act upon no other principle; and to the vindication 
of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and 
everything they possess." 

"The Chancellor delivered a general defense of German policy as 
instituted by Bismark, and reviewed the historic vicissitudes of the 
provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. 

He said that in the recent speech of Lloyd George he failed to 
recognize a sincere desire for peace or even a friendly spirit. "Be- 
tween the lines there is always present the suggestion that it is his 
duty to sit in judgment on guilty Germany for all sorts of crimes." 

He thinks that in one respect the tone of President Wilson has 
changed. "It appears," he says, "that the unanimous rejection by the 
German people at the time of the attempt of Mr. Wilson in reply to 
the Papal note, to sow discord between the German Government 
and the German nation, has done its work. It was possibly 
this unanimous rejection which led Mr. Wilson on to the right road, 
and perhaps a beginning has been made, because now there is no 
longer any question of the suppression of the German nation by an 



20 Lex Talionis 

These January interchanges on the whole seemed to 
make the prospects of peace remote. The Entente 
insisted on a declaration of German purpose with re- 
gard to Belgium. The Central Empires refused to 
commit themselves with regard to Belgium so long 

autocratic government, and the former attacks upon the House of 
Hohenzollern are not repeated." (President Wilson subsequently, 
however, maintained his demands in this respect.) 

He declared that the conditions of the evacuation of the occupied 
parts of France were to be agreed upon between France and Germany, 
and that Germany would not give up Alsace-Lorraine. 

Points 9, 10, and n he left to the Foreign Minister of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy to answer. Point 12 he left to Turkey to an- 
swer and pledged his support to that power. The right of the Entente 
to intervene in Poland (point 13) was denied; and with reference 
to point 14, an association of nations, he stated that the Imperial 
Government was willing to investigate the principle of a league of 
nations after all the other questions in suspense had been settled. 
"The principles for a general world peace," he said, "we also admit, 
and they could form points of departure and aims of negotiation. 
Where, however, concrete questions are concerned — points which are 
of decisive importance to us and our allies — there the wish for peace 
is less apparent. 

"Our enemies do not wish to destroy Germany, but they cast 
furtive and covetous glances toward parts of our lands and those 
of our allies. They speak with respect of Germany's position, but 
the idea that we are culprits who must do penance and promise ref- 
ormation, repeatedly makes itself apparent. This is the usual tone 
of the victor to the vanquished. This also is the tone of the man who 
points to all our former statements of willingness for peace as mere 
signs of weakness." 

In conclusion, Count von Hertling stated that if fresh proposals 
of peace were made they would examine them carefully because their 
aim was no other than the reestablishment of a lasting general peace, 
but that this lasting general peace was not possible so long as the 
integrity of the German Empire, the security of her vital interests, 
and the dignity of the Fatherland were not guaranteed. — (World 
Almanac, 1919). 



The American Peace 21 

as the Entente demanded Alsace-Lorraine, Trieste, the 
Trentino, Transylvania, and the Banat, whose separa- 
tion would violate the territorial integrity of the Central 
Empires. 

In his address to Congress on February 1 1 President 
Wilson replied to the spokesmen of the Central Em- 
pires. He regarded Count Czernin's reply as uttered 
in a very friendly tone. Count Hertling's reply he con- 
sidered vague and confusing and as contemplating a 
settlement effected by individual barter and concession, 
after which the new League of Nations would have the 
function of holding the balance of power steadily 
against external disturbance. 

This speech visualizes the war as above all a struggle 
between the principles of imperialism and democracy, 
and sees the issue as one which is no longer in the hands 
of ministries and councils, but one which must now be 
tried "in the Court of Mankind." 7 

7 "In view of the infinite sacrifice of these years of tragical suffering 
no peace can possibly be arrived at in any such fashion. The method 
the German Chancellor proposes is the method of the Congress 
of Vienna. We cannot and will not return to that. What is at stake 
now is the peace of the world. What we are striving for is a new 
international order based upon broad and universal principles of right 
and justice, no mere peace of shreds and patches." 

"Is it possible Count von Hertling does not see that, does not grasp 
it; is, in fact, living in his thought in a world dead and gone? Has he 
utterly forgotten the Reichstag resolutions of the 19th of July, or 
does he deliberately ignore them? They spoke of the conditions of a 
general peace — not of national aggrandizement or of arrangements 
between state and state. * * *" 

"Is Count von Hertling not aware that he is speaking in the 
court of mankind, that all the awakened nations of the world now sit 
in judgment on what every public man of whatever nation may say 



22 Lex Talionis 

The President's address at Baltimore on April 6, 
191 8, was full of indignation. Information had been 
received of the general character of the dictated treaties 
of Brest-Litovsk signed on March 5. The question 
he had asked, he said, whether it was justice or domin- 
ion and the execution of their own will upon the other 
nations of the world that the German leaders were seek- 
ing, had been answered in unmistakable terms; "They 

on the issues of a conflict which has spread to every region of the 
world ? The Reichstag resolutions of July frankly accepted the deci- 
sions of that court. There shall be no annexations, no contributions, 
no punitive damages. Peoples are not to be handed about from one 
sovereignty to another by an international conference or an under- 
standing between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must 
be respected. Peoples may now be dominated and governed only 
by their own consent. Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It 
is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth 
ignore at their peril." 

The President sets forth four principles to be applied : first, the 
essential justice of the particular case; second, peoples and provinces 
are not to be bartered ; third, territorial settlements must be made 
in the interests of the populations concerned ; fourth, well defined 
national aspirations to be accorded satisfaction so far as that can be 
accorded them. "A general peace erected upon such foundations," 
he says "can be discussed. Until such a peace can be secured 
we have no choice but to go on. * * * Our whole strength 
will be put into this war of emancipation from the threat and at- 
tempted mastery of selfish groups of autocratic rulers. * * * *. 
Having set our hands to the task of establishing a new order of 
reason and justice we shall not turn back." 

The four principles laid down in this address were commented 
on by Chancellor von Hertling in addressing the Reichstag on Feb- 
ruary 25. He said that he could fundamentally agree to them and 
that peace could be discussed on such a basis. At a later date his 
statement was concurred in by Count Czernin who, however, ex- 
pressed doubt whether President Wilson would succeed in uniting the 
allies on such a basis. 



The American Peace 23 

have avowed that it was not justice but dominion and 
the unhindered execution of their own will". The 
President declared that he accepted the challenge and 
that the people of the United States accepted it. "There 
is then but one response possible for us; force, force to 
the utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous 
and triumphant force which shall make right the law of 
the world and cast every selfish dominion down in the 
dust." 8 

8 In the same address the President also said: 

"We have ourselves proposed no injustice or aggression. We are 
ready whenever the final reckoning is made to be just to the German 
people, deal justly with the German power, as with all others. There 
can be no difference between peoples in the final judgment if it is 
indeed to be a righteous judgment. 

"To propose anything but justice, even-handed and dispassionate 
justice, to Germany at any time, whatever the outcome of the war, 
would be to renounce and dishonor our own cause. For we ask noth- 
ing that we are not ready to accord. * * * For myself I am ready, 
ready still, ready even now, to discuss a fair and just and honest 
peace, at any time that it is sincerely proposed — a peace in which 
the strong and the weak shall fare alike. But the answer, when I 
proposed such a peace, came from the German commanders in Russia, 
and I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer." 

In March, 1918 the President sent the following to the Congress 
of Soviets assembled in Moscow : 

"May I not take advantage of the meeting of the Congress of 
the Soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people of the 
United States feel for the Russian people at this moment, when the 
German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole 
struggle for freedom, and substitute the wishes of Germany for the 
purposes of the people of Russia? 

"Although the Government of the United States is unhappily not 
now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish 
to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia through the Congress 
that it will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once 



24 Lex Talionis 

In his address of May 18, 191 8, on the opening of 
the Red Cross campaign, the President commented on 
the insincerity of the German peace approaches, and 
declared his intention to stand by Russia as well as 
France. 

The most critical and decisive moments of the war 
on the western front were now approaching. The 
general offensive opened by the Germans in March 
carried their armies forward month after month. The 
Russian armies had been disposed of, releasing the 
German divisions in the east for reinforcement of the 
line on the western front. 9 On more than one occasion 
minutes alone intervened between the allied armies 
and the collapse of the entire allied front. 

There were now no optimists in France or England 

more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs, and 
full restoration to her great role in the life of Europe and the modern 
world. The whole heart of the people of the United States is with 
the people of Russia in the attempt to free themselves forever from 
autocratic government and become the masters of their own life." 

8 Foreign Secretary von Kuhlmann, in a debate in the Reichstag on 
June 24, while the great German offensive of 1918 was in progress, 
reiterated the condition that the absolute integrity of the German 
Empire and its allies formed the necessary requisite condition for 
entering into peace discussion or negotiations. 

He referred to the reproach made by English statesmen that 
Germany was not prepared to state its attitude publicly on the 
Belgian question, and declared that the fundamental views of the 
German Imperial Government differed from those ascribed to it. 
Belgium, he said, was one question in the entire complex. He refused 
to make a statement on this point that would bind Germany without 
binding the enemy. He reiterated that the German peace offers had 
been more specific than those of the Entente. He denied German 
ambitions of domination in Europe, deprecated the present tendency 



The American Peace 25 

on the question of the outcome of the war. German 
shells were falling in Paris. There was one ray of 
hope only in the deep gloom that enfolded the future — 
that the powerful, fresh American army could be 
thrown into the line in time to save the situation.^ 

Fortunately the American troops were now arriving 
in France in great and increasing numbers. Foch was 
no longer compelled to husband his dwindling Euro- 
pean reserves. On July 18 he was enabled to open a 
general counter-offensive which checked the German 
advance and constituted the turning-point of the war. 
From that day the German line was forced to retire 
steadily in a movement that continued until November 
11, 1918, when the armistice was signed and hostilities 
came to an end. 

It was on July 4, before the change for the better in 
the strategic situation had come, and anxiety in the 
United States and among the Allies had raised the 
public mind to a high emotional pitch, that President 
Wilson took occasion to address the Diplomatic Corps 
in Washington, during ceremonies held before the tomb 
of Washington at Mt. Vernon. 

to regard overtures of peace as peace offensives or traps, claimed 
enormous military resources for Germany, and declared that the 
idea of victory for the Entente was a dream and an illusion. "We 
wish," he said, "for the German people and our allies a free, strong, 
independent existence within the boundaries drawn for us by history. 
We desire overseas possessions corresponding to our greatness and 
wealth, the freedom of the sea, conveying our trade to all parts of 
the world. These, in brief, are our roughly sketched aims, the re- 
alization of which is absolutely vital and necessary for Germany." 
He placed the responsibility for the war chiefly on Russia and France. 
— (World Almanac, 1919-) 



26 Lex Talionis 

Since the President's address to Congress on January 
8, 191 8, formulating the issues of the war the allied 
chancelleries had remained silent. The formation of 
the Supreme War Council in Europe had created unity 
of political action, and Colonel E. M. House, repre- 
senting the President of the United States, was the 
agent through whom coordination of European and 
American war aims were being effected. The Allied 
Nations now endorsed and accepted the leadership of 
President Wilson, and his utterances were accepted as 
those of the allies as well as of the United States. 
Unless subsequently dissented from, the principles of 
settlement which President Wilson might propose to 
the enemy would be binding upon the allies. 

In unmistakable words the President, on July 4, pro- 
claimed the issue of the war to be one between democ- 
racy and autocracy, and that the settlement must be 
final. He declared the following to be the ends for 
which the associated peoples of the world were fighting, 
and that they must be conceded them before there could 
be peace: 

1. The destruction of any arbitrary power anywhere that 
can separately, secretly, and of its own single choice, disturb 
the peace of the world ; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, 
at the least its reduction to virtual impotence. 

2. The settlement of every question, whether of territory or 
sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relation- 
ship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement 
by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis 
of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or 



The American Peace 27 

people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of 
its own exterior influence or mastery. 

3. The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct 
toward each other by the same principles of honor and of respect 
for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual 
citizens of all modern states in their relations with one another ; 
to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly 
observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish 
injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established 
upon the handsome foundations of a mutual respect for right. 

4. The establishment of an organization for peace which 
shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations 
will check every invasion of right, and serve to make peace 
and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of 
opinion to which all must submit, and by which every inter- 
national readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by 
the people directly concerned shall be sanctioned." 

On the same day the President delivered a "four- 
minute" address to the American nation. It pointed 
out how the spirit of self-government had spread and 
grown and triumphed since the birth of our Republic, 
and how we were now fighting for our national exist- 
ence against the menace of autocracy. It referred to 
the recognition now demanded by the subjugated races 
of Austria-Hungary, and asked that Americans unite 
with the representatives of those races "in making this 
our Independence Day the first that shall be consecrated 
to a declaration of independence for all the peoples of 
the world". 

The vast and novel conception of the meaning of 
the war and of the results which the victory of the 
associated nations must secure, was now clearly stated 



28 Lex Talionis 

by President Wilson. The Fourth of July address in 
19 1 8 meant: 

1. That no compromise peace with the Central Empires 
as then constituted, would be made. 

2. That justice demanded that their territorial integrity, 
depending upon the principle of imperialism, be destroyed. 

3. That parleys for peace would not be arranged until after 
internal changes of a constitutional nature had transferred all 
power to legislatures solely responsive to the people. 

It meant nothing less than the destruction of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as the independence of 
the "submerged nations" was equivalent not to dis- 
memberment but to dissection of its body. 

It is hardly possible that these principles would have 
been evolved by the statesmen of the Entente Govern- 
ments. Their eyes were not fixed on constitutional 
reforms, but were riveted upon the issue of victory or 
defeat in the war. It so happened that President Wil- 
son's utterances dedicated the power of the United 
States to the overthrow of the Hohenzollerns and the 
Hapsburgs, and to the dismemberment of their empires. 
This was enough to secure the avowed adherence of 
the Entente statesmen to his principles and purposes, 
which, moreover, did not involve crossing any bridges 
of constitutional reform in their own countries until 
after the war was over. 

The paramount war aim which the President was 
now pushing to decision was the overthrow of the 
political principle of empire, which he believed to belong 
to a world dead and gone, and its replacement by the 
principle of democracy everywhere, under which prin- 



The American Peace 29 

ciple legislatures and executives would be responsive 
to the will of the people. 

A more conservative position, which a consideration 
of the structure of the Entente Governments might have 
recommended as appropriate under the circumstances, 
would have been one which demanded merely the 
modification of the autocratic regimes in Central 
Europe, under which the people were oppressed and 
denied their rightful voice in government; one which 
would not have demanded the territorial amputation 
of their empires, but which would have been satisfied 
by the assurance of autonomy for the oppressed prov- 
inces, and the curbing of the power of the autocratic 
rulers. This would have left the door open for nego- 
tiations which might have made it possible for the war 
to have been ended on a practicable basis before the 
entire stored-up wealth of the peoples of Europe had 
been destroyed. 

For the political principle which, in fact, underlay 
the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy, 
was empire. Their methods of administration were 
less autocratic and arbitrary than those of the Central 
Empires, but the difference was one of degree and not 
of kind, and they were in no sense democracies as that 
word finds application in America. In the confusion 
of thought which the turmoil of war introduced they 
took on the character of democracies in American eyes 
and in the American sense, and this process was power- 
fully aided by the protestations of their propaganda 



30 Lex Talionis 

that they were in fact democracies. This illusion seemed 
to be present in the mind even of Mr. Wilson himself. 
A great draft system was now in operation in the 
United States, on a scale which would ensure the enroll- 
ment of the entire fighting material of the country if 
it should become necessary. In his draft proclamation 
of August 31 the President said; 

"We solemnly purpose a decisive victory of arms and delib- 
erately to devote the larger part of the military man power of 
the nation to the accomplishment of that purpose". 

In his Labor Day message of September 1 he said: 
"It is a war to make the nations and peoples of the world 
secure against every such power as the German autocracy rep- 
resents. It is a war of emancipation. Not until it is won can 
men everywhere live free from constant fear, or breathe freely 
while they go about their daily tasks, and know that govern- 
ments are their servants and not their masters." 

Within the Austro-Hungarian Empire the disaffec- 
tion among the subject races, now powerfully encour- 
aged by Entente support, was getting out of hand. As 
early as June 30, 191 8, France had recognized Czecho- 
slovakia as an independent state, and on September 15 
the United States recognized it as a co-belligerent with 
a de facto government. Recognition of the independ- 
ence of the Jugoslavs also was contemplated. Prague, 
Laibach and Agram were centers of revolution. 

On September 15 Baron Burian, Austro-Hungarian 
Prime Minister, addressed a long communication to 
all the belligerent states suggesting a compromise peace 
and adverting to the consequences to Europe of a con- 



The American Peace 31 

tinued struggle, but still insisting on the territorial in- 
tegrity of the Central Empires. 10 

10 The Austro-Hungarian peace proposal was as follows: 
"Although it was declined by the enemy powers, the peace proposal 
made on December 12, 1916, by the four Allied Powers, which never 
desisted from the conciliatory intent that had prompted it, nevertheless 
was the beginning of a new phase in the history of this war. From 
that day the question of peace after two and a half years of fierce 
struggle suddenly became the main topic of discussion in Europe, nay, 
in the world, and has been steadily gaining prominence ever since. 
From that day nearly every belligerent state has repeatedly voiced 
its opinion on the subject of peace. 

"The discussion, however, was not carried on along the same lines. 
Viewpoints varied according to the military and political conditions, 
and so, thus far at least, no tangible or practical result has been 
achieved. Notwithstanding those fluctuations a lessening of the distance 
between the viewpoints of the two parties could be noted, though no 
attempt will be made to deny the great divergencies of opinion which 
divide the two enemy camps and which it has heretofore been impos- 
sible to reconcile. One may be, nevertheless, permitted to notice that 
some of the extreme war aims have been departed from, and that the 
fundamental basis of a universal peace is to some extent agreed upon. 
There is no doubt that on either side the desire of the peoples to reach 
an understanding and bring about peace is becoming more and more 
manifest. The same impression is created when the manner in which 
the peace proposal of the four allied powers was received in the past 
is compared with the subsequent utterances of their adversaries, 
whether they came from responsible statesmen or from personages 
holding no office, but likewise wielding political influence. By way 
of illustration confined to a few instances, the Allies in their reply to 
President Wilson's note advanced claims which meant nothing less 
than the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, the mutilation and 
radical changes in the political structure of Germany, and also the 
annihilation of European Turkey. With time, those terms that could 
not be enforced without a crushing victory were modified or partly 
abandoned by some of the official declarations 01 the Entente. 

"Thus Mr. Balfour, in the course of last year, plainly declared to 
the English Parliament that Austria-Hungary was to solve her domestic 



32 Lex Talionis 

problems by herself and that Germany could not be given another 
constitution through foreign influence. Mr. Lloyd George afterward 
announced in the beginning of this year that the Allies were not 
fighting for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary or to despoil the 
Ottoman Empire of its Turkish provinces, or, again, to bring internal 
reforms to Germany. We may also add that in December, 1917, Mr. 
Balfour categorically repudiated the assumption that British policy 
had pledged itself to create an independent state including the German 
territory lying on the left bank of the Rhine. As for the utterances 
of the Central Powers, they leave no doubt that those states are 
merely fighting to defend the integrity and safety of their territories. 
Much greater than in respect to concrete war aims is the evidence 
that the principles upon which peace could be concluded and a new 
order of things established in Europe and throughout the world have 
in a way drawn nearer to one another. On this point President Wil- 
son in his addresses of February 12 and July 4, 1918, formulated 
principles that have raised no objection from his Allies and whose 
wide application will shortly meet the objections from the four Allied 
Powers provided to be general and consistent with the vital interests 
of the states concerned. To agree upon general principles, however, 
would not suffice ; an agreement should also be reached as to their 
interpretation and application to the several concrete questions of war 
and peace. 

"To an unprejudiced observer there can be no doubt that in all 
the belligerent states, without exception, the desire for a compromise 
peace has been enormously strengthened ; that the conviction is in- 
creasing that the further continuance of the bloody struggle must 
transform Europe into ruins and into a state of exhaustion that will 
check its development for decades to come — and this without any 
guarantee of thereby bringing about the decision by arms which four 
years of efforts, hardships, and immense sacrifices have failed to bring 
about. Now, by what means, in what manner can the way be paved 
that will finally lead to such a compromise? Can any one in earnest 
expect that goal to be attained by adhering to the method hereto- 
fore followed in the discussion of the peace problem? We dare not 
answer that question in the affirmative. The discussion as conducted 
until now from one rostrum to another by the statesmen of the several 
countries was substantially but a series of monologues. It lacked 
sequence above all. Speeches delivered, arguments expounded by 
the orators of the opposite parties, received no direct immediate reply. 



The American Peace 33 



Again, the publicity of those utterances, the places where they were 
delivered, excluded every possible serviceable result. In such public 
utterances the eloquence used is of the high-pitched kind which is 
intended to thrill the masses. Whether, intentionally or not, the gap 
between conflicting ideas is thus widened. Misunderstandings that 
can not easily be eradicated spring up, and a simple, straightforward 
exchange of ideas is hampered as soon as mentioned, and even before 
an official answer can be made by the adversary every declaration 
of the statesmen in power is taken up for passionate and immoderate 
discussion by irresponsible persons, but the statesmen themselves are 
obsessed by a fear that they may unfavorably influence public opinion 
in their country and thereby compromise the chances of the war, and 
also of prematurely disclosing their true intentions. That is why 
they use thunderlike (the French text has 'donnantes' which is here 
meaningless; tonnantes, with the given meaning herewith was prob- 
ably the word sent and distorted in transmission) speech and persist 
in upholding unflinching points of view. If therefore it were intended 
to seek the basis for a compromise apt to make an end of the war 
whose prolongation would mean nothing but suicide, and to save 
Europe from that catastrophe resort should be hud in any event to 
some other method which would permit of continuous and direct con- 
verse between the representatives of the governments and between 
them only. Such an exchange of views would take in the conflicting 
views of the several belligerent states to the same extent as the gen- 
eral principles on which to build up peace and the relations between 
states, and might first lead to an understanding as to those principles. 
The fundamental principles once agreed upon, an effort should be 
made in the course of the informal negotiations to apply them con- 
cretely to the several peace questions and thereby bring about their 
solution. We indulge the hope that none of the belligerents will 
object to this proposed exchange of views. There would be no inter- 
ruption of military operations. The conversation would go no further 
than deemed useful by the participants ; the parties concerned could 
be put to no disadvantage thereby. The exchange of views, far from 
doing any harm, could be but beneficial to the cause of peace; what 
might fail at the first attempt could be tried over again ; something 
will at least have been done toward elucidating the problems. How 
many are the deep-rooted misunderstandings that might be dispelled! 
How many the new ideas that would break their way out! Humane 
sentiments so long pent up could burst forth from all hearts, creating 



34 Lex Talionis 

The reply of the Government of the United States 
dated September 17, declined to entertain the Austro- 
Hungarian proposals. 11 

The last public utterance which forms a part of the 
terms of peace finally agreed upon with Germany was 
President Wilson's speech of September 27, opening 
the Liberty Loan drive, giving further definition to 
the issues which must be squarely met before the war is 
ended. 12 

a warmer atmosphere while safeguarding every essential point and 
dispel many a discussion which at this time seems important. We 
are convinced that it is the duty of all belligerents to mankind to 
take up together the questions whether there is no way, after so many 
years of a struggle which, notwithstanding all the sacrifices it has 
cost, is still undecided and the whole course of which seems to demand 
a compromise, of bringing this awful war to an end. The imperial 
and royal government therefore comes again to the governments of 
all the belligerent states with a proposal shortly to send to a neutral 
country, upon a previous agreement as to the date and place, delegates 
who would broach a confidential nonbinding conversation over the 
fundamental principles of a peace that could be concluded. The 
delegates would be commissioned to communicate to one another the 
views of their respective governments on the aforesaid principles and 
very freely and frankly interchange information on every point for 
which provision should be made." — (World Almanac, 1919.) 

"The Government of the United States feels that there is only one 
reply which it can make to the suggestion of the imperial Austro- 
Hungarian government. It has repeatedly, and with entire candor, 
stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace 
and can and will entertain no proposal for a conference upon a matter 
concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain. 

ia The substance of the speech of September 27 is as follows: 
"We will accept no outcome of the war which does not squarely 
meet and settle the following issues: 

"Shall the military power of any nation or group be suffered to 



The American Peace 35 

About one week later, direct negotiations, initiated 
by wireless proposals from the German Chancellor for 
an armistice began, and were continued until November 
5 when agreement was reached. Their contents are 
set forth in the following chapter. 

determine the fortunes of peoples over whom they have no right to 
rule except the right of force? 

"Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make 
them subject to their purpose and interest? 

"Shall peoples be ruled and dominated, even in their internal 
affairs, by arbitrary and irresponsible force, or by their own will 
and choice? 

"Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all 
peoples and nations, or shall the strong do as they will and the weak 
suffer without redress? 

"Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance, 
or shall there be a common court to oblige the observation of common 
rights? 

"No peace shall be obtained by any kind of compromise or abate- 
ment of these principles. All who sit down at the peace table shall 
come ready and willing to pay the price — impartial justice in every 
item of the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed." 

Five principles follow: 

1. The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimina- 
tion between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom 
we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites 
and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples 
concerned. 

2. No special or separate interest of any single nation, or any 
group of nations, can be made the basis of any part of the settlement 
which is not consistent with the common interest of all. 

3. There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants or 
understandings within the general or common family of the league 
of nations. 

4. There can be no special selfish economic combinations within 
the league, and no employment of any form of economic boycott or 
exclusion, except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from 



36 Lex Talionis 

the markets of the world may be vested in the league of nations 
itself as a means of discipline and control. 

5. All international agreements and treaties of every kind must 
be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world. 

It is further stated that the United States will enter into no special 
arrangements or understandings with particular nations. 



CHAPTER II. 

The Peace Agreement. 

THE general cause of the Central Empires was 
lost when, simultaneously with the victorious north- 
ward sweep of Allenby through Syria, the Army of 
the Orient threw the reconstituted Servian forces, sup- 
ported by British, French and Greek troops, against 
the Bulgarian line on September 15, 191 8, and won a 
complete and decisive victory. 

This victory compelled an armistice on September 
29, under the terms of which Bulgaria evacuated all 
the territories she had taken from Greece and Servia, 
and placed her railroads leading into Central Europe 
at the disposal of the Entente forces. 

On this date the Turkish menace in the rear of the 
Army of the Orient was fast crumbling. Allenby's 
army, with light cavalry drawn from Turkey's dis- 
affected Saracenic provinces forming its right wing, 
advancing northward from Jerusalem, isolated and 
captured a Turkish army of 40,000 men on September 
20. Thereafter the Turkish forces on both sides of 
the Jordan gave way and began to surrender in groups. 
Damascus was taken on October 1st, Aleppo on Octo- 
ber 26, and Turkey signed an armistice on October 31. 
In Mesopotamia the advance of the British force under 
Townsend had hastened the Turkish surrender. 



38 Lex Talionis 

After Allenby's victory on September 20, the Army 
of the Orient no longer feared the Turkish menace on 
its flank, and was therefore free to follow up the 
advantage it had gained to the north. 

The southern frontiers of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy were now threatened. The internal dis- 
affection of the Czechs, Slavs and Croats was getting 
out of hand. 13 

On October first, therefore, Berlin was aware of 
the collapse of the Bulgarian front, of Allenby's vic- 
tories in Syria, and of the political dissolution in Aus- 
tria-Hungary. 

These reverses in a distant terrain had no immediate 
strategic effect upon the military situation on the west- 
ern front. There the slow German retreat from the 
heart of France was being conducted in good order. 
It was no different in its character from similar move- 
ments which from time to time during the war had 
been conducted by both sides, in which an offensive on 
an over-extended front could no longer be maintained. 

The reverses of Germany's allies did, however, have 
a direct bearing on political policy in Berlin. The 
great objects of the war were seen to be definitely lost. 
It remained only to make the best terms possible for 
Germany while a vigorous military defensive was being 
maintained. 

"After recognition of the belligerency of the Czechs by the United 
States on September 15, Prague, Laibach and Agram became centers 
of open revolution. President Wilson declined to grant an armistice 
until the independence of these nationalities was recognized. The 
Austrian front collapsed on October 24 and the overwhelming Italian 
victory of Vittorio Veneto completed the overthrow of the Empire. 



The Peace Agreement 39 

Hence, after conferences between the civil heads of 
state, leaders of the Great General Staff, and repre- 
sentatives of the majority parties in the Reichstag, 
Prince Maximilian of Baden on October 2 succeeded 
von Hertling as Chancellor, and on October 4, in a 
note which was transmitted to President Wilson by 
wireless, offered to make peace on the basis of Presi- 
dent Wilson's address of January 8, 19 18, and his 
later pronouncements, and to conclude an armistice. 14 

The President replied on October 8, 15 and direct 

14 "The German Government requests the President of the United 
States of America to take a hand in the restoration of peace, acquaint 
all belligerent states with this request, and invite them to send pleni- 
potentiaries for the purpose of opening negotiations. 

"It accepts the program set forth by the President of the United 
States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his 
later pronouncements, especially his speech of September 27, as a 
basis for peace negotiations. 

"With a view to avoiding further bloodshed the German Govern- 
ment requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land, on 
water, and in the air." 

1B "Before making reply to the request of the Imperial German Gov- 
ernment, and in order that the reply shall be as candid and straight- 
forward as the momentous interests involved require, the President 
of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact 
meaning of the note of the Imperial Chancellor. Does the Imperial 
Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the 
terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of 
the United States in January last and in subsequent addresses, and 
that its object in entering into discussion would be only to agree 
upon the practical details of their application? 

"The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestion 
of an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a 
cessation of arms to the governments with which the Government of 
the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as 
the armies of those powers are upon their soil. The good faith of 



40 Lex Talionis 

negotiations by wireless continued until November 5, 
when agreement was reached. 

The President's reply of October 8 was framed to 
elicit a categorical acceptance of the terms laid down 
in his speeches, so that discussions would only involve 
the practical details of their application. The offer of 
an armistice was declined so long as the armies of the 
Central Powers were on the soil of the associated gov- 
ernments. The consent of the Central Empires imme- 
diately to withdraw their forces everywhere from in- 
vaded territory was suggested as a condition upon 
which the good faith of any discussion would mani- 
festly depend. Thirdly, the President asked whether 
the Imperial Chancellor was speaking merely for the 
constituted authorities of the Empire who had so far 
conducted the war, and stated that he deemed the 
answers to those questions vital from every point of 
view. 

The German reply of October 12 was an unqualified 
acceptance of the President's proposals. It stated that 
the present German Government had been formed by 
conferences and in agreement with the great majority 
of the Reichstag and spoke in the name of the German 
people. The meeting of a mixed commission for mak- 
ing the necessary arrangements concerning the evacua- 
tion was suggested. 16 

any discussion would manifestly depend upon the consent of the 
Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from 
invaded territory. The President also feels that he is justified in 
asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the 
constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the 
war. He deems the answer to these questions vital from every point 
of view." 



The Peace Agreement 41 

At this point it is advisable to view these interchanges 
in connection with the strategic situation on the western 
front. The inference to be plainly drawn from the 
President's note was that peace might be made upon 
the terms which he had already formulated. The 
German statesmen desired such a peace, and therefore 
addressed their efforts toward the conclusion of an 
armistice upon that basis. The first step in the proceed- 
ings was indicated by President Wilson to be the evacua- 
tion of allied territory. 

After October 8, therefore, the strategic purposes 
of the great general staff were different from its pur- 
poses preceding that date. If, as seems probable, its 
earlier purpose had been to make a stand somewhere 
in the rear, in prepared trenches, that purpose was 

10 "The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by 
President Wilson in his address of January 8 and in his subsequent 
addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace of justice. Con- 
sequently its object in entering into discussions would be only to 
agree upon practical details of the application of these terms. The 
German Government believes that the Governments of the powers 
associated with the Government of the United States also take the 
position taken by President Wilson in his address. The German 
Government, in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian Government, 
for the purpose of bringing about an armistice, declares itself ready 
to comply with the propositions of the President in regard to evacua- 
tion. The German Government suggests that the President may oc- 
casion the meeting of a mixed commission for making the necessary 
arrangements concerning the evacuation. The present German Gov- 
ernment, which has undertaken the responsibility for this step toward 
peace, has been formed by conferences and in agreement with the 
great majority of the Reichstag. The Chancellor, supported in all 
his actions by the will of the majority, speaks in the name of the 
German Government and of the German people."— (World Alma- 
nac, 1919.) 



42 Lex Talionis 

changed after October 8, in response to directions from 
Berlin, which had now entered into an understanding 
with the associated governments to withdraw at once 
from occupied territory as a preliminary condition of 
agreement. The retreat was now being made for 
reasons which were not solely military. Military his- 
torians of the future would be led into error if this 
political fact and factor were ignored in their studies 
of conditions on the western front in October. 

The President replied without delay to the German 
note of the 12th, dispatching his answer October 14. 
He made it clear that the process of evacuation and 
the conditions of an armistice must be left to the judg- 
ment and advice of the military advisers of the Gov- 
ernment of the United States and the Allied Govern- 
ments, and that no arrangement could be accepted which 
did not safeguard and guarantee the maintenance of 
the present military supremacy of the armies of the 
United States and of the allies in the field. The cessa- 
tion of illegal and inhuman practices was another con- 
dition laid down. Then came a plain and unmistakable 
demand for the overthrow, before the negotiations for 
the armistice were closed, of the Kaiser and the House 
of Hohenzollern. It was as follows; 

"It is necessary also in order that there may be no possibility 
of misunderstanding that the President should very solemnly 
call the attention of the Government of Germany to the language 
and plain intent of one of the terms of peace which the German 
Government has now accepted. It is contained in the address 
of the President delivered at Mount Vernon on the Fourth of 
July last. It is as follows; 'The destruction of every arbitrary 



The Peace Agreement 43 

power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single 
choice disturb the peace of the world ; or, if it cannot be 
presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotency. 
The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation 
is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the 
German nation to alter it. The President's words just quoted 
naturally constitute a condition precedent to peace, if peace is 
to come by the action of the German people themselves. The 
President feels bound to say that the whole process of peace 
will in his judgment depend on the definiteness and the satis- 
factory character of the guarantees which can be given in this 
fundamental matter. It is indispensable that the Governments 
associated against Germany should know beyond a peradventure 
with whom they are dealing." 17 

17 "The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government 
and by a large majority of the Reichstag of the terms laid down by 
the President of the United States of America in his address to the 
Congress of the United States on the 8th of January, 1918, and in his 
subsequent addresses justifies the President in making a frank and 
direct statement of his decision with regard to the communications of 
the German Government of the 8th and 12th of October, 1918. 

It must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and 
the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to 
the judgment and advice of the military advisors of the government 
of the United States and the allied governments, and the President 
feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the 
government of the United States which does not provide absolutely 
satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the 
present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of 
the allies in the fields. 

He feels confident that he can safely assume that this will also 
be the judgment and decision of the allied governments. 

The President feels that it is also his duty to add that neither 
the government of the United States nor, he is quite sure, the govern- 
ments with which the government of the United States is associated 
as belligerent will consent to consider an armistice so long as the 



44 Lex Talionis 

armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhumane practices 
which they still persist in. 

At the very time that the German government approaches the 
government of the United States with proposals of peace its sub- 
marines are engaged in sinking passenger ships at sea, and not 
the ships alone but the very boats in which their passengers and 
crews seek to make their way to safety; and in their present en- 
forced withdrawal from Flanders and France the German armies 
are pursuing a course of wanton destruction which has always 
been regarded as in direct violation of the rules and practices of 
civilized warfare. Cities and villages, if not destroyed, are be- 
ing stripped not only of all they contain, but often of their very 
inhabitants. 

The nations associated against Germany cannot be expected to 
agree to a cessation of arms while acts of inhumanity, spoliation and 
desolation are being continued which they justly look upon with 
horror and with burning hearts. 

It is necessary, also, in order that there may be no possibility 
of misunderstanding, that the President should very solemnly call 
the attention of the government of Germany to the language and 
plain intent of one of the terms of peace which the German govern- 
ment has now accepted. It is contained in the address of the President 
delivered at Mount Vernon on the Fourth of July last. 

It is as follows: "The destruction of every arbitrary power 
anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice dis- 
turb the peace of the world ; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at 
least its reduction to virtual impotency." 

The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is 
of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German 
nation to alter it. The President's words just quoted naturally 
constitute a condition precedent to peace, if peace is to come 
by the action of the German people themselves. The President 
feels bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judg- 
ment, depend upon the definiteness and the satisfactory character 
of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental mat- 
ter. It is indispensable that the governments associated against 
Germany should know beyond a peradventure with whom they are 
dealing. 

The President will make a separate reply to the royal and im- 
perial government of Austria-Hungary." 



The Peace Agreement 45 

The German reply of October 20 18 agrees that the 
process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice 
shall be left to the military advisors, and assumes that 
the actual standard of power on both sides in the field 
shall form the basis for arrangements safeguarding 
and guaranteeing that standard. The trust is expressed 
that the President will approve of no demand which 
would be irreconcilable with the honor of the German 

16 "In accepting the proposal for an evacuation of occupied territories 
the German Government has started from the assumption that the 
procedure of this evacuation and of the conditions of an armistice 
should be left to the judgment of the military advisers, and that the 
actual standard of power on both sides in the field has to form the 
basis for arrangements safeguarding and guaranteeing this standard. 
The German Government suggests to the President that an opportunity 
should be brought about for fixing the details. It trusts that the 
President of the United States will approve of no demand which 
would be irreconcilable with the honor of the German people and 
with opening a way to a peace of justice. 

"The German Government protests against the reproach of illegal 
and inhumane actions made against the German land and sea forces 
and thereby against the German people. For the covering of a 
retreat destructions will always be necessary, and they are 
carried out in so far as is permitted by international law. The 
German troops are under the most strict instruction to spare private 
property and to exercise care for the population to the best of their 
ability. Where transgressions occur in spite of these instructions 
the guilty are being punished. The German Government further 
denies that the German Navy in sinking ships has ever purposely 
destroyed lifeboats with their passengers. The German Government 
proposes with regard to all those charges that the facts be cleared 
up by neutral commissions. 

"In order to avoid anything that might hamper the work of peace, 
the German Government has caused orders to be despatched to all 
submarine commanders precluding the torpedoing of passenger ships, 
without, however, for technical reasons, being able to guarantee that 



46 Lex Talionis 

people and with opening a way to a peace of justice. 
After enumerating fundamental constitutional changes 
which had just been effected, the note concluded: 

"The question of the President — with whom he and the 
Governments associated against Germany are dealing — is there- 
fore answered in a clear unequivocal manner by the statement 
that the offer of peace and an armistice has come from a gov- 
ernment which is free from any arbitrary and irresponsible in- 

these orders will reach every single submarine at sea before its re- 
turn. As a fundamental condition for peace the President prescribes 
the destruction of every arbitrary power that can separately, secretly 
and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world. To this the 
German Government replies: Hitherto the representation of the people 
in the German Empire has not been endowed with an influence on the 
formation of the Government. The Constitution did not provide for 
a concurrence of representation of the people in decisions of peace and 
war. These conditions have just now undergone a fundamental 
change. A new Government has been formed in complete accordance 
with the wishes (principle) of the representation of the people, based 
on equal, universal, secret, direct franchise. 

"The leaders of the great parties of the Reichstag are members of 
this Government. In the future no Government can take or continue in 
office without possessing the confidence of a majority of the Reichstag. 
The responsibility of the Chancellor of the empire to the representa- 
tion of the people is being legally developed and safeguarded. The 
first act of the new Government has been to lay before the Reichstag 
a bill to alter the Constitution of the empire so that the consent of the 
representation of the people is required for decisions on war and 
peace. The permanence of the new system is, however, guaranteed 
not only by constitutional safeguards but also by the unshakable de- 
termination of the German people, whose vast majority stands behind 
these reforms and demands their energetic continuance. 

"The question of the President — with whom he and the Govern- 
ments associated against Germany are dealing — is therefore answered 
in a clear, unequivocal manner by the statement that the offer of 
peace and an armistice has come from a Government which is free 
from any arbitrary and irresponsible influence and is supported by 
the approval of an overwhelming majority of the German people." 

(World Almanac, 1919.) 



The Peace Agreement 47 

fluence and is supported by the approval of an overwhelming 
majority of the German people." 

The President replied on October 23 to the effect 
that having received assurances from the German Gov- 
ernment he felt that he could not decline to take up 
with the associated governments the question of an 
armistice ; that the armistice must leave the associated 
powers in a position to enforce any arrangements that 
might be entered into, and to make a renewal of hos- 
tilities on the part of Germany impossible ; that if such 
an armistice was suggested by the military advisors of 
the associated nations the acceptance of its terms by 
Germany would afford the best concrete evidence of her 
unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of 
peace from which the whole action proceeded. The 
President stated candidly that those extraordinary safe- 
guards were demanded because of the doubt that re- 
mained whether the arbitrary and untrustworthy autoc- 
racy had been curbed, or that the changes now partly 
agreed upon would be permanent; that even if the 
future wars had been brought under the control of 
the German people the present war had not been. He 
continued in words which began to take on the essence 
of finality: 

"It is evident that the German people have no means of 
commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of 
the Empire in the popular will; that the power of the King 
of Prussia to control the Empire is unimpaired ; that the deter- 
mining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto 
been the masters of Germany. 

"Feeling that the whole peace of the world depends now 



48 Lex Talionis 

upon plain speaking and straightforward action, the President 
deems it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften what 
may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not 
and cannot trust the word of those who havei hitherto been 
the masters of German policy, and to point out once more that 
in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries 
and injustices of this war, the Government of the United States 
cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German 
people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional stand- 
ing as the real rulers of Germany. 

"If it must deal with the military masters and monarchical 
autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with 
them later, in regard to the international obligations of the 
German Empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but 
surrender." 

This demand for the overthrow of autocracy, fore- 
shadowed in the President's reply to the Pope in 19 17, 
first clearly sounded after the arbitrary settlements of 
the Brest-Litovsk treaties were known, and afterwards 
solemnly proclaimed at Mount Vernon, had grown 
constantly more insistent and more explicit in the Presi- 
dent's successive definitions of war aims. In these 
October notes he is at grips with the principle, and the 
pressure grows progressively heavier and more relent- 
less. The words in this note take the quality of inexor- 
able fate and of doom: 

"The moving finger writes, and having writ moves on ; 

Nor all your piety nor wit 
Can lure it back to cancel half a line ; 

Nor all your tears wash out a word of it." 

To this communication the German Government re- 
plied on October 27 : 



The Peace Agreement 49 

"The German Government has taken cognizance of the 
answer of the President of the United States. The President 
is aware of the far-reaching changes that have been carried out 
and are being carried out in the German constitutional struc- 
ture, and that peace negotiations are being conducted by a 
people's government in whose hands rests, both actually and 
constitutionally, the power to make the deciding conclusions. 
The military powers are also subject to it. The German Gov- 
ernment now awaits proposals for an armistice which shall 
be the first step toward a just peace as the President has de- 
scribed it in his proclamation." 19 

These notes in their complete continuity, setting 
forth the proposed bases of peace, were immediately 
transmitted by the President to the Supreme War Coun- 
cil, and Germany was so notified in his note of October 
28. They were turned over by Clemenceau to Marshal 
Foch, who, on October 25, summoned Petain, Haig and 
Pershing to Senlis, read the correspondence to them 
and asked their advice. On the 26th Foch handed the 
military terms of the armistice to Clemenceau at the 
Trianon Palace Hotel, the meeting place of the Su- 
preme War Council in Versailles. 

The representatives of the Entente Governments 
immediately convened there to consider the terms laid 

"On October 28, Emperor William issued the following decree, en- 
dorsing the constitutional amendments promulgated by the Reichstag: 
"Prepared for by a series of government acts, a new order comes 
into force which transfers the fundamental rights of the Kaiser's per- 
son to the people. Thus comes to a close a period which stands in 
honor before the eyes of future generations. Despite all struggle be- 
tween invested authority and aspiring forces, it has rendered possible 
to our people that tremendous development which imperishably re- 
vealed itself in the wonderful achievements of this war." — (World 
Almanac 1919.) 



50 Lex Talionis 

before them and to come to a conclusion as to their 
acceptance or rejection; to decide whether an armistice 
should be granted and peace made upon the basis of- 
fered, or the offer of an armistice refused and sur- 
render demanded. They reached a conclusion on 
November 4, having occupied a period of nine days 
in deliberating upon the entire contract. 

On the part of Great Britain there were present in 
these meetings Mr. Balfour, Prime Minister Lloyd 
George, the Foreign Minister, the Secretary of State for 
War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the High Com- 
missioner to the United States, (Lord Reading), the 
Chief of the General Staff (Wilson), Field Marshal 
Haig, the First Sea Lord Admiral Wemyss, and Mr. 
Bonar Law. Foreign Minister Pichon, Clemenceau 
and most of the members of the French Government 
were present. 

Colonel House and General Bliss represented the 
United States, and with them were Mr. Joseph Grew, 
Mr. Gordon Auchincloss, and Admiral Benson. In all 
about twenty-four delegates actively participated. 

The conclusions reached on November 4 were em- 
bodied in the following statement: 

"The allied governments have given careful consideration 
to the correspondence which has passed between the President 
of the United States and the German Government. Subject to 
the qualifications which follow they declare their willingness 
to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms 
of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of 
January, 19 1 8, and the principles of settlement enunciated in 
his subsequent addresses. 



The Peace Agreement 51 

"They must point out, however, that clause 2, relating to 
what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open 
to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. 
They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom 
on this subject when they enter the peace conference. 

"Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address 
to Congress of January 8, 191 8, the President declared that 
invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and 
freed. The allies feel that no doubt ought to exist as to what 
this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation 
will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian 
population of the allies and their property by the aggression of 
Germany by land, by sea, and from the air." 

The American Government acquiesced in these 
amendments of the allies and they were communicated 
to the German Chancellor on November 5, with the 
information that Marshal Foch had been authorized 
to receive properly accredited representatives of the 
German Government and to communicate to them the 
terms of an armistice. 

The German Armistice Commission, headed by 
Mathias Erzberger, and including Count Oberndorft, 
left Berlin on November 6, crossed the front by the 
Chimay-LaChapelle-Guise road on November 7, and 
on the morning of the 8th were conducted to the head- 
quarters of Marshal Foch in his private car in the 
Forest of Compiegne. 

Here the armistice terms were handed them. The 
German delegates protested against the severity of the 
terms, and by agreement a messenger was sent to Spa 
for instructions. The messenger had some difficulty in 



52 Lex Talionis 

crossing the line, but before his return authorization 
received by wireless on the ioth directed acceptance of 
the armistice. 

Positive information of the abdication of the Kaiser 
was received at Marshal Foch's headquarters on No- 
vember 9th, while the armistice negotiations were pro- 
ceeding: on the ioth the Kaiser crossed the frontier 
and took political asylum in Holland. The paramount 
American war aim was thus met before the armistice 
was signed. 

Of the two clauses which the Supreme War Council 
appended to their acceptance of the American terms 
of peace, the first, concerning the freedom of the seas 
bore more directly upon relations to be settled among 
the associated governments than between them and 
Germany. The second, providing for compensation to 
be made by Germany for damage done to the civilian 
populations was declaratory of principles included in 
the Wilson proposals and was merely redundant. It 
accomplished perfectly what was at the time n the 
minds of the signers, complete definition of the extent 
of liability which Germany was to assume. It also 
fixed with equal precision and clearness a limit beyond 
which the imposition of indemnities could not go. It 
estopped the signers from putting forth any claim of 
right to other compensation, indemnities or punitive 
damages. What was afterwards described as a peace 
of victory could not now be made without repudiation 
of the signatures of the allied governments. 

When the Supreme War Council were deliberating 



The Peace Agreement 53 

upon this decision around the green table in the Trianon 
Palace Hotel they had before them these facts: 

All of Germany's allies had collapsed. The news of 
the armistice with Turkey had just reached them, that 
of the Austro-Hungarian defeat was fresh; the Bul- 
garian collapse was known. 

These facts would seem to have recommended to 
them the refusal of a compromise peace with Germany, 
and the prosecution of the war to a military victory and 
an unconditional surrender. 

On the other hand the allied offensive was being 
prosecuted at enormous cost of life and resources. The 
resistance was stubborn. The attrition on the reserves 
was great. 20 The service of supply was disordered. 
Communications were growing difficult. The German 
line was intact. The military advisers of the Supreme 
Allied Council recommended acceptance of the terms. 

The allied statesmen and the allied populations had 
emerged but three short months before from the deep- 
est depression of the war. The memory of the peril 
of the previous summer was still heavy. The popula- 
tions were weary to exhaustion of the struggle. Nerves 
were at the snapping point. Further hostilities and 
further hazards were unwelcome. 

There was another consideration which could not 
have been absent from the minds of some of the nego- 
tiators: Their own resources were completely ex- 
hausted; they were continu ing the struggle with money 

""October 13. The remembrance that Haig had put in his two last 
fresh dmslons on the eighth, forbids me to oppo 6 e the armistice." 
Lolonel Repington's diary. 



54 Lex Talionis 

borrowed from, and with supplies furnished by the 
United States, and would soon be hopelessly in debt 
to the western Republic. If the war continued many 
months longer not even the fruits to be gained from 
complete victory over Germany would enable them to 
cancel any but a small part of these obligations. 

Some of these considerations must have recom- 
mended to the allied statesmen the acceptance of the 
Wilson peace. 

The reaction in the Entente countries to the German 
Chancellor's proposal of October 4 for an armistice 
was unfavorable. The London Times on October 8 
said: 

"The French and American press are uncompromising in 
their opposition to seeking peace with Germany under present 
conditions. The American press declares that the only alter- 
native for the Central Powers is unconditional surrender or 
war to the limit. Allied opinion on the Continent is in full 
sympathy with this view." 

As the interchange of notes progressed, however, 
English comment became more favorable, and endorse- 
ment of the President's utterances was general. For 
a time the London Times seemed inclined to ascribe 
astute Machiavellian policies to Mr. Wilson. "The 
democratic fiction," and "Mr. Wilson's political offen- 
sive" were phrases which it used in discussing President 
Wilson's note to Austria. It explained his motives in 
communicating with Germany as follows : 

"It was felt that an announcement of war a l'outrance, such 
as had been made to Austria, or a demand for unconditional 
surrender such as had brought Bulgaria to heel, would pull 



The Peace Agreement 55 

the German nation and Government together and substitute a 
defensive morale for the previous lust for power and conquest. 
Hence the American answer of October 8 to Prince Maxi- 
milian's whine of October 5 with its apparent loop-hole for 
peace." 

Under a headline of October 15 "Democracy or 
Surrender", the Times said: 

"The President was playing a deliberate game with Germany, 
trying to lead her Government on to admit fear of defeat and 
her people to see that the most comfortable way of meeting 
defeat would be to help the allies to eliminate Prussianism." 

On October 16 the Times said: 

"Mr. Wilson's prompt and emphatic reply has been received 
with general satisfaction in political and diplomatic circles. 

"Opinion was less unanimous upon President Wilson's refer- 
ence to a radical change in the character of the government of 
Germany as 'one of the terms of peace which the German Gov- 
ernment has now accepted.' But in some competent quarters 
the view prevails that the President's position hardly differs 
from that taken up by Mr. Lloyd George when he declared 
that the allies would naturally deal with a repentent Germany 
in a different spirit from that which would inspire their treat- 
ment of an unrepentant Germany." 

The inclination noticeable at the beginning to ascribe 
astute and subtle motives to the President in his deal- 
ings with Germany quickly passed out of the editorial 
expressions in the European press, and every evidence 
indicates that the European Governments themselves 
regarded them as sincere utterances which meant exactly 
what they said. 

When the President submitted his correspondence 
with Germany to the Supreme War Council, the Ameri- 



$6 Lex Talionis 

can Government brought no pressure to bear upon that 
body either for acceptance or rejection of the armistice. 
They were fully aware, however, that the United 
States would not desert them if they determined to 
prosecute the war to a military conclusion. While the 
deliberations were in progress at the Trianon Palace 
Hotel the Washington correspondent of the London 
Times wrote : 

"American opinion is thoroughly satisfied that the center of 
gravity of war policy should be shifted to Versailles. It is 
prepared to accept whatever Versailles may decide." 

The armistice with Austria was signed on Novem- 
ber 5, after separate negotiations, and developments 
there are not a necessary part of the present discussion. 

There are certain observations which may now be 
made concerning the circumstances under which hostili- 
ties with Germany came to an end. 

An analysis of the October notes and the disavowal 
of any purpose of imposing a punitive peace in the 
clarifying provisions in the agreement of November 4 
at the Trianon Palace Hotel disclose an unmistakable 
intent on the part of all parties to close hostilities on 
the basis of the peace proposed by President Wilson. 

Other motives than those which actuated the delib- 
erations at Versailles, as we shall see, very quickly 
modified the councils of the European statesmen. The 
mental processes which began to actuate their conduct 
immediately after Germany's acceptance of the armis- 
tice varied widely from those which impelled them to 
their decisions while hostilities were still in progress. 

In fact, the signatures were no sooner dry upon the. 



The Peace Agreement 57 

pact entered into at the Trianon Palace Hotel, and 
the cessation of hostilities assured, than they prepared 
to repudiate its contents as soon as Germany was dis- 
armed. The true agreement was kept secret, and the 
public in each Entente country was given to under- 
stand that complete victory had been won and surrender 
compelled. So sedulously did the Entente Governments 
disseminate the belief in an overwhelming military vic- 
tory that the legend is generally current today that the 
war ended in an unconditional surrender on the part 
of Germany. 

But the facts do not support this thesis. 

General Pershing's report of operations appears to 
be based upon considerations of conditions in the field 
only. Its closing paragraphs tell of the flanking move- 
ment by the American troops which culminated on No- 
vember 5 in a threat to the main railway artery of 
German retreat, whereupon the Germans on November 
6 sued for an armistice. 

The strategic situation did not, in fact, compel the 
request for an armistice. The series of wireless inter- 
changes between Berlin and Washington, involving 
chiefly political demands, begun on October 5 and end- 
ing in agreement on November 5, brought the armistice 
about. It was initiated the next day. It might prob- 
ably be said with truth that if these wireless inter- 
changes had resulted in agreement on October 10, or 
15 or 20, the armistice would have followed them 
immediately. 

There was no military decision on the western front. 
There was no military surrender. The agreement that 



58 Lex Talionis 

ended hostilities called for a negotiated peace, and in 
terms waived demand for surrender (Wilson note of 
October 23). The German delegation that signed the 
armistice was headed by a civilian, Mathias Erzberger. 

The manner in which the war on the western front 
closed, therefore, contrasts strongly with its conclu- 
sion on the other fronts. The Bulgarian line of de- 
fense crumpled and melted away leaving the civilian 
populations in its rear unprotected; the Turkish arm- 
istice followed the rapid surrender to Allenby of one 
Turkish army after another; and the retreat of the 
Austro-Hungarian army before the Italians at Vittorio 
Veneto was a headlong flight after which its officers did 
not even attempt to reassemble its units. 

The German front on November 1 1 remained un- 
broken, the retreat had been orderly, the soldiers' 
morale remained intact. There was no decision in the 
field. If a political settlement had not been reached; 
if negotiations for peace had not profoundly influenced 
strategic policy; and if the conclusion of the war had 
been referred solely to a military decision, an armistice 
would not have been signed on November 11, nor is 
there valid evidence as to when it could have been 
forced by the necessity of military surrender. On the 
other hand, if we sweep away the propaganda which 
was subsequently put forth for the purpose of obscur- 
ing the closing scenes of the war, we find that there 
was no expectation in the mind of the Supreme War 
Council that the German line could be broken at an 
early date. 21 



The Peace Agreement 59 

The French press accounts of the last three days 
fighting are colored and exaggerated but, with all the 
will in the world, are unable to picture a scene of 
military rout. On November 9 Le Temps says; "On 
all fronts the Germans, conquered, fight while retreat- 
ing; in a word the Germans are conquered, definitely 
conquered. What matters the front still held by their 
soldiers ! It only remains for them to lay down (poser) 
their arms and to submit to the conditions that will be 
imposed upon them." "The pursuit continues on all 
fronts. The British armies throw back (refoulent) 
the enemy on Mons and Maubeuge. Ours throw them 
back (les rejettent) on Herson, Mezieres and Sedan. 
The Americans with the same vigor clear the Germans 

zl The strategic situation on October 8 was set forth by the War 
Correspondent of the London Times as follows: 

"In saying all this it is necessary once more to guard against mis- 
interpretation. The Germans are fighting now with the energy of 
desperation, and it must not be supposed that they will not be equally 
dangerous adversaries on the defensive as they were on the offensive. 

"The situation is exceedingly favorable to us, but it is not yet de- 
cided in our favor, and in rejecting the German peace offer we must 
not delude ourselves into thinking that the rest of the war will be all 
beer and skittles. 

"On the contrary there will be terrible fighting. Still, the fact 
that the Germans, who began the war, have now made peace a part 
of their war policy, should encourage us to make war a part of our 
peace policy." 

On the same day Mr. Winston Churchill, Minister of Munitions, 
speaking at Glasgow, urged continued effort on the part of the 
workers: 

"Having regard," he said, "to the time that must elapse before 
the winter weather comes in France and Flanders, I cannot feel 
that we have any right to count upon an immediate decision of a 
final character there. Whatever may be the course of the war in 



60 Lex Talionis 

from the two banks of the Meuse. The allied soldiers 
and ours do not encounter very great resistance." 

The British communiques are more restrained and 
nearer the point. On November 8 we find "battles 
somewhat violent, sharp fighting, stubborn resistance;" 
on November 9, "In the course of the afternoon the 
resistance of the enemy is sensibly increased and we 
have encountered considerable opposition of mitrail- 
leuse in certain sectors of the front; some prisoners and 
some cannon taken." On November 8 the Americans 
encounter "violent combats, obstinate resistance." 

The communiques of November 10, the last day 

1918, the year 1919 will see our foe unable to resist our legitimate 
and rightful claims." 

Colonel Repington also states that best informed authorities agreed 
that a military decision could not be expected before April, 1919. 

On November 5 the London Times said editorially: 

"It may be doubted whether even now the public generally realizes 
the extreme difficulty and obstinacy of the fighting. Far too much 
is being taken for granted here in these victories, and the severity 
of the strain on the endurance especially of the British armies, who 
have been in the hottest of the fighting since July 1916, has not been 
fully appreciated in this country. People have tended to think that 
because the Germans were retreating the battles have all been in 
the nature of rear-guard actions, and that their result was a foregone 
conclusion. That view is very unjust to the troops engaged and 
especially to the British army. 

"If the German army had been allowed to carry out its retreat 
'according to plan' the result would have been to place it in a stronger 
position than ever. Supposing that they had extricated themselves 
from France and Flanders without suffering heavy losses, that they 
had established themselves at their convenience on a shorter line 
along the Meuse, and that they had then launched their 'peace 
offensive' with resources undiminished and with all the prestige of 
an easy and scatheless retreat, the situation now both military and 
political might well have been one of intense difficulty." 



The Peace Agreement 6i 

upon which official reports of the fighting were issued, 
were of this tenor: "Pursuing the rear guards of the 
enemy which, at certain points, have put up strong 
resistance, notably in the center and right. Our troops 
have largely progressed in the course of the day on the 
entire front." (French communique.) On the British 
front; "Increased resistance." On the American front; 
"Local operations by First and Second Armies give 
considerable gain on a number of points between the 
Meuse and Moselle. In the Woevre, "Obstinate re- 
sistance of machine-guns and heavy artillery." 

In the face of the character of the official communi- 
ques the voluminous and reiterated claims subsequently 
made of overwhelming military victory on the western 
front, especially the assertion of a military surrender, 
become mere froth for public consumption. 

The German Kaiser did not flee ignominiously to 
save himself as did Darius at Arbela. The paramount 
American war aim and condition of an armistice was 
the Kaiser's abdication, and the establishment of a 
government responsive to the people (a condition 
precedent to the cessation of hostilities) . The German 
Imperial authorities voluntarily yielded power to rep- 
resentatives of the people, in order to meet the Amer- 
ican President's demand and thereby save the German 
state — in order to close the war on terms far more 
favorable to the future welfare of the German nation 
than could be hoped for if the war were to be prose- 
cuted to a military conclusion involving ultimate sur- 
render. 

Under the circumstances, motives of pure patriotism 



62 Lex Talionis 

would have recommended to the Kaiser acquiescence in 
the demand for his abdication. Wilhelm II may not in 
fact have been actuated by these motives, but the fact 
that he abdicated on November 9, and took political 
asylum in Holland on November 10, is not in itself 
evidence of cowardice or an unworthy course of con- 
duct. The Kaiser's person was never in danger of 
capture by the enemy. 

The change of government from autocracy to repub- 
lic in Germany was not a spontaneous development 
from internal political conditions. It was not forced 
by the popular will. It was effected by agreement of 
the leaders of all responsible parties to meet the con- 
dition precedent to an armistice made by President 
Wilson. The German revolution, so-called, did not 
precede, but followed the change in government. It 
consisted of violent efforts by a minority Bolshevist ele- 
ment to seize the instrumentalities of a government 
suddenly and extraordinarily changed as a result of 
pressure from without. Although favored by those 
conditions which the pressure of hunger throughout a 
population produces, it was unable to prevent the rapid 
organization of a stable democratic government and 
never succeeded in dominating the German working 
classes. 

The armistice instrument of November 1 1 con- 
tained 35 articles and was extremely severe in its pro- 
visions. The German delegates bitterly protested 
against some of its terms as going beyond the scope 
of measures necessary to insure disarmament, and the 
German Chancellor immediately addressed a communi- 



The Peace Agreement 63 

cation to the American Secretary of State urging that 
President Wilson intervene to mitigate the fearful con- 
ditions which would supervene under it in Germany. 

A note to the American State Department had 
already been dispatched by the German Government, 
representing the urgent need for systematic food relief 
in Germany, which was replied to by the American Gov- 
ernment on November 12. The American reply is set 
forth in the following chapter. This note was the only 
direct official communication that passed between the 
two governments for seven months, or until the occasion 
of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in June, 19 19, 
except that which immediately followed to Foreign 
Minister Erzberger on the subject of the armistice. 
The note of the State Department declined Erzberger's 
plea for intervention to mitigate the severity of the 
armistice terms, refusing to receive any communica- 
tions which were not addressed to all the associated 
governments. The channel of communication with the 
associated governments was to be exclusively through 
the Armistice Commission. 

The action of the American State Department in 
refusing to hold separate communications with the 
German Government was based upon the continuing 
necessity for unity of action on the part of the asso- 
ciated governments, and especially upon the need of 
supporting the Armistice Commission during the im- 
mediately succeeding weeks in its work of guaranteeing 
the effectual disarmament of Germany in a military 
sense. A divergence in attitude or purpose between 
the United States on the one hand and the Entente 



64 Lex Talionis 

Governments on the other would be dangerous, and 
the appearance of it was especially to be avoided in the 
early days of the armistice status. 

On the other hand, inasmuch as the United States 
Government had been the spokesman for the Entente 
Governments in the negotiations which led to the 
cessation of hostilities, and for nearly a year in the 
framing of peace issues, it was natural that the German 
Government should look to the American Government 
for indications of the line of action which the making 
of the peace would take. 

Having adopted the Armistice Commission as the 
only channel through which it would permit Germany 
to send its communications, the United States Govern- 
ment, if it proposed to take the lead in the common 
policy which the associated governments were to fol- 
low, must establish for itself a dominating influence in 
the deliberations of the Supreme War Council, to which 
body alone the Armistice Commission was amenable 
and to whose directions alone it owed obedience. 

To recapitulate: 

The peace negotiations begun in October, accepted 
by the Allies at the Trianon Hotel on November 4. 
and by Germany on November 5, were a complete 
agreement between the civil heads of state, settling defi- 
nite bases of peace; and when the minds of the negotia- 
tors had met hostilities in the field were ordered stopped 
by mutual agreement by civilian intervention before a 
military decision was reached. 

For the allies to continue the war meant many 
months of frightful slaughter and hopeless national 



The Peace Agreement 65 

bankruptcy. It is only stating the inexorable logic of 
the situation to say that the compromise peace agreed 
to at the Trianon Palace Hotel was the price which 
the allies were willing to pay for the early cessation of 
hostilities. At that time none of the consequences to 
a defeated power which follow unconditional surrender 
in the field could be contemplated by an honest observer 
as applicable. 

The entire peace negotiations with Germany have 
been here set forth. Briefly stated the agreement, 
which we may call the American Peace, was as follows : 

1. Terms to be carried out before the armistice. 

a. Abdication of the Kaiser and his House. 

b. Relinquishment of vested power to the people. 

2. Alsace-Lorraine to be ceded to France. 

3. Lands indisputably Polish to be ceded to Poland; 
Poland to have outlet at Danzig. 

4. German colonies to be considered in general settlement ap- 
plicable to all colonial possessions. 

5. Compensation to civilians injured by aggressions by Germany 
by sea, land and air ; no punitive damages. 

6. A peace settlement by negotiation. 

7. A league of democratic nations including Germany. 



CHAPTER III. 

The Entente Peace. 

IN America the war momentum ended with the arm- 
istice. War stimuli ceased to operate. Everyone 
sought to adjust himself again to the half-forgotten 
habits of the pre-war days. President Wilson at once 
became the central figure on the international stage. 
In Europe and America he was expected to give direc- 
tion to the war settlement. 

But in the Congressional election just held he had 
failed to receive the support of the electorate, and a 
Republican majority had been returned to Congress. 

It is difficult to analyse the reasons which actuated 
the casting of the vote. Internal politics were much 
involved. Organized labor had become very powerful 
under the Wilson regime, and radical doctrines had 
been allowed much latitude of expression. 

As to the Administration's conduct of the war, the 
President had formulated new war aims after the 
United States became a belligerent. That the casus 
belli had arisen under the principle of the freedom of 
the seas was almost forgotten. The new war aims 
seemed to involve the United States in a policy which 
undertook to extend the principles of democratic gov- 
ernment as understood in America to governments in 
the Eastern Hemisphere. It brought the traditional 
policy of isolation into question. 

Confronted with so many novel issues, the conserva- 



The Entente Peace 67 

tlve instincts of the people were aroused and trans- 
lated themselves into action at the polls. 

On November 1 1 the President addressed Congress 
in person, and communicated to it the terms of the 
armistice instrument. He did not make the wireless 
notes of October and November a part of his com- 
munication, which would more fully have enlightened 
the Congress and the people as to the character of the 
peace settlement. 

It does not seem probable that this omission was 
the result of any deliberate purpose or policy held at 
that time. The notes had been published, and if any- 
one chose to assemble them the character of the peace 
could be determined from them. 

Upon receipt at the White House of the cabled 
message announcing the armistice and setting forth its 
terms, the President hastened to prepare a speech be- 
fore a joint session, and to communicate the informa- 
tion to Congress at the earliest possible moment. In 
its hasty preparation the importance of again directing 
attention to the entire correspondence was overlooked. 

It was, however, an omission which resulted in ob- 
scuring the judgment of American public opinion, which 
was sure to have far-reaching consequences, and which 
enhanced enormously the difficulties which President 
Wilson was to encounter later. 

Quite plainly the absence in his address of any refer- 
ence to the Trianon Hotel settlement was not the result 
of a motive similar to that of the European chanceller- 
ies, who deliberately intended to mislead the public in 
order to secure their support for a peace of vengeance. 



68 Lex Talionis 

The fact that Mr. Wilson in his address announced a 
purpose of granting immediate and extensive food 
relief, and of assistance to the German people in their 
efforts towards reconstruction, is sufficient evidence that 
on November 12 he had no desire to conceal from the 
American people the character of the real peace settle- 
ment. 

In his address the President announced the ending 
of the war, and the triumphant overthrow of the prin- 
ciple of autocracy. This great thing having been ac- 
complished, he made it plain that a policy of good- 
will and aid to the German people under their new 
democratic regime would follow if they would accept 
the aid. 

The first manifestation of this friendly attitude, he 
explained, was a comprehensive plan for food relief, 
in which the allied governments had signified their pur- 
pose to join, to be carried out in the same systematic 
manner in which the relief of Belgium had been organ- 
ized. 

The concluding paragraphs of this address were as 
follows : 

"The humane temper and intentions of the victorious gov- 
ernments have already been manifested in a very practical 
way. Their representatives in the Supreme Council at Ver- 
sailles have by unanimous resolution assured the people of the 
Central Empires that everything that is possible in the circum- 
stances will be done to supply them with food and relieve the 
distressing want that is, in so many places, threatening their 
very lives; and steps are to be taken immediately to organize 
these efforts at relief in the same systematic manner that they 
were organized in the case of Belgium. 



The Entente Peace 69 

"By the use of the idle tonnage of the Central Empires, it 
ought presently to be possible to lift the fear of utter misery 
from their oppressed populations, and to set their minds and 
energies free for the great and hazardous tasks of political recon- 
struction which now face them on every hand. 

"Hunger does not breed reforms; it breeds madness and all 
the ugly distempers that make an ordered life impossible. 

"They are now face to face with their initial test. We must 
hold the light steady until they find themselves. 

"And in the meantime, if it is possible, we must establish a 
peace that will justly define their place among the nations, 
remove all fear of their neighbors, and of their former masters, 
and enable them to live in security and contentment when they 
have set their own affairs in order. 

"I for one do not doubt their purpose or capacity. There 
are some happy signs that they know and will choose the way 
of self-control and peaceful accommodation. If they do, we 
shall put our aid at their disposal in every way we can. If they 
do not, we must await with patience and sympathy the awaken- 
ing and recovery that will surely come at last." 

The note to the German Government of November 
12, to which reference has been made in the preceding 
chapter, and after the dispatch of which communica- 
tion with the German Government was abruptly stopped 
by the State Department's notification to Erzberger 
that further communications must be had with the asso- 
ciated governments through the Armistice Commission, 
was as follows : 

Department of State, Washington, 

November 12, 1918. 
Sir: 

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of 
today transmitting to the President the text of a cable inquir- 



yo Lex Talionis 

ing whether this government is ready to send foodstuffs into 
Germany without delay, if public order is maintained in Ger- 
many and an equitable distribution of food is guaranteed. 

I should be grateful if you would transmit the following 
reply to the German Government. 

At a joint session of the two Houses of Congress on November 
II, the President of the United States announced that the 
representatives of the Associated Governments in the Supreme 
War Council at Versailles have by unanimous resolution as- 
sured the peoples of the Central Empires that everything that 
is possible in the circumstances will be done to supply them 
with food, and relieve the distressing want that is" in so many 
places threatening their very lives, and that steps are to be 
taken immediately to organize these efforts at relief in the 
same systematic manner that they were organized in the case of 
Belgium. 

Furthermore, the President expressed the opinion that by 
the use of the idle tonnage of the Central Empires it might 
presently be possible to lift the fear of utter misery from their 
oppressed populations, and set their minds and energies free for 
the great and hazardous tasks of political reconstruction which 
now face them on every hand. 

Accordingly the President now directs me to state that he 
is ready to consider favorably the supplying of foodstuffs to 
Germany and to take up the matter immediately with the 
allied governments, provided he can be assured that public 
order is being and will continue to be maintained in Germany, 
and that an equitable distribution of food can be clearly guar- 
anteed. 

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my highest considera- 

Robert Lansing. 
Mr. Hans Sulzer, Minister of Switzerland, 

In charge of German Interests in the United States. 



The Entente Peace 71 

On November 29 an announcement from the White 
House named as delegates to the Peace Conference 
the President, himself, the Secretary of State Mr. Lans- 
ing, the Honorable Henry White, Mr. Edward M. 
House, and General Tasker H. Bliss. I do not know 
when the President took the determination to be pres- 
ent at the Peace Conference in Paris, but the decision 
was probably reached shortly after the dispatch of the 
note to Erzberger cutting off direct communication be- 
tween the State Department and the German Govern- 
ment. Thereafter the President would have to dele- 
gate his entire peace-making authority to his plenipoten- 
tiaries in Paris or else be present in person to participate 
in the settlement. 

^ The President again addressed a joint session of 
Congress on December 2, and communicated to it his 
intention of going to Paris for the purpose of discuss- 
ing the main features of the treaty of peace. "The con- 
clusion," he said, "that it was my paramount duty to 
go has been forced upon me by considerations which, 
I hope, will seem as conclusive to you as they have to 
me. The allied governments have accepted the bases 
of peace which I outlined to Congress on the 8th of 
January last, 22 as the Central Empires also have, and 
very reasonably desire my personal counsel in their in- 
terpretation and application, and it is highly desirable 
that I should give it in order that the sincere desire of 
our government to contribute, without selfish purpose 

""I owe it to them (our soldiers) to see to it, so far as in me lies, 
that no false or mistaken interpretation be put upon them, and no 
possible effort omitted to realize them." 



72 Lex Talionis 

of any kind, to settlements that will be of common 
benefit to all the nations concerned, may be made fully 
manifest." 

The President sailed from New York on December 
4 on the George Washington. 

During the period when President Wilson was still 
in Washington (November n to December 4) there 
was not a day, as subsequent developments show, when 
vigilant observation of political developments in 
Europe was not necessary, and when the most accurate 
conclusions upon the political movements and the 
psychologic, economic and financial tendencies there 
should not have been at his disposal. 

This was not properly appreciated by constituted 
government agencies on this side of the ocean. Intel- 
lectual tension everywhere had been relaxed, and these 
agencies which never had, in fact, been organized for 
such a purpose, remained blind to developments in 
Europe of most profound significance. 

While on the high seas, from December 4 to De- 
cember 13, the President, in spite of wireless communi- 
cation, which was chiefly with the United States, was 
for all practical purposes isolated from the world. 

During the entire period from November 1 1 to De- 
cember 14 the sole source of confidential information 
of conditions in Europe which could come with any 
force to the President was Colonel House, his personal 
adviser, and General Bliss, his military adviser. The 
embassies in the Entente countries performed their 
duties in a perfunctory and routine manner, as all im- 
portant negotiations were in the hands of the Presi- 



The Entente Peace 73 

dent's personal advisers. The character of the peace 
to which the President was committed was only half 
disclosed to the embassies, and they were not, there- 
fore, carefully watching the attitude of the European 
ministries with reference to it. 

The President's personal advisers presumably pos- 
sessed copies of the October-November interchanges 
with the German Government, of his address to Con- 
gress of November 1 1, of his note to the German Gov- 
ernment through the Swiss Charge on November 12; 
they were aware of the character of the peace agree- 
ment as consummated, and of the President's concep- 
tion of its meaning. It was primarily their duty in 
Europe to interpret President Wilson's views without 
abatement of their significance, no matter if they 
encountered distinct divergence of opinion in the minds 
of the Europeans, 

It was also their function to advise the President of 
any divergence which appeared to be of a serious char- 
acter; and above all, if such divergence of view led, 
before the President's arrival, to political or other 
action inconsistent with the Wilson purposes, to inter- 
pose their protest, in order that the President after- 
wards might not be confronted with a series of faits- 
accomplis. 

No more solemn,' vigil ever fell to the lot of men 
than to these agents in the thirty-three days following 
the armistice ; and a function which would tax the high- 
est and most complex faculties of which the human 
mind is capable devolved upon them. Consummate 
wisdom, moral courage and personal force were de- 



74 Lex Talionis 

manded. This vigil may have been maintained, and 
this function performed; in that case responsibility for 
consequences was not with them, but with the President. 

They had permitted very drastic armistice terms to 
be imposed — terms which strained the spirit of the 
peace agreement. These terms, however, when car- 
ried out, secured the first essential — they made it impos- 
sible for Germany to renew hostilities, and did not in 
themselves preclude a final settlement in accordance 
with the Wilson agreement. They did, however, form 
an ideal basis for a peace of vengeance. 

It is necessary now to scrutinize the situation in 
Europe, to observe the conduct and policies of the 
Entente statesmen, and to trace the significant develop- 
ments from the day of the armistice until December 14, 
the day of Mr. Wilson's arrival at Paris when it would 
become possible for him to exert his personal influence 
upon the forces at work there. 

The business of first importance after November 1 1 
was the task of the military men in bringing about the 
disarmament of Germany within thirty days. This was 
in the hands of the permanent Armistice Commission, 
presided over by Marshal Foch, which was created by 
the armistice instrument of November 11. It took up 
its headquarters at Spa, and proceeded with military 
thoroughness and dispatch. A reading of the thirty- 
five articles of the armistice instrument will give some 
conception of the magnitude of its functions. Besides 
effectually removing all military equipment, it took 
enormous quantities of other property. It denuded the 



The Entente Peace 75 

German railways of their rolling stock and thereby 
brought normal communication almost to a standstill. 

So energetically was the work performed that by De- 
cember 10, the primary function for which the Armis- 
tice Commission was created had been performed. Ger- 
many was divested of weapons and military supplies of 
all kinds, a million allied soldiers lay along the Rhine 
and held the bridges, and Marshal Foch, himself, an- 
nounced on that date that it was now impossible for 
Germany to renew hostilities. 

The legal character and scope of the Armistice Com- 
mission were easily understood. They were fixed by 
the clauses in President Wilson's October notes relating 
to terms of armistice. The meeting of the minds of 
the parties on November 5 established a contractual 
relation, of which the scope of the Armistice Commis- 
sion was a part. 

The function of the Armistice Commission was to 
see to it that German disarmament was carried out to 
a point where the renewal of hostilities would be im- 
possible, leaving the associated governments in a po- 
sition to enforce the terms of peace already agreed 
upon. It would properly continue to function until a 
preliminary treaty of peace was signed, which treaty 
by new provisions would provide for any military sanc- 
tions which might be deemed necessary. This was its 
sole function. 

It had no legal authority to negotiate, nor had the 
Supreme War Council authority to confer power of 
negotiation upon it, being bound by its agreement with 



j6 Lex Talionis 

the German Government to make a negotiated peace 
between civilian plenipotentiaries. 

The only contingency in which the Armistice Com- 
mission could legally carry on negotiations with the 
German Government would be in case of repudiation 
by that Government of its October-November agree- 
ment, and an attempted resistance by military force or 
treachery. In the absence of this eventuality the Armis- 
tice Commission could have no legal power to impose 
new terms, and after a brief exercise of power would 
cease to figure prominently in the process of settlement. 

The Supreme Authority in Europe after November 
ii, 19 1 8, in the absence of breach of faith by Germany, 
and the only body having authority to deal with Ger- 
many, was the Supreme Allied War Council which, 
under the war agreements of the governments not to 
make a separate peace, would hold power until a 
peace treaty with Germany was signed. 

There were two divergent paths of statesmanship 
possible for the European leaders after the day of ar- 
mistice : to adhere to the peace settlement proposed and 
agreed upon at the Trianon Palace Hotel (and already 
partly performed on the part of Germany,) or, when 
Germany was disarmed thirty days later, to repudiate 
the agreement and impose a peace of vengeance. (In 
later chapters some of the moral phases of European 
policy will be considered. In the present chapter I seek 
to set forth definite facts, which are concrete in their 
nature and are susceptible of being proved or disproved, 
and over which there can be but little dispute.) 

The military disarmament of Germany (submitted 



The Entente Peace 77 

to as an evidence of good faith) was completed in less 
than a month. As a result the allies in December pos- 
sessed the power, but not the right, to impose a differ- 
ent settlement upon Germany from that agreed to over 
the armistice signatures. 

The state of mind during the lurid days of combat 
that recommended to the allied statesmen the accept- 
ance of the proposed terms was succeeded, after the hos- 
tilities ceased, by one which contrasted strongly with it. 
Stock-taking and calculation began. 

The appalling cost of the war, not only in lives but 
in treasure, was making itself manifest. A staggering 
burden of taxation and confiscation must be imposed by 
the governments upon the people if each nation was to 
pay its own war debts, creating an internal situation 
which heads of government and ministries shrank from 
facing. 

There was, I believe, a spiritual exaltation for many 
weeks following the cessation of hostilities, which per- 
meated the masses in all the nations engaged in the 
war, and was probably a reaction to the fact that its 
horrors had ceased. A quick preliminary peace of 
moderation made during this period would have been 
approved, and the ministries that were responsible for 
it would have been sustained. On a plain question of 
right and wrong public opinion is always on the side 
of moral integrity. It was in the power of the govern- 
ments to inform the people frankly of their obligations 
under the terms agreed upon with Germany, and when 
these terms were understood by them there can be no 
doubt that the people, under the stimulating leadership 



78 Lex Talionis 

of President Wilson, would have made a prompt and 
favorable decision. 

From the moment when hostilities ceased the figure 
of President Wilson grew day by day, in the minds of 
the people of the Continent of Europe, until his com- 
ing engrossed their thoughts almost to the exclusion of 
everything else. 

If the question of a moderate peace with Germany 
had depended solely upon the masses in Europe, its 
advocacy by Mr. Wilson, upon his arrival on December 
14, would have assured its consummation. 

But in Europe public opinion is by no means as well 
informed as in the United States, nor does it exercise 
the same measure of control over public affairs. In- 
deed, it is a revelation to the American student of gov- 
ernment to see how easily public opinion there may be 
swayed by governing groups, and how readily the gov- 
erning groups avail themselves of the fact. 

In December, 19 18, it lay peculiarly within the power 
of the Supreme War Council and of the Chancellries 
to direct the course of the masses in their attitude to- 
ward the peace. A state of exaltation of spirit, making 
whole populations capable of an act of moral duty and 
dignity, is fugitive and ephemeral. While it is trans- 
lating itself into action its leadership cannot falter or 
intermit its activity, or the cold, material motives of 
self-interest will resume their wonted sway. 

President Wilson did not arrive in Europe until 
thirty-three days after hostilities ceased. All the forces 
there which had ranged themselves sincerely under 
American leadership were therefore marking time, for 



The Entente Peace 79 

the President's agents in Europe gave no visible sign 
that they were on guard. 

In Europe, unlike the United States, there is an inti- 
mate connection between government and organized fi- 
nancial power, and the great financier is in daily contact 
with the great statesman. European systems of finance 
are strongly international in their character. 

In France, when hostilities ceased the financiers were 
confronted with the appalling fact that all the stored- 
up wealth of France had been shot out of the cannon's 
mouth in four years of war. They were confronted 
with the neccessity of revealing this fact to the French 
people and to the world, or of devising some present- 
able facade indicating solvency, which would conceal 
the ruins behind it and give time to devise some means 
of recoupment. 

There was no way to make both ends meet. They 
might be made to seem to meet if the allied and asso- 
ciated governments could enter a credit of billions upon 
their books by forcing Germany to undertake the pay- 
ment of an immense annual tribute for a long period 
of years. 23 

In France the spirit of vengeance could be easily 
stirred — the war had been peculiarly a war of peoples, 
not as in the older days a war of governments. Ger- 

^The estimates of German pre-war wealth made by the agents of 
the Supreme War Council indicate that the total of what the allied 
debts would amount to primarily influenced their conclusions as to 
the total of German resources. They computed the value of Ger- 
many's forests, mines, lands and railway systems at ten billion dollars, 
her mineral deposits at nine and one-half billion dollars ;her tangible 
wealth, excluding minerals, at ninety billion dollars. Her annual 



80 Lex Talionis 

many by December 10 was disarmed and innocuous. 
There was nothing which stood between France and 
complete spoliation of the enemy except the moral 
restraint of the armistice terms. 

If the armistice terms could be falsified, two desir- 
able things could be accomplished, the sating of the 
vengeance of the French nation, and an effort toward 
the remotely possible rehabilitation of French pre-war 
finances through the imposition of immense indemnities. 

The French public had been permitted to believe 
that there were no strings to the victory. 24 Not only 
was the public allowed to believe it but the Government 
took every necessary measure to assure the confirmation 
of that belief. The French semi-official press under- 
national income was ten billion dollars. She possessed more than 
half the coal in Europe. 

The total war expenditure of the allies was estimated at a hundred 
and twenty-five billion dollars which was stated 10 be less than one- 
seventh of the German assets in sight. 

That practical statesmen in the last weeks of the war were find- 
ing some time to look into the future and consider it is not to be 
doubted. Bonar Law, in a speech at the Guild Hall on September 
30, 1918, (which a discerning mind might classify as a reply to 
President Wilson's address of September 27) said: 

"After the war what will happen to the industrial position of this 
country and our allies will depend upon our credit, and the credit 
will depend on the war ending in the way that we intend it shall end." 
(Cheers.) 

^The Municipality of Paris issued the following proclamation an- 
nouncing the armistice: 

"People of Paris! It is victory, triumphant victory on all fronts. 
The enemy, vanquished, has laid down his arms and blood will cease 
to flow. Let Paris depart from her proud reserve which has won 
for her the admiration of the world. Let us give free course to our 



The Entente Peace 8i 

took to interpret the meaning of President Wilson's 
October notes, reading into them a meaning which they 
did not contain, and taking a position which tended to 
nullify the decisions reached on November 4 at the 
Trianon Palace Hotel. (These press utterances were 
only a few of the political phenomena in Europe which 
should have put every agency of the American Govern- 
ment instantly on guard.) 

Such an utterance was that of the Temps on Novem- 
ber 8: 

". . . At the same time he (President Wilson) signified 
to Germany that he subscribed to the second observation of the 
allies, that which implies the payment of all damages (la com- 
pensation totale des dommages). It is the accomplishment of 
the word which Clemenceau pronounced the 17th of September, 
"Le plus terrible compte de peuple a peuple s'est ouvert. II 
sera paye" (The most terrible accounting owed by one people 
to another has been opened. It will be paid.) 

By the end of November the tone of the French press 
was vindictive. From the day of the armistice its repu- 
diation of the Trianon Hotel pact was unmistakable. 
This thought in the editorial columns of the Temps is 
plainly fathered by the wish : 

"When the conditions of armistice were signed at Versailles 
the allies and the United States had before them a Germany 

joy and enthusiasm and let us swallow our tears. As testimony to 
our great soldiers and our incomparable chiefs, let us beflag all houses 
with the French colors and the colors of our dear allies. Our dead 
may sleep in peace. The sublime sacrifice made by them of their 
lives for the future of the race and the salvation of La Patrie shall 
not be barren. For them as for us Le jour de Gloire est arrive. 
Vive la Republique! Vive la France Immortelle!" 



82 Lex Talionis 

which they knew — a Germany coherent, where discipline 
reigned, and where the different powers, civil and military, had 
clearly fixed relations. Now we are before a Germany which 
we do not know, and which does not know itself. Nobody 
knows what will happen. One cannot forget Russia." 

On November 30 the Temps frowned upon the pro- 
posed purpose of the Germans to convoke a national 
assembly for the adoption of a constitution, and de- 
manded a peace settlement before such action was taken, 
ending its editorial with the words "La paix d'abord!". 
On the 24th of November this journal opposed the 
plea of the German Government that food be permitted 
to enter because starvation threatened to precipitate 
bolshevism, insisting that Germany, prosecuting a war 
of aggression, had not hesitated to participate bol- 
shevism in Russia. In early December it commented 
with enthusiasm on the position taken by Lloyd George 
when he said "A just peace, severely just, pitilessly just; 
it is necessary that Germany pay the costs of the war 
to the limit of her capacity." 

In view of the relationship which the French press 
sustains to the Government, there could be no possible 
difficulty at this time in understanding the minds of the 
French statesmen. The French Government repudiated 
the Trianon Hotel pact almost as soon as the ink was 
dry on the signatures, and at the same time the French 
public was led to believe that no trace whatever of 
obligation inhered in it. That the French official mind 
was not running with that of the President was mani- 
fest as early as October 25, when Le Temps undertook 
to interpret the meaning of the President's note of 



The Entente Peace 83 

October 23 to the German Government. It said 
editorially: 

"A surrender (capitulation!) That is the term. Like Mr. 
Wilson we think there is no advantage in not using it publicly. 
Surrender of Germany! This leaves no place for misunder- 
standing among the allies. Surrender of Germany ! This 
teaches the Germans what the Hindenburgs and Ludendorffs 
have cost them, their incorrigible leaders, their Hohenzollern 
Dynasty . . The problem is purely military — that Germany 
solicits an armistice." 

There appears to have been entire unanimity in the 
Supreme War Council in the determination to repudiate 
the Trianon Hotel agreement. Marshal Foch did not 
hesitate to make the choice. The decision was easy for 
Clemenceau and for Louis Klotz and the French fi- 
nanciers. 

Italy, desperately poor before the war began, was 
in a like case with France. It had been the expectation 
in Italy throughout the war that victory would amelio- 
rate the poverty of the people, and her statesmen could 
not bring themselves to contemplate a barren victory. 
They took the French point of view. 

The British Ministry acquiesced. Great Britain was 
not so desperately depleted financially as her allies, and 
might weather her way through reconstruction with- 
out tribute from Germany, but if her Continental allies 
were determined upon the hard peace, Britain would 
not stand in their way. Moreover she could find use 
for her share of the money. 

Many and intimate conferences of the greatest im- 
portance between the allied statesmen, almost from the 



84 Lex Talionis 

day of the armistice, must have been in progress, at 
which neither Colonel House, General Bliss nor the 
American Ambassadors were present, and of the signi- 
ficance of which they were not informed. (It is to be 
noted that no American Ambassador was en poste at 
the Court of St. James at this time, a newly appointed 
Ambassador accompanying President Wilson to 
Europe, and that the American Ambassador at Paris 
resigned his post in the early days of the Peace Confer- 
ence.) 

On December first a meeting of the Supreme War 
Council was held in London, which was participated 
in by Marshal Foch, Premier Clemenceau of France, 
Premier Orlando and Foreign Minister Sonnino of 
Italy. Others present from the Continent were Cambon, 
General Mordaque, General Weygand, Marquis Im- 
periali; other Englishment were Lord Curzon, Lord 
Reading, Mr. Balfour, Sir Erric Geddes, Lord Milner, 
Sir Henry Wilson, Mr. Bonar Law, General Smuts. 
The foreigners were welcomed by Prime Minister 
Lloyd George and the Duke of Connaught. 

There were no American representatives present. 

It is not necessary to enter the realms of conjecture to 
determine the subjects of discussion and the policies 
adopted. 

The conspirators, as without much exaggeration we 
may now call them, were in this position: 

1. They were mutually agreed and determined to 
impose a peace of vengeance upon Germany (which 
would destroy that state as a rival, and place its people 



The Entente Peace 85 

under an industrial bondage which might save their own 
treasuries from bankruptcy.) 

2. Entente opinion already believed that a military 
victory had been won over the German army, and had 
compelled its surrender. By permitting this belief to 
harden into conviction, the support of public opinion in 
Entente Europe could be counted on. 

3. But the peace of vengeance was morally indefen- 
sible, being a repudiation of a contractual obligation to 
the enemy, and involving the entire demolition of the 
Wilson peace settlement. A break with the United 
States could not be thought of. Therefore the Amer- 
ican negotiators must be made to shift their ground, 
and their acquiescence must be secured by the arts of 
persuasion, not excluding those of duplicity and menda- 
city if necessary. To accomplish this, time would be 
needed, and a policy of delay, and if necessary of ob- 
struction in the proceedings, recommended itself to 
them. 

4. Assuming unity of purpose among the associated 
governments to be secured : 

Tenacious opposition to agreements offered must be 
expected from Germany, whose government would seek 
to stand upon the Trianon Hotel pact. The opposition 
of Germany, now disarmed, would have to take the 
form of moral resistance only. This moral and pas- 
sive resistance, based upon a conviction of the justice 
of her position, would be stubborn. It would yield only 
to unremitting pressure. The means of such pressure 
were the Armistice Commission having behind it the 
army on the Rhine, and the Naval Blockade. 



86 Lex Talionis 

These agencies would rigidly prevent food from en- 
tering Germany. The pressure of starvation would 
grow progressively greater from day to day, and the 
power of resistance to allied demands would gradually 
weaken, until acquiescence was secured. Here time 
again was of the essence. 

There would be no direct communication with the 
German Government by the civilian delegates at Paris 
until the moment for the signing of the peace. All 
dealings would have the form of military measures. At 
Paris, philosophic discussion on the subject of the league 
of nations, and numberless territorial disputes and 
points of clashing interest, would afford occupation for 
delegates and staffs. 

The Europeans had the advantage of thirty-three 
days before Mr. Wilson's arrival, to put this plan in 
operation. 

(As to whether the United States, which had taken 
the lead in bringing about a peace which limited the 
right to impose indemnities, could be persuaded to 
acquiese in the hard peace, the Europeans could have 
had no definite information at that time. Their con- 
certed plans indicated that they believed it in their 
power to bring this about. Their belief in this respect 
was probably strengthened by an inference which they 
drew that the American election of November 5, being 
a repudiation of the leadership of President Wilson, 
was also a repudiation of the peace of moderation. 

The elections of November 5, however, cannot be 
accepted as a judgment of the American people on the 
character of the peace agreement actually imposed on 



The Entente Peace 87 

Germany, as the acceptance of the Wilson proposals 
given by the allies on November 4 at the Trianon 
Palace Hotel was not yet known to them. The demand 
of the Republicans that the war be prosecuted until 
German surrender was compelled, and that severe 
penalties be imposed, were made while the fighting was 
still in progress, before the allies had accepted the 
Wilson terms, and while they had the right to demand 
whatever terms they could compel in the field. 

The Europeans, however, were convinced that the 
Republican party demanded a peace of victory, and 
the Republican victory at the polls no doubt strength- 
ened their confidence that the American people would 
not support Mr. Wilson's peace settlement.) 25 

The character of the considerations which occupied 
the minds of the members and coadjutors of the Su- 
preme War Council, and of the conclusions reached, in 
its meetings in London during the first three days of 
December, reveal themselves sufficiently in three events 
of basic importance which took place before President 
Wilson's arrival in Europe, and which mark the fact 
that Europe had determined to part company with 
President Wilson and with adherents of the Wilson 
peace. 

The first of these faits-accomplis, as we may call 

2B In this connection the following entry in Colonel Repington's diary 
is interesting: 

"Nov. 7. I am amused to hear that the F. O. has not been made 
officially cognizant of the armistice terms. It is thought by wise folk 
that the Republican majority in the Congressional elections will make 
our ministers statesmen, because they will no longer fear Wilson. 
The said wise folk regard the Republican majority as a God-send." 



88 Lex Talionis 

them because of their bearing upon President Wilson's 
purposes, an event whose significance appeared to 
escape the scrutiny of all the agencies of the American 
Government at the time, was the British General Elec- 
tions held December 14, and for which December 4 
was nomination day. (The indications are that the 
decision to hold general elections on the issue of a hard 
peace was made in late November, after consultation 
with the Continental statesmen.) 

During the war, politics had been adjourned in 
England, and the majority which, throughout, sus- 
tained the government in the House of Commons, was 
the result of a coalition of liberals and unionists which 
generally had the support of labor. 

When the armistice brought hostilities to a close on 
November 11, with a necessary peace settlement fol- 
lowing close upon it, it would have seemed that that 
settlement would logically be made under the existing 
coalition ministry which had conducted the war, as pre- 
sumably the settlement did not involve domestic politics, 
and presented no issue to divide the electorate. But 
the Ministry wanted a new mandate. Having deter- 
mined upon a certain peace policy, it wanted to commit 
the people to it. 

The manner in which hostilities ended was not clearly 
known in England. The notes exchanged in October 
and November had been published in the newspapers, 
but had quickly disappeared from the printed page, and 
were mere disjecta membra of the agreement. Govern- 
ment did not enlarge upon their meaning. 

The newspapers in the days preceding the armistice 



The Entente Peace 89 

had been full of hopes of victory, and of demands that 
the fighting should be pushed to the point of surrender. 
It was easy for the average Englishman to believe, 
when the news of the armistice came, that the victory 
was an unqualified one. 

When government did not officially intimate that the 
victory was a limited one, the conviction became general 
within a few days that surrender had been compelled. 

The conclusion cannot be escaped that the Lloyd 
George Ministry deliberately permitted the English 
people to be deceived, and that the Ministry itself was 
guilty of positive deception. 

On November 6 Lloyd George, with all the manner 
of one announcing complete victory, stated in the Com- 
mons that the allies had sent their conclusions to Presi- 
dent Wilson, and that Marshal Foch had been author- 
ized to communicate to German plenipotentiaries the 
terms of an armistice. The impression which Mr. 
Lloyd George's words conveyed is disclosed by the 
London Times' report of his statement. 

"It was significant that the loudest and longest cheers which 
greeted any part of the Prime Minister's statement were given 
to the declaration that the Germans must apply to Marshal Foch. 
The implication of the phrase 'in the usual military form' was 
plain". 

Mr. Lloyd George was disingenuous here in two re- 
spects : 

i st. He did not tell the Commons that the "conclu- 
sions" of the Supreme War Council, reached November 
4 at the Trianon Palace Hotel, were conclusions to ac- 
cept a peace without punitive damages. 



90 Lex Talionis 

2d. His phrase "in the usual military form" misrep- 
resented the fact. We have seen that the German 
Government sent a civilian delegation to sign a peace 
agreement already formulated, and whose terms Mar- 
shal Foch had no authority to alter. 26 

The significance of the chronology here cannot be 
escaped : On November 4 the Trianon pact was signed, 
on November 5 President Wilson communicated it to 
the German Government and published it in America ; 
on November 6 (the Trianon pact being as yet undis- 
closed in England) Lloyd George, appearing in the 
Commons and saying nothing about the Trianon pact, 
announced the military surrender of Germany, and 
proclaimed to the people of England an unqualified 
victory. The publication in England of Mr. Wilson's 
note to Germany, setting forth the Trianon pact was 
not made until November 7, when it appeared in the 
London Times. It could be printed then with impunity, 
for the psychological results which Lloyd George de- 
sired had been secured the preceding day. 27 

Not a word of public discussion thereafter emanated 
from the British Government as to the significance of 
the Trianon Hotel transactions. The conclusion fol- 

26 President Wilson's final note to Germany on November 5 said : 
"Marshal Foch has been authorized by the Government of the 
United States and the Allied Governments to receive properly ac- 
credited representatives of the German Government and to communi- 
cate to them the terms of an armistice." 

"That three days after the Trianon Hotel pact was signed the 
Foreign Office had not been informed of it seems incredible, but see 
entry in Colonel Repington's diary November 7, 1918. 



The Entente Peace 9 1 

lowed that the Government regarded them as of no 
importance. 

Lloyd George, speaking in the Guild, Hall on the 
evening of November 9 (before the armistice was 
signed, but when the terms of agreement had been 
settled), said: "Germany is faced with immediate sur- 
render or a worse fate. She has no other choice. Her 
doom is sealed." 

Hence, within a fortnight after hostilities ended, the 
English people, led to that conclusion by their own 
statesmen, believed that Germany had surrendered un- 
conditionally. The logical conclusion followed that in 
justice Germany should be made to pay heavily. 

This was the state of mind that Mr. Lloyd George 
and the Ministry had manoeuvred with great skill to 
produce. It afforded an ideal issue upon which to go 
to the country, and upon which to perpetuate themselves 
in power. Furthermore the entire English people 
would be involved in the moral position of the Govern- 
ment, and in its defense if its moral position should be 
questioned. 

No time was lost in setting the election machinery in 
motion. A Royal Proclamation fixed nomination day 
as December 4. Under the law the election would fall 
on the 10th day after, or December 14. 

The political stage having been thus prepared it 
was perfectly possible for Mr. Lloyd George to go 
upon the hustings and declare that Germany, having 
outraged the conscience of mankind, deserved condign 
punishment, and that if he and his supporters were re- 
turned to power in Parliament, Germany should be 



92 Lex Talionis 

made to pay to the last farthing, and the Kaiser and 
his abettors should be tried in allied civilian courts for 
their high crimes against society. 

This he did. He assured the English people that a 
victory, prosecuted to unconditional surrender, had been 
won, and that their moral right to impose a peace of 
retributive justice was unquestionable. The return of 
a majority was, of course, assured. The Coalition won 
471 seats out of 707. 

Mr. Asquith, the liberal leader, alone of all the 
figures of commanding place in England, raised his 
voice in protest against the Government's policy. He 
protested against the holding of general elections be- 
fore the peace was made. "Elections at this time", he 
said "are a blunder and a calamity — unjust, unneces- 
sary, and mutilated, because of the absence of hundreds 
of thousands of electors from their homes". "If they 
were to ask him", he said "what were the issues of the 
election" he would say "it is whether the members you 
are going to return are bound or free." 

He demanded "a clean peace"; he was against ac- 
ceptance of any peace which would be "a prelude in 
disguise to continuance of war. An aggressive economic 
boycott, what was that but war under another name?" 
He was "in favor of exacting from wrong-doers to the 
uttermost farthing, but when we had got reparation we 
must have a clean slate, and seventy million people had 
to go on living a life of their own." 

On December 1 1 Mr. Asquith was hissed at Cupar 
for intimating that the allies did not have the moral 
right to crush Germany. He concluded his campaign 



The Entente Peace 93 

on the 1 2th addressing eight meetings in the valley of 
the Eden at Falkland and Ladybank. Soldiers took an 
active part in heckling the speaker, and insinuations 
were thrown out that as Prime Minister during the 
war some of his measures had worked to the advantage 
of the Germans. At these meetings he was under police 
protection. Otherwise the election is described gener- 
ally as "very slow, not much excitement, not much pas- 
sion." 

By the time election day arrived Mr. Asquith's voice 
was as a voice crying in the wilderness. Everywhere 
that Lloyd George went the audience (from whom he 
had concealed the vital truth) was favorable. The 
words of his final appeal, delivered the day before the 
elections were reported as follows. 

"Now I come to the second question I mean to talk about, 
and that is indemnities, (cheers.) Who is to foot the bill? 
(A voice; 'Germany!') I am again going to talk to you quite 
frankly about this. 

"By the jurisprudence of every civilized country in the world, 
in any 1 lawsuit, the loser pays. It is not a question of ven- 
geance; it is a question of justice. It means that the judge and 
the court have decided that one party is in the wrong. He 
has challenged judgment. By the law of every civilized 
country in the world the party who is guilty of the wrong pays 
the costs. (Cheers.) 

"There is absolutely no doubt about the principle. What 
we hope for in future, in dealing between nations, the same 
principles shall be established as in dealing between individuals 
— the same principles of right and wrong." 28 

28 The limitation upon allied right to reparations accepted at the 
Trianon Hotel may be restated here: 



94 Lex Talionis 

Lloyd George was not alone as an exponent of this 
new school of moral exegesis; Bonar Law, at Great 
Assembly Hall, Mile End, London, said on December 
1 1 : 

"Then there was the question of making Germany pay. 
Here, again, they could not say what would be done at the 
Conference, but they could say what they would like to do, 
and what they had already recommended to the allies. "It 
was no good to say that Germany, who had wrought all this 
loss, must pay for it. The first thing was to find out what 
she could pay; and they had already proposed to their allies 
that an expert scientific commission, to examine into and deter- 
mine what could be had, not without injury to Germany, for a 
country was responsible for its government, and must expiate 
them. (A voice; "It is not their fault.") 

"He heard someone say that the German people were not 
responsible. He did not agree. Every nation must be respon- 
sible for its government. He hoped the lesson of the war 
would not be lost on the German people; but he agreed with 
what President Wilson said, that the German people had got 
to prove a change of heart before he took it for granted. 
(Cheers.)" 

"The allied governments have given careful consideration to the 
correspondence which has passed between the President of the United 
States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications 
which follow they declare their willingness to make peace with the 
Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down, etc. 

"Further, the President declared * * * that invaded territories 
must be restored as well as evacuated and freed. 

"The allied governments feel that no doubt ought to exist as to 
what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation 
will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian popula- 
tion of the allies and their property by the aggressions of Germany 
by land, by sea, and from the air." 



The Entente Peace 95 

The London Times, a ready disciple of the Govern- 
ment's philosophy, had helped to start the election 
campaign off on December 6 with the following: 

"The Kaiser must be prosecuted for a crime which has sent 
millions of the best of our men in Europe to death and mutila- 
tion, and should be prosecuted in an international court." 

"The allies have accepted the principle that the Central 
Powers must pay! the cost of the war up to the limit of their 
capacity". 

The Privy Council now possessed carte blanche from 
the English people to prosecute its foreign policy. At 
Paris it would not be hampered by domestic intransige- 
ance. 29 



29 The disclosure of the result of the British elections was hailed 
with delight in France. The unrestrained enthusiasm of the semi- 
official Temps finds this expression on December 30: 

"This is the happiest event that has taken place since the signing 
of the armistice. Like military valor, political courage has been rec- 
ompensed." 

Then the editorial goes on to say that Lloyd George, having 
determined to consult the country before undertaking to conclude the 
peace, the Government victory passes all expectations. "Asquith is 
echoue, Henderson, Ramsay McDonald and Snowden are defeated ; 
it is a mass compact and a positive program. The editorial continues: 

"It is a national program to make Germany pay, to take radical 
precautions toward her; at home to have an energetic government, 
to cultivate the soil intensively, to increase industrial production, to 
tax the rich, to scatter well-being, social reform, strength, prosperity. 

"The prestige of Lloyd George and the prestige of Great Britain 
come forth reinforced. * * * Under the influence of the British 
elections the peace will be better, and England gives to all the 
democracies of the world the salutary example 'equilibrium by move- 
ment.' " 



96 Lex Talionis 

A curious coincidence with reference to these elec- 
tions is found in the fact that the campaign opened on 
December 4 and was, over on December 14, and that 
it was on December 4 that President Wilson sailed 
from New York and on December 14 that he reached 
Paris. 

The results of the elections were not announced in 
England until December 30. President Wilson was on 
that date a guest in Buckingham Palace. 

The whole election process, then, took place while 
President Wilson was on the high seas; the issues had 
not been advertised, and were not known in America 
before the President sailed. 

The President's purpose in going to Europe was to 
see to it that a peace of moderation was made. One 
element of strength which he conceived that he pos- 
essed was an influence over public opinion in the Entente 
countries, which might be used as a persuasive force, if 
necessary, in the negotiations in the Peace Conference. 
But in the short period of time during which President 
Wilson was on shipboard this strength was stripped 
from him. He could not now count on the support of 
English public opinion as against the Imperial policy 
of a hard peace, and he had had no opportunity to 
remonstrate. The fait-accompli of the British Elections 
was conceived in the councils of the Supreme War 
Council as one element of a larger plan. This larger 
plan, fast being put into operation, could have been 
checked and superseded only by strong and vigorous 
participation in these early deliberations of the Su- 
preme War Council itself. Apparently it was un- 



The Entente Peace 97 

checked in any particular by American agencies in 
Europe before President Wilson's arrival there. 

The second fait-accompli with which the President 
was confronted on his arrival in Paris was the exten- 
sion of the armistice for thirty days. It expired De- 
cember n, and by its terms seventy-two hours were 
allowed for its denunciation (until the morning of 
December 14). 

If Mr. Wilson had sailed from New York on De- 
cember first he would have been in Paris in time to 
participate in the deliberations of the Supreme War 
Council upon the terms of the armistice renewal. The 
allied governments could scarcely have avoided meet- 
ing him face to face at that time on the issue there 
presented. 

Under Mr. Wilson's interpretation of the peace 
agreement, the Armistice Commission would have been 
restricted to measures relating to military disarmament; 
the fixing of obligations to be assumed by Germany 
would have been held in suspense until the civilian con- 
ference then assembling in Paris had deliberated upon 
the matter and reached certain broad decisions, where- 
upon the German plenipotentiaries would have been 
called into the conference. 

This was not the purpose of the Supreme War 
Council. They deliberated at Paris and took their 
decisions while the George Washington was yet at sea. 
By these decisions they conferred powers upon the 
Armistice Commission which made it an agency of gen- 
eral negotiation between them and the German Govern- 



98 Lex Talionis 

ment, and which practically delegated the authority of 
the Supreme War Council to Marshal Foch for a 
period of thirty days. The Council had sat and risen 
before President Wilson arrived in Paris. 30 

It would seem that American agents in Europe, if 
they had been, in fact, closely observant of the manner 
in which Entente purposes were shaping themselves, 
might have seen the advisability of Mr. Wilson's pres- 
ence in time to participate in the deliberations upon the 
first renewal of the armistice, and have urged upon him 
the desirability of choosing a date of sailing which 
would enable him to be present on that momentous occa- 
sion. No such suggestion reached President Wilson. 
One is reluctant to think that intrigue among the for- 
eigners might have sought to delay the President's de- 
parture, and consequently his arrival in Paris. 

The renewal of the armistice had the far-reaching 
result of putting all initiative with regard to Germany 

S0 On Monday, December 16, the Temps announced that the armistice 
had been prolonged at Treves, on the 13th of December, in the morn- 
ing, in the private car of Marshal Foch, until January 17, 1919, at 
5 a. m. It announced that several added conditions were imposed, 
and a new guarantee — to occupy the neutral zone "if judged good." 
It stated that it learned from German sources that two and one- 
half million tons of merchant shipping in German ports were to be 
placed under control of the allies, "in view of being able to furnish 
food to Germany," the vessels to remain the property of Germany. 
The British demanded the cruiser "Boden" in place of the "Macken- 
sen". 

A financial clause (protocole financier) was included, under which 
Germany was not to dispose of metal cash, goods or credits abroad. 
The instrument was signed by Foch, Wemyss, Erzberger, Obendorff, 
Winterfeld and Von Selow. 



The Entente Peace 99 

out of the hands of the civilians gathering at Paris 
until January 14, 19 19, when it would again become 
necessary for the Supreme War Council to renew the 
mandate of the Armistice Commission (or to modify 
or abolish it if a preliminary treaty had been drawn up 
in the meantime.) 

The third fait-accompli, which was calculated power- 
fully to aid the Armistice Commission in any application 
of pressure upon the German Government and people 
which its purposes might require, was the extension of 
the British Naval Blockade, which had been maintained 
for four years before the German North Sea ports, to 
the entire German Baltic Coast. This was done in the 
first week in December, while President Wilson was on 
the high seas, and without knowledge of it or means 
of protesting, and was confirmed by Orders in Council. 

During the war Germany had held the straits, and 
was able to carry on her domestic coast-wise trade 
along the Baltic, as well as commerce with the Scanda- 
navian countries. The Baltic and North Sea fisheries 
also supplied abundant sea-food to the German popu- 
lation. 

The 26th article of the armistice instrument of 
November 1 1, provided that the existing blockade con- 
ditions were to remain during the period of armistice, 
and that all German ships at sea should remain liable 
to capture. 

This provision was construed by the British Privy 
Council to authorize the extension of the blockade after 



ioo Lex Talionis 

the armistice, with war-time rigor, to the German Baltic 
Coast from Kiel to Koenigsburg. 

It brought coast-wise domestic commerce to a stand- 
still (at the same time that the taking of rolling-stock 
by the Armistice Commission was paralysing the rail- 
ways), permitted nothing to go out of Germany except 
coal and potash, which the allies needed, and prohibited 
entirely the importation of food supplies and food fish. 

In view of the inconsistence of this last prohibition 
with the 26th article of the armistice instrument of 
November n, which contemplated supplying food to 
the German population during the continuance of the 
armistice, of President Wilson's announcement to Con- 
gress on November 1 1, that food relief for the German 
population was already being undertaken, with the co- 
operation of the allied governments, and of his assur- 
ance of November 12, through the Swiss Charge to the 
German Government, that such relief would be under- 
taken at once, an analysis of the purpose of the Euro- 
peans is beginning to be accompanied with no great 
difficulty. 

These three measures disclose Europe to be united 
in direct opposition to President Wilson and his peace 
purposes. They constituted a rigid triangular frame- 
work, into which the peace about to be concluded at 
Paris would inevitably be fitted, and which would give 
that peace its character, unless before the process of 
peace-making began, the framework were rejected or 
rebuilt. 

The British elections were the base of the triangle, 
of which the Armistice Commission and the Naval 



The Entente Peace 



ioi 



Blockade were the other two sides. The base of the 
triangle, the British elections, had been constructed in 
the space of one week; in the same week the extended 
blockade was put in operation, and the Supreme Coun- 
cil delegated its authority to Foch, thus completing 
the framework of the triangle. 

British elections are easy to hold if the government 
desires to consult the people, and somewhat difficult if 
it does not. A change of heart on the part of Lloyd 
George and his Ministry, resulting from persuasion ex- 
perienced at Paris in late December, might easily have 
been followed in January by new elections in England, 
in which a more perfectly enlightened electorate could 
have expressed its will in a different sense from the 
December elections. Thus the base of the triangle 
having given way, the two sides would have fallen, 
leaving the field at Paris clear for an American peace 
instead of an Entente peace. 

If, on the other hand, the triangular framework 
were not demolished, the making of such a peace as 
President Wilson contemplated would become a task 
of almost superhuman difficulty. 

This was the situation when President Wilson dis- 
embarked at Brest and stood on French soil. 



CHAPTER IV 

American-Entente Solidarity. 

THE George Washington entered the harbor of 
Brest on Friday, December 13, amid the thunders 
of the Presidential salute. The ceremonies attending 
the disembarkation were entirely in the hands of the 
French. Foreign Minister Pichon and Minister of 
Marine Leygues boarded the George Washington and 
delivered short addresses of welcome. In the party 
also which went aboard the transport were General 
Pershing, General Bliss, Admirals Sims, Mayo, Ben- 
son and Wilson. Colonel House was indisposed at 
Paris and was represented by Mr. Gordon Auchincloss. 

When the President stepped upon the municipal pier 
he was met by the Mayor of Brest, who made an ad- 
dress formally extending the freedom of the city and 
delivering the keys of the city to the President. In 
reply the President expressed the pleasure he felt that 
he had come "to join my counsel with that of your own 
public men in bringing about a peace settlement which 
shall be consistent alike with the ideals of France and 
the ideals of the United States". A committee of 
twenty-two deputies was also at Brest to meet the 
President. 

At 4 p. m. the presidential train departed for Paris. 
The same official delegation Avhich had met him at 
Brest on the part of the Government of France wel- 
comed him upon his arrival the next morning at Paris, 
the President's train having been stopped for a brief 



American- Entente Solidarity 103 

period en route in order to permit the French delega- 
tion to arrive in Paris by another train at an earlier 
hour. 

In the Bois de Bologne Station, which had been dec- 
orated with carpets and palms, the President and his 
party were greeted by President Poincare and Madam 
Poincare, Premier Clemenceau, Andre Tardieu, High 
Commissioner to the United States, and other officials. 
The party was then driven in carriages through cheer- 
ing crowds to the Murat residence, which was to be 
the President's home in Paris. 

The morning was engrossed in official amenities. A 
call of ceremony at the Murat residence was made by 
President Poincare, and was immediately returned by 
President Wilson at the Elysee Palace. This was fol- 
lowed at once by an official luncheon at the Elysee, at 
which it was necessary for President Wilson to reply 
to the toast which President Poincare offered. 

After the luncheon at the Elysee, the .President re- 
turned to the Murat residence where he had a short 
conference with Colonel House, which was immediately 
followed by a formal reception in the salon of the 
Murat residence to the French civilian and military 
functionaries in Paris. 

The luncheon at the Elysee was the first occasion 
when, as it were, France and America met each other 
face to face, when the Presidents of France and the 
United States interchanged in person and in public the 
greetings of the nations. It was one of those rare 
occasions in the intercourse of states when the aloof 
and impersonal dealings of foreign offices, with their 



io4 Lex Talionis 

guarded and wary methods, is replaced by the reveal- 
ing interchanges of human contact and human person- 
ality. The customary formal intercourse between for- 
eign offices may readily be carried on without disclosing 
the motives of the chancelleries. In word-of-mouth 
conversations of men in the flesh, who are also heads 
of state, and when the policies of governments are in- 
volved, there is a greatly heightened interest. On such 
an occasion as the Elysee luncheon, national emotions 
would be authoritatively expressed and sentimental re- 
lationships disclosed. It was one of those occasions 
to which the trained and savage diplomacy of the Old 
World looked for distinct advantage. 

In toasting the Head of the American State, Presi- 
dent Poincare's address was exactly of the nature which 
one familiar with the recent deliberations of the Su- 
preme War Council might have looked for. It con- 
sisted of a eulogy of President Wilson and the Amer- 
ican Army, and an indictment of the Germans with a 
demand for their punishment. Its significant part fol- 
lows: 

"They (the American soldiers) brought with them in arriv- 
ing here the enthusiasm of crusaders leaving for the Holy Land. 
It is their right today to look with pride upon the work accom- 
plished, and to rest assured that they have powerfully aided by 
their courage and their faith. 

Eager as they were to meet the enemy, they did not know 
when they arrived the enormity of his crimes. That they 
might know how the German armies made war it has been 
necessary that they see towns systematically burned down, 
mines flooded, factories reduced to ashes, orchards devastated, 



American- Entente Solidarity 105 

cathedrals shelled and fired, all that deliberate savagery aimed 
to destroy national wealth, nature and beauty, which the imagi- 
nation could not conceive at a distance from the men and things 
that have endured it and today bear witness to it. 

In your turn, Mr. President, you will be able to measure 
with your own eyes the extent of these disasters, and the French 
Government will make known to you the authentic documents, 
in which the German General Staff developed with astounding 
cynicism its program of pillage and industrial annihilation. 

Your noble conscience will pronounce a verdict on these 
facts. Should this guilt remain unpunished, could it be re- 
newed, the most splendid victories would be in vain. 

Mr. President, France has struggled, has endured and has 
suffered during four long ytears ; she has bled at every vein ; 
she has lost the best of her children ; she mourns for her youths. 
She yearns now, even as you do, for a peace of justice and 
security. It was not that once again she might be exposed 
to aggression that she submitted to such sacrifices. Nor was 
it that criminals should go unpunished, that they might lift their 
heads again to make ready for new crimes, that under your 
strong leadership America armed herself and crossed the 
ocean. . . . rfl 

At its conclusion the President of France raised his 
glass, and President Wilson rose to reply. 

The scene and the occasion afforded room only for 
felicitations. The moving words of President Poincare 
required something more than a colorless response. 
An expression of jarring sentiments would shock a 
sense of the fitness of things and offend the canons of 
good taste. 

31 World Almanac, 1919. 



106 Lex Talionis 

But President Poincare's address was ( in fact a de- 
mand for retribution upon the hated enemy. It ex- 
pressed in the polished tones of the salon what was 
breathed with unconcealed passion upon the streets. It 
sought to leave the President no room for compromise. 
Its burden seemed to be, "Say whether you are with us; 
for all who are not with us are against us". 

President Wilson's manner in replying was gracious. 
After testifying to "the quick contact of sympathy and 
unaffected friendship between the representatives of 
the United States and the representatives of France," he 
said: 

"From the first, the thought of the people of the United 
States turned toward something more than the mere winning 
of the war. It turned to the establishment of the eternal 
principles of right and justice. It realized that merely to win 
the war was not enough; that it must be won in such a way 
and the questions raised by it settled in such a way, as to 
ensure the future peace of the world, and lay the foundation 
for the freedom and happiness of its many peoples and nations'. 

Never before has war worn so terrible a visage, or exhibited 
more grossly the debasing influence of illicit ambitions. 

I am sure I shall look upon the ruin wrought by the armies 
of the Central Empires with the same repulsion and deep indig- 
nation that they stir in the hearts of the men of France and 
Belgium, and I appreciate, as" you do, Sir, the necessity of such 
action in the final settlement of the issues of the war as will 
not only rebuke such acts or terror and spoliation, but make 
men everywhere aware that they cannot be ventured upon 
without the certainty of just punishment . . . " 32 

There is here some shifting of ground, probably un- 

32 World Almanac, 1919. 



American-Entente Solidarity 107 

consciously made. Circumstances indicate that in this 
response the President was speaking impromptu. It 
is not probable that the written address of Poincare 
had been handed him in advance of the occasion, and 
that his reply was a studied response to it. There 
began here a long-continued personal contact between 
the President and the European representatives, which 
was characterized by entire informality; and none of 
the barriers were afterwards interposed which custom- 
arily hedge the head of a state from contacts which 
might be embarrassing or inconvenient. 

At the Elysee the circumstances, as the President 
understood them, demanded that he say all that could 
possibly be said, without misleading his audience, to 
make manifest the fact of international good-will. He 
was not speaking in secret council — he was speaking to 
the Entente peoples. Even if he possessed knowledge 
that the Entente governments were tainted with wrong 
motive, this was a most unsuitable occasion to show 
dissent. 

Conscious of the requirements of the occasion, the 
President sought to picture a just peace, one that would 
"lay the foundations for the freedom and happiness of 
the world's many peoples and nations." 

At the same time he sought to respond generously 
to President Poincare's powerful appeal for national 
sympathy, and to go as far as might be consistent with 
his own position in recognizing the justice of the French 
demand that wrong be expiated. Hence the response 
"I appreciate, as you do, Sir, the necessity of such action 
in the final settlement of the issues of the war as will 



108 Lex Talionis 

not only rebuke such acts of terror and spoliation, but 
make men everywhere aware that they cannot be 
entered upon without the certainty of just punishment". 

These words were not intended to carry a suggestion 
of a peace based upon retribution and vengeance. Ad- 
dressed to a different audience, and taken in connec- 
tion with their context, they might not have imported 
a meaning inconsistent with a settlement actuated by 
liberal and generous motives so far as the masses in 
Central Europe were involved. 

But in his promise that the settlement should involve 
"the certainty of just punishment" the President allowed 
himself to be drawn on by the influence of the occasion 
to a point where his utterances infringed his own prin- 
ciples, for the spirit and letter of the compromise peace 
already signed provided no basis of right for such pun- 
ishment. 

Addressed to the European audience to which he 
spoke, and to the European public, these words were 
understood in a different spirit from that in which they 
were uttered. They increased the confidence of the 
advocates of the Entente Peace, and they chilled the 
aspirations of those who were looking to President 
Wilson "to lead mankind upon the road to a less pain- 
ful and less bloody future." In the response at the 
Elysee luncheon the quality of mercy (which was the 
key to the Wilson peace and to the league of nations) 
was strained. Without intending abatement of his prin- 
ciples the President here distinctly lost ground. 

An enormously important factor at this time among 
the circumstances surrounding the making of the peace 



American-Entente Solidarity 109 

was the psychological condition of the Europeans. It 
was the first condition to be met and treated upon the 
President's arrival there. It was the condition which 
he was least prepared to meet. That he was misin- 
formed as to what the condition was is readily seen by 
the course which he followed, and by his utterances 
during the following three weeks. 

(President Wilson's attitude, and that of America, 
was one of genuine sympathy with the Entente peoples, 
and of unbounded good-will toward them. To oppose 
or block them in any just purpose was utterly remote 
from the President's consciousness. His attitude to- 
ward the peoples of Central Europe was one of char- 
ity; the objects of his indignation had been the auto- 
cratic rulers who had misled them, and whom he had 
just driven from power forever. Magnanimity toward 
the fallen enemy underlay the lofty language of the 
closing paragraphs of the President's address to Con- 
gress on armistice day, and he took it almost for 
granted that all the world would unite in translating 
those sentiments into action at Paris. He had pro- 
claimed them clearly, and the Entente Governments 
had applauded and approved. He expected to enter 
into deliberation with lofty and noble intellects, with 
minds immune from the canker of hatred.) 

The character of the peace which the President had 
clearly outlined, the fundamental emotions to which 
he had constantly appealed for its sanction, and which 
had won for him his great moral leadership, involved 
the replacing of war stimuli in the minds of men by 
those emotional impulses which permit the mind to 



no Lex Talionis 

resume the rational courses of thought that gradually 
carry them back into the ways and environment of 
peace. 

This trend in the emotions could not be imparted by 
any of Europe's leaders. Europe's spiritual leadership 
had been exhausted by the war; only the predatory 
instincts remained. It was given up to seething hatred, 
and to that instinct for vengeance which a fighting 
animal feels when it sees its adversary, somewhat unex- 
pectedly, at its mercy. The people were uninformed, 
they were tired of war, they wanted peace, but they 
were inert. They could be led in any direction that 
authority might determine. They could be made to 
respond either to sentiments of magnanimity or to those 
which would reawaken the dying flames of war hatred. 

The danger to the American peace, then, lay in the 
psychology of Europe's rulers and its ruling classes. It 
would be necessary to introduce among them a new 
cast of thought, for if war hatred and cupidity con- 
tinued to obsess them, it was in their power to communi- 
cate the same hatred and cupidity to their people, and 
to oppose the President with a united front. 

So formidable might such united opposition be, and 
so probable was it that it would be encountered, that, 
had President Wilson been appraised of it and fully 
prepared to meet the danger, it is hardly probable that 
events in Paris would have taken the course they did. 
Had accurate intelligence of psychological conditions 
been imparted to him, and equally accurate intelligence 
of the concerted European purpose, the President him- 
self possessed the capacity to meet the situation, and 



American-Entente Solidarity i i i 

it would have been in his power to keep the control 
of events in his own hands. 

Mr. Wilson, if fully appraised of the conditions, in 
looking back over history for a parallel case, would 
instantly have found it in the policy and course of action 
of President Abraham Lincoln toward the close of the 
Civil War. In the long days and nights of relative 
freedom from turmoil which Mr. Wilson passed on 
board the George Washington before arriving in 
France, the nobility of Lincoln's statesmanship would 
have stood forth as the model for his own, and con- 
templation of the superb moral courage of Lincoln's 
personal character would have inspired him with the 
strength to overcome all combinations of forces which 
might be massed to block the consummation of a just 
peace. The spirit of Lincoln's second inaugural would 
have been the point of departure of his policy, "With 
malice toward none, with charity for all," a policy 
which, upon landing in Europe, he would reveal in 
plain words and which would have left no doubt as to 
what was the issue involved in the making of the peace. 

The President might also have recalled from the 
storehouse of his literary culture the closing scene of 
the Fourth Act of Hernani. Standing before the tomb 
of Charlemagne, in the vaulted cavern of Aix-la-Chap- 
elle, with the hooded conspirators who had sought there 
to take his life foiled and standing before him awaiting 
judgment, Don Carlos pardons all, confers upon Her- 
nani the Golden Fleece and raises him to high place in 
the state as Don Juan of Arragon. As the last of the 
concourse departs, he upon whose shoulders as Charles 



1 1 2 Lex Talionis 

V the Imperial purple has just fallen, apostrophises 
the mighty shade to whose vast power he now succeeds : 

* * * I implored thee 
Greatly to lead me through my awful trust, 
And thou hast whispered me, 'Begin with Mercy' !" 

All the peoples of the world, with their aspiration 
for better things, were receptive, and world public 
opinion was ready to be mobilized in irresistible sup- 
port of such a cause. Only the forces of hatred, now 
turning the agencies of war propaganda to their own 
ends, entrenched behind the reactionary chancelleries 
of Europe; and that colossus which now bestrode the 
Continent, the Supreme War Council, were intent upon 
a different and inconsistent settlement. Between Presi- 
dent Wilson and the Supreme War Council there was 
no alternative but war to the death, the elemental 
struggle between right and wrong. 

The terrain of the contest was that chosen by the 
Supreme War Council. It was a region of intellectual 
fog and mist, a moral ground of shifting sand and 
morass, an environment of intangible things, of subtlety 
and indirection. 

The strategy of the Supreme War Council was, first 
of all, to divide the forces of the enemy. It was its 
only hope of victory. Behind President Wilson lay the 
irresistible reserves of world public opinion. If utilized 
against the Supreme War Council no advantages of 
terrain could possibly save its forces from defeat. 
Therefore President Wilson must be cut off from his 
reserves, he must be met and defeated first; after which 



American-Entente Solidarity 113 

the resistance of a leaderless public opinion would be 
quickly dissipated. 

When President Wilson was approaching the shores 
of France the European chancelleries had no certain 
knowledge whether American agencies had detected 
and communicated to the American President the daring 
coup which they were even then executing in the erection 
of the Triangular Framework for the peace. Its 
nature was so essentially hostile to their solemn engage- 
ments with him and with America, and its conception so 
audacious, that, if it had been detected, the President 
would be arriving in Europe in a far different mood 
than had characterized his attitude toward the Entente 
governments before he left New York. In this matter 
the Supreme War Council had much at stake. 

The bearing and utterances of the President, upon 
arrival, would clear this point up. If the President 
knew the significance of the Triangular Framework, 
and the mental reaction which it produced in him was 
strong; then, coincident with his arrival in France, a 
crisis in the relations of the Entente Governments and 
the United States would be precipitated. The Supreme 
War Council would have to enter into deliberations 
immediately of the gravest character with the Amer- 
icans, and the tense situation would have to be handled 
in instant and secret conference. This they were pre- 
pared to do. 33 



> ^The correspondent of the London Times in Paris wrote at this 
time that he had good authority for stating the following outline of 
proceedings as probable: 

"Super-conference to be held at Trianon upon President Wilson's 
arrival. Broad outlines to be settled; to last into January; next step, 



ii4 Lex Talionis 

With the possibility of a short sharp struggle in 
view, the Europeans were prepared for an immediate 
conference to be opened the week of December 16. 
There would be no publicity until its trend was dis- 
closed to them. It would be a wordy battle behind 
closed doors, and whatever its outcome the negotiators 
would come forth from it with smiling faces and the 
appearance of harmony before the world. There 
would be no appeal to public opinion, for the Supreme 
War Council knew that if the truth were disclosed its 
own defeat that would be quick and decisive. 

If it resulted in the establishment of American su- 
premacy, the work of demolishing the Triangular 
Framework would be performed at once, with the 
same lack of ostentation with which it had been con- 
structed. Public opinion would not have been aware 
either of its construction or demolition. The Supreme 
War Council would retrace its steps, which it had 
carefully covered, and its face would be saved. Nego- 
tiations for the merciful peace would thereupon be in- 
stituted in the light of day. 

But after the luncheon at the Elysee Palace on De- 
cember 14, and before a week had elapsed, no Euro- 
pean statesman could fail to see that President Wilson 
either did not understand, and had not been appraised 
by his agents, of the significance of the Triangular 
Framework, of the three faits-accomplis which had 

summoning in March or April of plenary peace conference of allied 
nations. A league of nations to be planned and submitted at a 
subsequent conference. No proper government exists at present to 
represent Germany." 



American-Entente Solidarity 115 

changed the whole European scene while he was on 
the Atlantic; or that if he were aware of them, they 
met his approval, and that, notwithstanding his public 
declarations, he was satisfied that the peace should be 
moulded and fitted into the Triangular Framework. 

Subsequent developments indicate that the first of 
these alternative speculations was adopted by them, and 
was the correct one. 

In either event the European statesmen perceived 
that, even if a crisis was to come at all in their rela- 
tions with the Americans, it would not have to be met 
at the outset. Inasmuch as the Triangular Framework 
was not to be repudiated and demolished by America 
at once, the successful achievement of the Entente 
Peace could be hopefully predicted, as it would now 
proceed automatically towards its own execution 
through the agency of the Armistice Commission, which 
was already proceeding with small regard to the delib- 
erations of the civilians at Paris. 

The crystallization of European purposes was imme- 
diate. The proceedings at Paris were now to be de- 
veloped merely into a process of "killing time," and of 
solicitous care that a state of personal harmony be main- 
tained. No situation must be allowed to rise which 
would precipitate an issue with America over the jurid- 
ical bases of the rights of conquest and tribute, which 
would carry with it on the part of the American Presi- 
dent an appeal to public opinion in America, in the 
Entente countries, and throughout the world. 

The conference was clearly to open in an atmos- 
phere of good feeling. This was recognized as an 



u6 Lex Talionis 

enormous advantage. It was a posture of events which 
greatly heartened the Old World negotiator. With 
reference to Germany, where the extortions of the Ar- 
mistice Commission and the heavy pressure of the 
hunger blockade were beginning to make the purposes 
of the Entente clear, and where President Wilson was 
beginning to be looked upon as the single source from 
which an influence might come to restrain the merciless 
purpose of the Entente, this fact could be used with 
crushing effect in breaking German moral resistance, 
by showing that the United States and President Wil- 
son purposed the same sort of settlement as the Entente 
demanded. 

The Entente statesmen, therefore, perceiving that 
there was no pressure for the immediate convocation of 
formal conferences to undo what was already done, 
encouraged a succession of ceremonials, formalities, and 
popular receptions in honor of the American President, 
which would have the effect of creating universally an 
impression of profound agreement and unity of pur- 
pose between the Government of the United States and 
the Entente Governments (creating a conviction in the 
public mind which at a later date statesmen would 
naturally be loth to destroy), and which would occupy 
the President while time, so necessary to their own con- 
crete purposes, was running. 

These ceremonies, conceived with the most elaborate 
circumspection and conducted with exquisite tact and 
courtesy, were steadily expanded into a program which 
took President Wilson to England and Italy, and lasted 



American- Entente Solidarity 117 

from the time of his arrival in Paris on December 14 
to January 7, 19 19, when he returned there. 84 

, "During the first three weeks of his sojourn in Europe President 
Wilson's activities were as follows — (World Almanac) : 

Saturday, December 14; formal exchange of visits with President 
Poincare, official dejouner at Elysee Palace, conference at Murat 
residence with Colonel House, reception by the President to diplomatic 
corps and government officials. 

Sunday, December 15; conference with House, conference with 
Clemenceau. 

Tuesday, December 17; President laid wreath on tomb of La- 
fayette, attended memorial service, received Jusserand, then Cle- 
menceau, dined with Colonel House. 

Friday, December 20; received official visit of King Victor Im- 
manuel of Italy; Colonel House represented President Wilson at 
Luncheon at Elysee to King of Italy. 

Saturday, December 21; Foreign Minister Pichon gave dinner to 
King of Italy at which Colonel House represented President Wilson. 
King of Italy departed. President worked in morning with Colonel 
House; received Orlando and Sonnino at 10:30 a. m. In afternoon 
returned formal visit of King of Italy. 

Sunday, December 22; Sorbonne conferred degree honora causa 
upon President. 

Tuesday, December 24; Visit to American Hospital at Neuilly, 
also Val de Grace. 

Wednesday, December 25; Church. President visited Langres to 
review American troops, dined there. 

Thursday, December 26 ; President met at Dover in name of King 
by Duke of Connaught. Great demonstration in London, "Bank Holli- 
day." Party met at Charing Cross by King George, the Queen, and 
Princess Mary. King, Queen, President and Mrs. Wilson appeared 
in balcony of Buckingham Palace where President spoke a few words 
to the multitude. Dinner with the King. 

Friday, December 27 ; President received Prime Minister Lloyd 
George. Luncheon with Prime Minister at Downing Street; confer- 
ence with British War Cabinet and leaders of all political parties — 
present, George, Crewe, Curzon, Reading, Gray, Morley, Brice, Bal- 
four, Bonar Law, Asquith, Henderson, Adamson. 

December 28 ; President guest of Lord Mayor of London at Guild 



u8 Lex Talionis 

On the President's part, the opportunity to meet and 
find common ground with many men in high authority, 
to gain personal contact with the peoples of the Entente 
countries, to observe and gauge their feelings and senti- 
ments, and above all to inspire popular support for his 
own purposes, seemed to recommend and justify the 
program to him. 

Seeing a greater analogy between the relations of 
the peoples of Europe to their governments, and the 
relation of the people of the United States to their 
government, than sound observation justified, the 

Hall, luncheon at Mansion House, dinner with Prime Minister and 
Imperial War Cabinet; conference, President, Lloyd George and 
Balfour. 

December 29; At Manchester, at Carlisle. 

December 30; Freedom of Manchester; speeches at Free Trade 
Hall, luncheon at Midland Hotel. President returned to London, 
dined with King. 

Tuesday, December 31; President returned to France. 

Wednesday, January 1 ; President rested. 

Thursday, January 2; En route Italy. 

Friday, January 3; President in Rome; spoke before Italian Par- 
liament. 

Saturday, January 4; President received by King Victor Immanuel 
at Quirinale Palace, address by King. President at residence of 
American Ambassador received Salandra and Bissolati. Made mem- 
ber Royal Academy of Science. Received at Vatican by Pope. Left 
Rome for Genoa. 

Sunday, January 5; Genoa. President delivered address at monu- 
ment of Mazzini, also at Statue of Columbus; acknowledged gift of 
Mazzini's works from Municipality. At Milan, spoke at Royal Palace 
to large delegation; replied to address of welcome by Mayor. 

Monday, January 6; President at Turin. Responded to address 
of welcome at luncheon given by Mayor, spoke at University of Turin. 
Made address at Municipal Building after receiving freedom of City. 



American- Entente Solidarity 119 

President believed that popular opinion in the Entente 
countries might be made to exercise a strong pressure 
upon the governments in favor of his policies, should 
the aid of such pressure become necessary during the 
subsequent negotiations. 

The President remained in France for ten days occu- 
pied with ceremonials and informal conferences. The 
King of Italy and the Prince of Piedmont came to Paris 
on the 19th; the King paid a formal call upon the 
President on the 20th, who returned the call at the 
Foreign Office the next day. 

On the morning of the 21st also the President ac- 
corded a long interview to Premier Orlando and For- 
eign Minister Sonnino of Italy. At this interview 
began the interminable discussions over the Italian 
boundary, with their clashes between doctrinaire prin- 
ciples and the practical necessities of the case, which 
continued intermittently and with increasing ascerbity 
until the ultimate withdrawal of the Italians from the 
conference in the following April. 

On Sunday the President received the degree of 
doctor honoris causa from the Sorbonne and made a 
felicitous speech, which appealed to the generous senti- 
ments of his hearers and sought to further the cause of 
the peace of moderation which he had come to Europe 
to make. Yet the atmosphere of hatred against the 
hereditary enemy of the French was all about him, and 
he was being subtlely influenced — not to abandon his 
insistence upon justice and right, but to manifest a 
generous recognition of the degree of sympathy to 



120 Lex Talionis 

which the French nation was entitled. Hence, in 
acknowledging the honor conferred upon him, he 
thought it fitting to contrast Gallic culture with that of 
Germany to the great disadvantage of the latter. The 
President then went on to emphasize the fact that the 
negotiators at Paris must be guided by the great force 
of moral right, and that the decisions made must be 
consonant with the wishes of public opinion: 

"The triumph of freedom in this war means that that spirit 
shall now dominate the world. There is" a great wave of moral 
force now moving through the world, and every man who 
opposes himself to that wave will go down in disgrace. 

"The tasks of those who are gathered here, or presently will 
be gathered here, to make the settlements of this peace, is 
greatly simplified by the fact that they are the masters of no 
one; they are the servants of mankind, and if we do not heed 
the mandates of mankind we shall make ourselves the most 
conspicuous and deserved failures in the history of the world. 

"My conception of the league of nations is just this — that it 
shall operate as the organized moral force of men throughout 
the world, and that wherever and whenever wrong and aggres- 
sion are planned or contemplated, this searching light of con- 
science will be turned upon them." 

The President appears to have regarded Orlando, 
and especially Sonnino, as types of the reactionary 
statesmen whose policies were to be discredited by the 
new diplomacy. In neither the British nor the French 
statesmen does he appear to have perceived similar 
characteristics. He had already set his face against 
any such settlement of the Italian boundary as the 
Declaration of London of 191 5 contemplated, and 
which they sought to have put into force. The Presi- 



^American- Entente Solidarity 121 

dent's Sorbonne address, following within twenty-four 
hours upon his long interview with the Italians, declar- 
ing that every statesman who opposed himself to the 
great wave of moral force now moving through the 
world would go down in disgrace, seems quite prob- 
ably to have been suggested to him by the results of 
that interview, and to have been a plain warning to 
the Italian statesmen, and to all others who might seek 
to obstruct the proper settlement of the peace, of the 
consequences which such a course of obstruction would 
bring upon themselves. The President at this time was 
convinced of the supreme power of public opinion and 
of his own leadership of it. 

If, however, in his controversy with the Italian states- 
men over the Italian boundary the President hoped that 
an appeal by him to the people of Italy would compel 
the Italian Government to yield, he must have been 
guided by fatally defective or insincere advice. The 
people of Italy, perhaps more fully than any of the 
other Entente populations, were prepared to give their 
support to the American Peace, but it was a support 
which would have to have been summoned in common 
with that of the peoples of England, France and the 
United States, and directed to the accomplishment of 
a common cause. To ask the Italian people at the 
outset to sacrifice the irredenta populations was not a 
well-judged method of testing the President's leader- 
ship of Europan public opinion. A close study of this 
long and devastating controversy leads to the conclu- 
sion that it was in its nature a general European intrigue 
to destroy American leadership. 



i22 Lex Talionis 

On the 24th of December the President left Paris to 
spend Christmas Day with the American troops at 
Langres, then to go immediately to London to accept 
the invitation of his Britannic Majesty to visit England. 

The President had been in Paris for ten days. There 
is not a trace of evidence to indicate that his advisors 
had brought to him the concrete proofs of the duplicity 
with which he was being encompassed. The subtlety 
of the Europeans, notwithstanding the signs which were 
visible in salons, hotel lobbies, in the press, and on the 
street, had disarmed suspicion and had produced in the 
President's mind a sense of accord and of general 
acquiescence in the purposes which he entertained. The 
only occurrence of these ten days which stands out in 
clear relief is the opening episode of the dangerous 
Italian controversy. Such opposition as the President 
had there encountered appeared to him to be of minor 
importance. 

The President's words to the American troops at 
Langres on Christmas Day do not reveal the slightest 
suspicion that the American peace was in peril. On the 
contrary they show confidence and optimism: 

"Everybody concerned in the settlement knows that it must 
be a peoples' peace, and that nothing must be done in the 
settlement of the issues of the war which is not as handsome 
as the great achievements of the armies of the United States 
and the allies. 

"You knew what we expected of you and you did it. I 
know what you and the people at home expected of me, and 
I am happy to say, My Fellow Countrymen, that I do not find 
in the hearts of the great leaders with whom it is now my 



American-Entente Solidarity 123 

privilege to cooperate, any difference of principle or of funda- 
mental purpose. It happened that it was the privilege of 
America to present the chart for peace. 

"And now the process of settlement has been rendered com- 
paratively simple by the fact that all the nations concerned 
have accepted that chart, and by the application of these prin- 
ciples the world will now know that the nations who fought 
this war as well as the soldiers who represented them, are ready 
to make good, not only in the assertion of their own interests, 
but make good in the establishment of peace upon the perma- 
nent foundation of right and justice." 

Thus, at Christmas time, having been in contact with 
the French and Italian statesmen for ten days, the 
President is able to say that he does not find in their 
hearts any difference of principle or of fundamental 
purpose. He believed that all nations had "accepted 
the chart which it was the privilege of America to 
present." He felt no doubt as to the sincerity of the 
Continental statesmen in this vital matter. 

The President and his party arrived in London the 
day after Christmas, having been met at Dover by the 
Duke of Connaught in the name of the King. At 
Charing Cross they were met by the King, the Queen 
and Princess Mary. Press accounts stated that London, 
which was celebrating "Bank Holiday," gave the Presi- 
dent "an absolutely royal welcome." After arriving at 
Buckingham Palace the President and Mrs. Wilson, 
with the King and the Queen in the background, ap- 
peared for a few moments at one of the Palace bal- 
conies to acknowledge the salutations of the people. 

In response to the toast of the King at the official 



124 Lex Talionis 

dinner given that night in the Royal Palace the Presi- 
dent said: 

"It will take more moral courage to resist the great moral 
tide which is running through the world than to submit to and 
obey it. There is a great current in the hearts of men. The 
hearts of men have never before beaten in such remarkable 
unison. Never before have men been so conscious of their 
brotherhood. Never before have they really understood how 
little difference there was between the words right and justice 
in one latitude or another, under one sovereignty or another. 

"It will be our high privilege to apply not only the moral 
judgment of the world to particular rules, but to organize the 
moral force of humanity, and establish that right and justice 
to which our great nations are devoted." 

It is important to note that on the morning of the 
next day the President received Prime Minister Lloyd 
George. This meeting was followed by a luncheon 
given by the Prime Minister in Downing Street, at 
which the members of the British War Cabinet and the 
leaders of all the political parties were present. The 
presence of Asquith, Henderson and Adamson indi- 
cated the harmony with which all political parties were 
supporting the Ministry. 35 

SG The following announcements were made the next day in the 
public press: 

"Reuters Agency announces that it is authorized to say that the 
conversations between President Wilson and the War Cabinet were 
satisfactory. They comprised many subjects and included the Four- 
teen Points." — London Times, December 28. 

"Conferences between Lloyd George, Balfour and President Wil- 
son were in the highest degree satisfactory." — London Times, Decem- 
ber 28. 



.American-Entente Solidarity 125 

Concerning the results of these meetings the Presi- 
dent said the next day at Guild Hall. 

"In my conferences with the directors of your Government, 
it was very agreeable to recognize how our ideas followed the 
same direction, and our thoughts were always that the key of 
the peace was the guarantee of the peace and not its details; 
that the details would have no value unless a concert of powers 
was behind them". 

The ceremonies at the Guild Hall on Saturday were 
conducted amidst a scene of great splendour, in which 
the scarlet robes of the Aldermen, and the white wigs 
and mediaeval costumes of functionaries, afforded a 
picture such as is never seen in the United States. Here 
the President spoke of the remarkable unity of emotions 
which he found, saying that the war had been fought to 
end an old order and create a new; that the principle 
of a balance of power held by the sword must be aban- 
doned, and the principle of a league of nations adopted, 
that this was once regarded as a hope of cloistered stu- 
dents, something to think of but never attain, but that 
now we find practical statesmen determined to attain 
it. The coming peace conference, he said, would prove 
to be the "final enterprise of humanity." 

At the Mansion House where the President was the 
guest of the Lord Mayor he spoke informally in a way 
that awoke the warmest response. In optimistic tones 
he said: 

"Our spirits are released from the darkness of clouds that 
at one time seemed to have settled upon the world in a way 
that would not be dispersed ; the sufferings of your own people, 
the sufferings of the people of France, the infinite suffering of 



126 Lex Talionis 

the people of Belgium, the whisper of grief that has blown 
all through the world, is now silent, and the sun of hope seems 
to spread its rays and to charge the earth with a new prospect 
of happiness. So our joy is all the more elevated because we 
know that our spirits are now lifted out of , the valley." 

The President dined that night with the Imperial 
War Cabinet, and again held conferences with Lloyd 
George and Balfour. 36 

The reception accorded the President in Manchester 
the next day, as was to be expected in that industrial 
center, was no less enthusiastic but much more informal. 
Replying to the address of the Mayor at Free Trade 
Hall on December 29 the President said: 

"If the future has nothing for us but a new attempt to keep 
the world at a right poise by a balance of power, the United 
States would take no interest, because she will join no com- 
bination of nations which is not a combination of all of us. She 
is not interested merely in the peace of Europe, but in the 
peace of the world". 

He spoke again of the great voice of humanity 
abroad in the world which the statesmen of all nations 
must heed and obey or go down in ignominious dis- 
grace. "And now that there is no common enemy ex- 

30 The Imperial War Cabinet no doubt made real use of the follow- 
ing: 

"The Spartacist Group have proclaimed a Liebknecht-Ledebour 
government to overthrow Ebert and Haase." — (Berlin dispatch to 
London, December 27.) 

"Reports have reached the Hague that the extremists have seized 
power in Berlin, and that Herr Ebert's Government is virtually no 
longer existent." — (London Times, December 28.) 

The first of these dispatches was misleading and the second was 
distinctly false. 



.American-Entente Solidarity 127 

cept distrust and marring of plans, we can all feel the 
same eagerness in, the new combat and feel there is a 
common enterprise before us". "Now that there is 
no common enemy", says the President. Quite obviously 
he visualizes the reestablishment of a general spirit 
of friendship with the former enemies, and when he 
says at Free Trade Hall, "the United States would 
join no combination of nations which is not a combina- 
tion of all of us," he visualizes a league* of nations 
which will include the enemy nations also. His expres- 
sions were general, however, and seemed to raise no 
concrete issue. 

President Wilson returned to London, December 30, 
and dined again with their Majesties at Buckingham 
Palace. The results of the elections of December 14, 
theretofore undisclosed, were announcd in the London 
papers on that day. The next day, the last of De- 
cember, the President was again in France. 

President Wilson had been in England nearly a week. 
Nothing in the circumstances of his visit as the guest 
of the British Sovereign awakened distrust of the mo- 
tives of his hosts, or suspicion that it was their purpose 
to sabotage the American Peace. 

The President's words continued to breathe unim- 
paired confidence in his own principles, and gave every 
indication that he expected the full and ungrudging sup- 
port of the British Ministry in translating them into a 
concrete peace settlement. When he told his Guild Hall 
audience that he had found that the ideas of the British 
Ministers had followed the same direction as his own, 
and that their thoughts were always that the key of 



12 



8 Lex Talionis 



the peace was the guarantee of the peace and not 
its details, there seems little doubt that whatever was 
in the minds of the British Ministers, the guarantee 
which the President visualized was a league of nations 
which should include all, enemies as well as friends, and 
that he expected the cooperation of the British Min- 
istry to this end. The conversation of the Ministers 
with whom he had been closetted had assured him of 
frank cooperation and support for the American Peace, 
which all knew must be based squarely upon the pro- 
visions of the Trianon Hotel Pact. The Old World's 
most astute and polished minds, cooperating in a single 
purpose, and exercising exquisite tact in a disingenuous 
cause, had not only concealed the plot which had con- 
structed the Triangular Framework of the Entente 
Peace, but by exhausting the arts of hypocracy, had con- 
firmed the American President in the conviction that 
they frankly accepted his leadership. 

New Year's Day was spent in Paris. The next day 
the President left for Rome where he arrived Friday, 
January 3. The Italian journey included visits to Genoa, 
Milan and Turin. 

These visits were remarkable for the enthusiasm of 
the popular demonstrations with which the President 
was greeted. His own enthusiasm seemed to rise in 
harmony with it. At the University of Turin, where 
a degree was conferred upon him, the President best 
expressed the magnitude of the hope which he enter- 
tained for better things. 

"After all when we are seeking peace we are seeking nothing 
else than this: that men shall think the same thoughts, govern 



American-Entente Solidarity 129 

themselves by the same impulses, entertain the same purposes, 
love their own people but also love humanity, and above all 
else love that great and indestructible thing which we call 
justice and right". 37 

The unlimited confidence and enthusiasm with which, 
in Italy, the President forecast a healing peace, and 
the great emotional enthusiasm with which the people 
received him, were both enhanced, and are largely ac- 
counted for, by the plain inference to be drawn from 



'"Some of the more significant of the utterances of President Wilson in 
Italy are quoted below: 

"The world is not now going to consist of great empires. It is going 
to consist for the most part of small nations apparently, and the only 
thing that can bind such nations together is the knowledge that each 
wants to treat the other* fairly. . . 

"The social structure rests upon the great working classes of the 
world, and those working classes in several countries of the world 
have, by their consciousness of community of interest, by their con- 
sciousness of community of spirit, done more perhaps than any other 
influence has to establish a world opinion which is not of a nation, 
which is not of a continent, but is the opinion, one might say, of 
mankind. . . Those of us who are now charged with the great and 
serious responsibility of concluding peace must think, act and confer 
in the presence of this opinion. . . . We are not the masters of the 
fortunes of any nation, but are the servants of mankind ; it is not our 
privilege to follow special interests but it is our manifest duty to study 
only the general interests. . . .The representatives of the Govern- 
ments at Paris are not the real makers of war and peace; you are 
the makers of war and peace. The pulse of the modern world beats 
on the farms and in the mines and in the factories. . . .We are not 
foreigners to each other; we think the same thoughts, we entertain the 
same purposes, we have the same ideals. . . .The light that shone 
upon the summit now seems to shine almost at our feet, and if we 
lose it it will be only because we have lost faith and courage, for we 
have it in our power to attain it." 



130 Lex Talionis 

the attitude of the French and British statesmen, that 
the great powers of Europe were prepared to cooperate 
in the liberal settlements which the American President 
had outlined. In early January he himself had no 
doubt of this. No statesman who spoke as the Presi- 
dent did at the University of Turin could at that time 
have harbored the purpose of participating in a settle- 
ment which was to repudiate moral obligation and pass 
upon the entire people of a fallen nation a sentence of 
outlawry, reducing them by a process of starvation to 
a state of industrial bondage. 

From Turin the President returned to Paris,, arriv- 
ing there January 7. His words uttered in the great 
industrial cities of northern Italy, in addresses before 
throngs of people, had aroused intense enthusiasm. He 
voiced the aspirations of plain men and seemed to bring 
within measurable distance that state of universal jus- 
tice of which men theretofore had only been permitted 
to dream. "The social structure rests upon the great 
working classes of the world. . . Those of us now 
charged with the great and serious responsibility of 
concluding peace must think, act and confer in the 
presence of this opinion. . . We are not the masters 
of the fortunes of any nation but are the servants of 
mankind. . . The pulse of the modern world beats 
on the farms and in the mines and in the factories. . . 
Men shall love their own people but shall also love 
humanity, and above all love that great and inde- 
structible thing that we call justice and right. . . The 
light that shone upon the mountain-top now seems to 
shine almost at our feet, and if we lose it it will be only 



American-Entente Solidarity 131 

because we have lost faith and courage, for we have 
it in our power to attain it". 

The President's utterances so thrilled the masses of 
workers that "II Wilsonismo," as they named the 
philosophy which moved them so deeply, seemed to 
be a force which might gain irresistible power. But 
except at Rome the President had spoken only in 
Italy's large but few industrial cities of the north. 
There the principles of socialism were strong and 
insistent, but elsewhere in Italy the new doctrines of the 
industrial age were scarcely known. From Tuscany 
and Umbria through Apulia to Sicily the lives of towns- 
men and contadine were keyed to a rythme which had 
changed but little through the long centuries. 

There, instincts are strongly national, and through- 
out Italy, even in the industrial districts of the north, 
patriotic enthusiasm is so great that in any case the 
leadership of the foreigner is bound to be precarious, 
and is sure to be lost at once if it seems to fail in 
appreciation of Italian national interests. 

While in Rome the President had been permitted to 
confer with the socialist, Leonida Bissolati, a member 
of the Cabinet who was opposing the Government's 
Adriatic policy. A few days later Bissolati precipitated 
a cabinet crisis by resigning, in the hope that the Italian 
Government might be forced thereby to modify its 
nationalistic position at Paris. Bissolati's influence and 
prestige were entirely insufficient to create a serious 
situation for the Government, and the only result of 
his resignation was to strengthen the hands of the 
Orlando Cabinet. The suggestion that influences from 



132 Lex Talionis 

without were seeking to bring about internal changes 
would always rally general support to the ministry in 
a country where nationalistic instincts were so deep as 
among the people of Italy. 

As time passed and it became the conviction of 
Italians generally that President Wilson's position at 
Paris was hostile to Italian interests, the enthusiasm 
which his personality and principles had inspired to so 
spontaneous demonstrations at the beginning of Janu- 
ary passed away almost as rapidly as it had appeared. 
It quickly gave way to criticism which, as the Italian 
controversy at Paris grew more involved, developed 
into positive hostility. The repercussion at Paris of 
, this national feeling, where the influence of the Italians 
in other matters of far more general importance was 
not to be ignored, was to become a matter of thegreat- 
est significance. 

We have seen how in England President Wilson had 
been robbed of the support of public opinion before 
his arrival, by the holding of general elections upon a 
dishonest issue chosen by the Ministry. In Italy the 
same result is obtained, but the political phenomenon 
which accompanies it is different. Here the President 
is permitted, even encouraged, to seek to increase his 
prestige by direct personal contact with the people, even 
to confer at the American Embassy with a politician 
who is in direct opposition to the Government's policies 
(for former premier Salandra accompanied Bissolati 
in his call upon President Wilson.) 

Whether acting with the approval of President Wil- 
son or not (whether lured on by more astute Italian 



American-Entente Solidarity 133 

statesmen for their own purposes or not) Bissolati pre- 
cipitated a crisis over the Adriatic issue, and created 
a situation in which the Italian people seemed to be 
given the alternative of supporting President Wilson 
or their own Government, and on an issue in which 
the Government's position was, in fact, approved by an 
overwhelming majority of the people. On this issue 
the Italian Government won; Bissolati resigned; and 
thereafter there was no more question that public opin- 
ion in Italy would support government policy in the 
peace conference at Paris then there was that English 
opinion would support the British Ministry. 

The best that can be said with reference to the 
causes of this extraordinary episode is that President 
Wilson's American advisors had not sufficient knowl- 
edge of the complexities of the Italian question to 
advise him properly. The worst that might be said is 
that a peculiarly subtle political intrigue set the stage 
and devised the play that would rob the champion of 
public opinion of his leadership in Italy, and send him 
away in the condition of Samson shorn of his locks. 

President Wilson returned to Paris on January 7 
with the applause of the Italian people sounding in his 
ears. He was desirous of taking up at once the prac- 
tical questions of the peace settlement. 

These three weeks devoted to ceremonials and 
courtesies had a psychological aspect which sets them 
apart from the long months which follow in the process 
of making the treaty. During that time a curtain had 
been allowed to fall, as it were, between the partici- 
pants in its activities and the realities which were mak- 



134 Lex Talionis 

ing Europe a place of misery and fear; and which shut 
out like a baize-covered door the confused cries of dis- 
tress from without. Within there was warmth, har- 
mony, graciousness, courtesy, good-will, hope ; the crea- 
tion of lasting memories of personal friendships, friend- 
ships which it was the firm purpose of all nothing 
should be allowed to break. 38 

Upon the President's return to Paris on January 7 
the baize-covered door could not be kept entirely shut, 
and the raucous noises began to enter. What the 
Supreme War Council, the only governing body in 
Europe, was doing, must now be disclosed in part, 
at any rate, to the Americans. 

3S The Mansion House address discloses all too clearly the failure 
of the President to preceive how rapidly the tide of destructive forces 
was already running against the American Peace: 

"Our spirits are released from the darkness of clouds that at one 
time seemed to have settled upon the world in a way that could not 
be dispersed, the sufferings of your own people, the sufferings of the 
people of France, the infinite sufferings of the people of Belgium, the 
whisper of grief that has blown all through the world, is now silent, 
and the sun of hope now seems to spread its rays and to charge the 
earth with a new prospect of happiness. So our joy is all the more 
elevated because we know that our spirits are now lifted out of the 
valley." 



CHAPTER V 

The Second Armistice Renewal. 

THE pacification of Europe on an imperalistic basis, 
which the Supreme War Council would have been 
able to undertake had it been assured of American 
support, could not be attempted at the risk of a breach 
with the United States. The Supreme War Council 
was skillful in effecting faits-accomplis, but the use of 
military force on a major scale was too obvious a pro- 
ceeding at a time when President Wilson was urging 
the spirit of conciliation upon the peoples of the 
Entente. That method more than any other would 
alienate American support. 

Imperialistic policies, therefore, were cautiously pur- 
sued, with the result that the authority of Paris was 
everywhere distrusted or openly defied. Europe 
plunged deeper into disorder as a result of this play of 
cross purposes. 

A soviet imperialism was fast forming in Russia. 
All along its fringes it was being fought by anti-Bol- 
shevist volunteer organizations and governments. Arch- 
angel was being held against it. Democratic majorities 
in Esthonia, Lithuania and Lettland were presenting a 
desperate military resistance to the advance of bol- 
shevist armies. The Letton troops lacked equipment 
and organization; the Lithuanian army was good. A 
Bolshevist regime in Riga ordered the arrest of all be- 
longing to the bourgeois classes, and did away with 



136 Lex Talionis 

distinctions of property. Here and elsewhere bourgeois 
who resisted were killed or imprisoned. Adherents 
of the Bolshevist cause were fed and others left to 
starve. Admiral Kolchak at Omsk maintained an inde- 
pendent position at the head of an anti-bolshevist army, 
and to him messages of encouragement were sent 
through the French Foreign Office. General Denekine 
in the Caucasus was resisting the bolshevist advance to 
the southward. The Ukraine was wavering between 
independence and adherence to the soviet. The Bol- 
shevist pressure against Poland was heavy; there were 
bolshevist disorders in Warsaw. Switzerland gave 
its recognition to the independent government in Lithu- 
ania. Finland sent aid to Esthonia. Bolshevism scaled 
the Carpathians, and was gaining a foothold in Hun- 
gary. In the German Eastmark it made no impression. 
A revolutionary school at Moscow, under the deanship 
of Karl Radek, was graduating enthusiastic propagan- 
dists to go east and west, as militant apostles of the 
bolshevist principle. 

Poland was anti-bolshevist, but divided against itself. 
The ancient landed aristocracy sought to establish a 
Franco-Polish oligarchy as an integral part of the 
Entente. They would have no compromise with the 
Germans, and their forces were already in upper Silesia 
and Posen, advancing to within a hundred kilometers 
of the frontier of Brandenburg. The Germans re- 
sisted stubbornly, refusing to relinquish these territories 
until the Peace Conference had acted. 

They were represented at Paris by a National Com- 
mittee working in close understanding with the French 



The Second Armistice Renewal 137 

Foreign Office. Ignace Paderewski was their choice 
for Premier, and this choice was no doubt occasioned 
partly because of the popularity of the great virtuoso in 
the United States, a consideration which they believed 
would gain the support of the American Government. 
Paderewski arrived at Danzig on an English cruiser 
on December 21, and was received with great enthu- 
siasm by Korfanty and the Poles. On the 26th he 
entered Posen .in a coach-and-four on his way to 
Warsaw. 

But General Pilsudski, who had been a prisoner in 
Germany, headed a different element in Poland, and 
one no less powerful. He and his followers did not 
recognize the authority of the Polish National Com- 
mittee at Paris. They advocated a constituent assem- 
bly in which the new Polish districts in Hungary, Lithu- 
ania, West Prussia and Posnania should take part. 
They sent a special commission to Paris, which arrived 
there January 4th, and precipitated one of the major 
controversies of the Peace Conference. 

The new and enthusiastic republic of Czecho-Slovakia 
did not find it convenient to wait for the Peace Con- 
ference to define its boundaries. It occupied Troppau 
in Austrian Silesia on December 18, and shortly after- 
ward Presburg. President Masaryk arrived in Prague 
before Christmas to give active leadership to the state. 
"Bohemia", said Karadnik, Minister of Railways, 
"must be considered henceforth as the real center of 
Europe". There was some difficulty in making the 
Slovaks realize that they were a part of the new state. 

The reunion of Montenegro and Servia was an- 



138 Lex Talionis 

nounced at Paris in happily phrased terms on December 
22. It was effected by the entry of French troops, after 
some resistance, into Cettinje, as a part of the rapid 
coalescence of various elements under French persua- 
sion into the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes (Jugoslavia) and under the Dynasty of the 
Karageorges. 

The rapid growth of the Jugoslav state under French 
influence was accompanied with an equally rapid in- 
crease of apprehension in Italy. A power seemed to 
be growing up across the Adriatic composed of ele- 
ments traditionally hostile to Italy. It challenged 
Italy's interests in Dalmatia, Fiume and Istria, and 
it was being supported by more than one of Italy's 
allies. In the cafes across the Adriatic Italians were 
being openly attacked, and were not receiving the pro- 
, tection of the French guards. On January ist the com- 
mander of an American squadron in the Adriatic had 
said to a Jugoslav delegation." Every American is a 
partisan of the Jugoslav cause." 

The Roumanians annexed Bukovina ; they entered 
Transylvania and began an advance into Hungary's 
eastern provinces, occupying Petrosky, Hungary's only 
oil field. In the Banat, claimed by both Servia and 
Roumania, French troops took up their positions in 
a neutral zone to prevent the outbreak of war. Hun- 
gary, divested by force of all her territories except 
Budapest and the alluvial plain of the Danube, was 
facing intolerable conditions, and Count Karolyi, striv- 
ing by a liberal administration to stay the tide of Bol- 
shevism, warned the Entente of catastrophe and ex- 



The Second Armistice Renewal 139 

pressed the fear that Wilson would not prevail. Con- 
stantinople was occupied by British and French troops. 
The Batum-Baku railway across the Caucasus was be- 
ing operated under British control. The blockade 
against Syria and Asia Minor was partially lifted. 

Under this general state of affairs, living conditions 
for the various populations of Europe were pitifully 
inadequate. The great network of customs conven- 
tions, the zolverein systems of Central Europe, a slow 
growth out of peace-time psychology, had been swept 
away in the day of war. Now all frontiers were 
sealed. Behind them distrustful and hostile groups 
faced each other. The ordinary interchanges of com- 
modities, absolutely necessary to sustain the life of the 
peoples, were prohibited. Actual starvation super- 
vened everywhere. 

The French had a clearcut policy. It was to give 
ample military support to Poland at once, and to make 
war on Soviet Russia. It also contemplated the mili- 
tary occupation of Germany, and the garrisoning of all 
centres of disturbance elsewhere. It sought equalibrium 
by movement. They hoped to involve President Wil- 
son in this enterprise before the settlement with Ger- 
many was undertaken. The Supreme War Council, 
therefore, was in no hurry to organize the Peace Con- 
ference, and it had no intention of doing so, or of 
yielding, in any respect, to American influences until 
action at Paris was first taken on the renewal of the 
powers of the Armistice Commission, not later than the 
1 2th of January. 

Hence, while Paris was awaiting President Wilson's 



140 Lex Talionis 

return from Italy, the suggestion was being made to 
the Americans that preliminary meetings to fix the 
number of delegates and settle questions of precedure 
should be held about the middle of January. It was 
thought appropriate that a council should be created 
in which the Great Powers should have five delegates 
each and the small powers two or three, and that the 
latter should be represented only when their special 
interests were under consideration. 

There was much talk about the organization of a 
great commission for food relief under Mr. Hoover. 
In this matter it was generally agreed that, with the 
exception of fats, Germany had enough food to carry 
on for a while, and that relief should first be given in 
territories that had been under German occupation. It 
was estimated that in these territories a hundred and 
twenty-five million people were facing starvation. A 
million-and-a-half tons of food, of the value of three 
hundred and fifty million dollars, was immediately 
required. 

The supplying of any food to Germany was, of 
course, inconsistent with the successful working of the 
Supreme War Council's Triangular Framework. Still 
unaware of the existence of this framework, the Amer- 
icans do not appear to have interposed any serious 
objection to an indefinite postponement of food relie f 
for Germany; and throughout the winter the work of 
this commission, which was rapidly organized on a 
large scale, was confined to regions outside of Ger- 
many. It took definite organization about the middle 
of January, undertook the coordination of food, fi- 



The Second Armistice Renewal 141 

nances and shipping resources, and was one of the 
few constructive forces which emanated from Paris 
while the Peace Conference was sitting. It powerfully 
resisted the western spread of the spirit of Bolshevism; 
and American enterprise, energy and generosity alone 
made its activities possible. Out of these activities 
grew the body which was created on February 8th and 
known as the Supreme Economic Council. 

Throughout December the German Government was 
making every appeal in its power for food relief. The 
peril that confronted it was not merely, like that of 
other parts of Europe, that its immediate needs might 
be ignored. It saw itself faced with a wartime block- 
ade, more thorough than before the Armistice, whose 
conscious purpose was starvation. Its own efforts to 
obtain food from without would be directly frustrated 
by that blockade. Germany was not to be abandoned 
to starvation; starvation was to be inflicted upon it. 

On December 20th, again the German Government 
had dared to appeal direct to the American Secretary 
of State, and again acceptance of the communication 
was refused. Appeals were made on behalf of "Ger- 
man womanhood and of German babies". Brockdorff- 
Rantzau was appointed Foreign Minister at the end 
of December. In accepting office he announced Ger- 
many's purpose to adhere to the Fourteen Points. Com- 
menting on utterances of Pichon as to Entente policies 
he expressed doubt whether "from the ruins of past 
years a really new and better world would arise". 

At Paris, it was said, this speech did not arouse any 
enthusiasm, even in American circles. Germany, they 



142 Lex Talionis 

said, should convince the world that she would not 
deviate from the Fourteen Points, and should know 
that, in spite of inter-allied discussions, the Americans 
were in Paris, like the Allies, to make a victorious, noc 
a negotiated peace. It does not appear to have oc- 
curred to the Americans that there was any room for 
argument, as to whether this statement of the facts 
was entirely sound, or to find in it anything incongruous 
with the tenor of the long series of public utterances in 
Europe which the President was even then concluding 
at Turin. 

The British Radio Station at Lands-End, on Janu- 
ary 5th, commented for the benefit of the peoples of 
the world on the German appeals — "Systematic at- 
tempts being made by Germany to exaggerate food 
shortage; hunger bogey". An American, in a position 
to speak with much authority, said, with reference to 
German disorders "The greatest care is necessary so as 
to have a responsible government to deal with. At the 
same time, German statesmen must have no hope of 
gaining the sympathy of the United States by currying 
favor". 

An American journalist, gauging sentiment among 
the members of the American staff, said, "There is no 
row over indemnities or assessments of damages against 
Germany. There is complete accord that Germany 
must be made to pay to the limit of her capacity." 

Any real adherence to the Wilson principles in the 
American staff had thus already deliquesced under the 
influence of European solvents. President Wilson, on 
returning to Paris, would be without the support of an 



The Second Armistice Renewal 143 

organization in full understanding and sympathy with 
his purposes. Notwithstanding the disaffection among 
his own forces, he held his position for many weeks 
with much tenacity of purpose. 

On his return to Paris, President Wilson desired to 
proceed at once to the business of peace making. It 
was the American proposal, first, to form a practical 
league of nations on, at least, a provisional basis, which 
might be built about the practical nucleii of inter-allied 
boards and councils, some of which were already in 
existence. There would be constituted at once a super- 
national authority, which would take over the powers 
of the Supreme War Council. The constitution of this 
organization would contain, first of all, a definition of 
principles, few and simple, and not to be applied pedan- 
tically. In the light of these principles specific terri- 
torial and political issues would be judged. 

Lord Robert Cecil and Mr. Balfour arrived some 
days before President Wilson, and evinced great inter- 
est in this program. Three distinct plans for a league 
of nations were launched; one by Lord Robert Cecil, 
one by General Smuts, and one by Leon Bourgeois. 
They contemplated a league which would embrace all 
nations, and would not establish a balance of power. 
As a matter of fact, the sudden ending of the war had 
taken everybody by surprise, and no common plan for 
a league of nations had been discussed. 

After the President's arrival these discussions took 
a wide field; in them, the question of the approaching 
renewal of the armistice was merely touched upon, and 
it was generally agreed that it should be handled pri- 



144 Lex Talionis 

marily as a military matter. In comparison with the 
great questions which were now occupying his attention, 
the President regarded it as a detail and of minor im- 
portance. The Americans also regarded the Italian 
boundry issue as settled. 

There were now thirty or more delegations in Paris, 
hundreds of experts and thousands of attaches and 
members of staffs, each delegation having an entire 
library. The library of the American delegation was 
said to contain ten thousand volumes. "Paris" said 
the Journal des Debats, "is likely to be smothered under 
the bureaucratic invasion." 

Reports reached Paris that on January 5th the Ger- 
man Armistice Commission was strenuously opposing 
compliance with the provisions of the "protocole fi- 
nancier" attached to the armistice convention of De- 
cember 14th, which gave the Allies control of German 
foreign credits; and had also flatly refused to deliver 
the two-and-a-half million tons of merchant shipping 
which Foch demanded. The Armistice Commission at 
Spa on January 9th denied the German request to be 
permitted to forward food in German coastwise 
steamers between German ports. 

Berlin, at the end of December, became the scene 
of violent Bolshevist efforts to gain control of the instru- 
mentalities of government. The Europeans all insisted 
that there was no recognizable government in Ger- 
many with which to deal at that time, and their judg- 
ment that the actual making of the peace with Germany 
should be the last subject on the agenda found quite 
general support among the Americans. An American 



The Second Armistice Renewal 145 

"in high executive position" volunteered the prophecy 
on January 10th that "all Germany within sixty days 
would be under the military rule of forces commanded 
by Foch, as elements of disorder were getting the upper 
hand." 39 

Some sections of the British press at this time mani- 
fested impatience at the long delay in the making of 
the peace which was now foreshadowed, and urged a 
general peace settlement leaving details until later. 
"Peace" said the Daily Mail, "could be signed within a 

39 The political philosophy of the French Ministry which was all 
about the Americans is reflected in the following summary of editorial 
opinion in Le Temps from the ist to the ioth of January: 

On January i the Temps quotes Clemenceau, "Out of old stones 
we are pretending to construct an entirely new edifice. It is impos- 
sible." To build a new world it would be necessary first to build a 
new Germany. Where is it? For several weeks of revolution the 
government has vacillated between anarchy and reaction. For the 
moment reaction seems to prevail. The consulate of Ebert and Haase 
is replaced by Ebert and Scheidemann — two heads under the same 
hat. Thus power has completely escaped the Independent Social- 
ists, i. e., the men who did not await defeat to protest against the war. 

After stating that Ditmann and Barth, both dismissed, had been 
workers for the revolution, and are now replaced by Noske, Wissel 
and Loebe, all reactionaries, the Temps continues: 

"It remains to be seen how the government can live. After the 
stiikes of last week one can see only two solutions — master Berlin 
or quit Berlin. To master Berlin they must have loyal troops. It is 
what Frederick William IV did in 1848 and what Ebert is trying to 
do now. But discipline is lax. Under these conditions can Scheide- 
mann govern Berlin? It appears doubtful. While the German menace 
remains insoluble you cannot rebuild a new edifice in the world." 

Referring to President Wilson's speech at Manchester, the day be- 
fore, which breathed conciliation, the Temps advocates a settlement 
"on the only base possible" — permanent friendship among the conquer- 
ing nations. It again quotes Clemenceau, "There is a system of 



146 



Lex Talionis 



month." It was true, but this view was a menace to 
the purposes of the British Ministry and the Supreme 
War Council, and was soon silenced by the positive 
assertion that the state of Germany precluded the 
recognition of her plenipotentiaries at this time. On 
January 10th it was falsely reported in Paris that 
Ebert, Scheidemann and Lansberg had resigned under 
Bolshevist pressure. This argument, therefore, pre- 

alliances which I do not renounce. I say it plainly. It is my directing 
thought in the conference.'" 

On January 2 the Temps takes issue with President Wilson's 
idealism, declaring that bases must be chosen conformable to ex- 
perience ; that true apostles are not dreamers but are realists. The 
Germans are not fit for a league of nations. Erzberger, famous for 
his thirty million marks propaganda, has published a book on the 
league of nations. The Germans all repeat Mr. Wilson's formulas. 
Kant edited his "Perpetual Peace" at Konigsberg in 1795 ; it has not 
fructified yet. Will it do so now? It is but a hypothesis. After 
so many men have been killed it is not a hypothesis upon which we 
have the right to found peace. Certainties are necessary. That is 
what Clemenceau has just said in his speech at the Palais Bourbon. 
France wants no more invasions: it is a question of frontiers and 
military preparation. Clemenceau says, "My principal preoccupation, 
I confess, is not to give trial to too many hopes." Which way! The 
nation has not forgotten. It judges the future by the past, and wants 
a peace worthy of victory. 

On January 10. "The Scheidemann Government appears to have 
gained the advantage yesterday. How much and for how long? We 
shall see. Joffe has sent an insolent message from Moscow, saying 
•he awaits the fall of the Ebert-Scheidemann Government, and will 
not have to wait long. The Bolshevists are right in expecting its 
early fall. * * * In November we wanted to separate Russian Bol- 
shevism from German anarchy by a strong Poland. That is not now 
enough. It is in Germany itself that it is necessary to act. The orderly 
regions of west and south Germany should be protected from a Lieb- 
knecht regime. They should have their own money, customs, railways, 
public forces. Pensons-y!" 



The Second Armistice Renewal 147 

vailed over the suggestion that steps be taken for the 
conclusion of a quick preliminary peace with Germany. 

President Wilson had evinced a desire for official 
conferences to begin not later than January 9th for the 
purpose of organization. But, to his disappointment, 
Lloyd George had not arrived in Paris, having been 
delayed in England by demobilization problems. He 
was further delayed by the necessity of reorganizing 
his Cabinet, and would not arrive before the 12th. 
Premier Orlando also, it was made known, would have 
to be in Rome for the opening of Parliament on the 
nth. Manifestly preliminary meetings could not be 
held until the following week. Even nature seemed 
to conspire to delay the commencement of peace nego- 
tiations, for the waters of the rapidly rising Seine 
almost overflowed the stone embankments of the Quai 
d'Orsay and threatened to make the Foreign Office in- 
accessible. 

The true reason for delaying a start in the peace 
making was different from any of these. The Supreme 
War Council was manoeuvering until the critical mo- 
ment for renewing the powers of the Armistice Com- 
mission for thirty days should arrive on January 12th 
and be safely passed. 

There is a sad instance just here of Old World po- 
litical finesse which the American observer would like 
to pass by, but which makes the European methods so 
obvious that it should not be ignored. A day or two 
after the President's return to Paris from Italy, when 
it was clear that, owing to the apparently necessary 
absence of George and Orlando, no formal steps toward 



148 Lex Talionis 

organization could for the moment be undertaken, Am- 
bassador Jusserand, who had accompanied President 
Wilson to Europe on the George Washington, sug- 
gested that the President utilize the intervening days 
to make a visit to Belgium and the devastated regions, 
something which the French public had long desired, 
and which the French press had persistently suggested 
that he do. But President Wilson was now unwilling 
that anything should delay further progress, and de- 
clined the invitation. 

Whatever motive may be ascribed to Ambassador 
Jusserand and the European diplomats concerned in 
this suggestion, the fact remains that had President 
Wilson accepted the invitation, he would have returned 
fresh from the inspection of war horrors, no detail of 
which would have been allowed to escape him, and 
with a mind more receptive than at any other time to 
the suggestions of a stern and retributive policy. So 
distant an excursion as one to Belgium could scarcely 
have been accomplished, and the return to Paris have 
been effected, before the 12th. No time for prepara- 
tion for that momentous meeting would have been af- 
forded, even if the need for preparation had been 
realized. Indeed some slight contingency or change of 
plan might have delayed the President's return a day 
or two. In that case the armistice would have had 
to be renewed in his absence. The Supreme Council 
would have acted in his absence, and his endorsement 
of the proceedings would have been subsequently ob- 
tained as a formality, as had been done in the case of 
the first armistice renewal. 



The Second Armistice Renewal 149 

The President, then, remained in Paris. In the next 
few days there were discussions with Lord Robert Cecil, 
Balfour, General Smuts and others on the subject of an 
international police force, the immediate control of 
war materials, and, collaterally, the spread of Bol- 
shevism and disorders in Europe. President Wilson 
also discussed Italian interests with Orlando and Son- 
nino. The following agenda, it appeared at this time, 
met general approval : First, agreement for creation 
of a league of nations; second, establishment of new 
states; third, assessment of indemnities, damages and 
methods of payment; fourth, conclusion of treaty with 
Germany. The making of the peace with Germany 
was to come last, because, it was the consensus of 
opinion, no stable government was in power there with 
which to deal. The Spartatists in Berlin were believed 
to have sixty thousand armed men. Obviously, nego- 
tiations with the German government could not be un- 
dertaken for some time. Said the British Radio, on 
January iith, "Bolshevist agitation spreading in Ger % 
many." 

There is much confusion in the circumstances sur- 
rounding the sitting of the Supreme War Council on 
Sunday, January 12th. So far as the Americans under- 
stood its significance, it was to be the first meeting of 
the peace conference (Inter-Allied Supreme Peace 
Council), and the last of the Supreme War Council. 
They expected to enter at once upon the questions of 
organization, representation, and procedure. That ques- 
tions as to the renewal of the armistice would be trouble- 
some at this meeting had not been in their consciousness. 



150 Lex Talionis 

The Europeans had carefully muddied the waters and 
stirred up the dust for the purpose of surrounding the 
meeting with an atmosphere of confusion. 

The following day the Temps informs us that there 
were really two meetings at the Quai d' Orsay ; that the 
first was a meeting of the Supreme War Council, and 
lasted from two-thirty to five-thirty; and that the second 
was a meeting of the Prime Ministers and Foreign Min- 
isters of France, Britain and Italy, and the President 
and Secretary of State of the United States, and that 
it examined questions of procedure and organization 
of the Peace Conference, notably fixing the represen- 
tation of the small powers. 

The first of these two meetings affords the greater 
interest to the historian. Le Temps gives us some in- 
formation about it. There were present; for the 
United States, President Wilson and Secretary Lans- 
ing; for France, Clemenceau, Pichon, Clementel, Klotz, 
Legues, Loucheur; for Britain, Lloyd George and Bal- 
four; for Italy, Orlando and Sonnino. Appearing be- 
fore the meeting to present the situation were Marshal 
Foch, Dutasta, Berthelot and General Weygand. 

According to the Temps, Marshal Foch read a re- 
port on conditions of the execution of the armistice 
and its breaches by Germany. He examined the situa- 
tion with regard to Poland and recommended military 
intervention to check the Bolshevist advance and to 
stop the fighting between the Poles and the Germans. 
To that end he urged that two Polish divisions, then 
in France, under General Haller, should be sent at once 
to Danzig, and that one American division and one 



The Second Armistice Renewal 151 

inter-allied division be dispatched to support them. 
Military occupation of Germany, alleged to be a prey 
to Bolshevism was declared essential. 

This account by Le Temps does not do justice to the 
emotional interest of the occasion. President Wilson 
had fully expected to take practical steps for the organi- 
zation of a peace conference having power to act. He 
was expecting to discuss the immediate questions of 
representation and procedure. Instead, he was offered 
participation in a vast imperialistic plan for the pacifica- 
tion of Europe by military measures which would in- 
volve the use of American troops, and this plan was 
insistently pressed upon him. 

It came as a surprise. He was not prepared with 
arguments. He sent hastily for General Bliss. But 
Foch's report was based upon official intelligence, which 
showed Bolshevism and reaction in Germany, and Bol- 
shevism in the rest of Europe, — both so menacing that 
military intervention alone could save the situation. 

The President did not believe that the picture of 
internal conditions in Germany, as painted by Foch, was 
true. He was unalterably opposed to the opening of 
hostilities against Russia. He believed in conciliation 
there, and was already contemplating an invitation to 
be sent the warring factions in Russia to terminate their 
internecine hostilities. He, therefore, gave expres- 
sion to his views, clearly and forcefully. He would 
not be swept off his feet. The colloquoy, thereupon, 
became rapid, issues became confused. Tempers grew 
ruffled. Clemenceau and Foch spoke heatedly and with 
anger. The absence of a common language as a 



152 Lex Talionis 

medium of communication greatly added to the con- 
fusion. The questions of fixing the terms upon which 
the armistice with Germany should be renewed became 
confused with the general discussion of the military 
situation. The President was advocating measures of 
food relief for Germany, and the utilization of two- 
and-a-half-million tons of merchant shipping in Ger- 
man harbors for this purpose only, at the same moment 
that Clemenceau and Foch were advocating the seizure 
of the same shipping because such seizure would cripple 
Germany's economic recovery. The long meeting ended 
in confusion and discord. The Supreme War Council 
had failed to stampede the American President into 
an agreement for the Napoleonic reconstruction of 
Europe, but it had had its way with reference to the 
terms upon which the armistice with Germany should 
be renewed. The French press, the next day, published 
the following official communique: "Meeting reached 
agreement as to terms upon which armistice is to be 
renewed." 40 

An Associated Press dispatch on January 14th illus- 
trates the euphemistic language in which proceedings of 
this character were announced to the world: 

"Marshal Foch, the Allied Commander-in-Chief, is today 

*°The following information was printed in America in an Asso- 
ciated Press report of January 14th: 

"An interesting feature of yesterday's meeting, as also of Sunday's, 
was that more than two hours of the discussion was conducted in 
French, of which neither President Wilson nor Secretary of State 
Lansing has a conversational knowledge, and which David Lloyd 
George, the British Premier, understands to only a limited extent. 
All the conversations concerning the renewal of the armistice were 
conducted in French." 



The Second Armistice Renewal 153 

on the way to his headquarters at Treves to meet the German 
delegates and lay down terms for the extension of the armistice. 

There was some disposition during yesterday"s conference 
to make the terms of the extension more drastic than had at 
first been proposed, but this was not carried out. 

The extension provides, however, for the turning over of the 
German commercial fleet to transport troops in exchange for 
food ; for the restitution of material taken from France and 
Belgium, and for full compliance with the terms of the orig- 
inal armistice". 

Immediately following the adjournment of the meet- 
ing of the Supreme War Council for the renewal of 
the armistice, according to Le Temps, the meeting of 
President Wilson, Secretary Lansing, and the Premiers 
and Foreign Ministers of France, Britain and Italy, 
convened for the organization of the Inter-Allied Peace 
Conference. The session lasted for an hour and re- 
sulted in an agreement that its members should consti- 
tute a council in whose hands control of the Peace Con- 
ference should remain. It should pass and act upon 
exigent questions, appoint commissions to report on 
issues of the peace settlement, and authorize the hold- 
ing, from time to time, of plenary sessions, the scope of 
whose business it should regulate. Smaller nations 
were to have representation in its meetings only when 
their individual interests were involved. 

On the next day, Monday the 13th, there was another 
meeting of the Supreme War Council in which the de- 
tails involved in the armistice were completed. 

The statesmen of Europe were now able to breathe 
a sigh of relief. 41 The second hurdle in the succession 



154 Lex Talionis 

of armistice renewals had been cleared. Once more 
the breath of life was breathed into the Armistice Com- 
mission, and it could proceed untrammeled for thirty 
days more in applying the necessary pressure to reduce 
the morally recalcitrant Germans to submission. The 
autocratic authority of the Supreme War Council, as 
Europe's sole governing body, remained unshaken. 

Furthermore, control at Paris was now assured by 
the creation of the new council of heads of state, which 
would dominate the unwieldly Peace Conference. The 
situation during the coming month would be much like 
that in the month just ended. In the language of the 
thespians, there was to be the "same play." In De- 
cember while the hard peace was steadily being fitted 
into the invisible Triangular Framework, the curiosity 
and interest of the journalists and of public opinion had 
been satisfied by the varied and changing aspects of 
President Wilson's journeys in England and Italy. In 
January and February this same popular interest would 
be satisfied by descriptions of the varied scene in Paris, 
heightened by sufficiently frequent plenary sessions, 
upon which interest would be concentrated and from 

"A short news item in the London Times on January 13th recalls 
the activities of the British Imperial War Cabinet to our minds, 
which, on December 28th, had broken bread with President Wilson, 
and had agreed perfectly with him upon the principles of the American 
Peace, some of whose members, also, had signed the Trianon Hotel 
Pact; 

"This morning at eleven, for the first time the Imperial War Cab- 
inet gathered at Paris, at the Hotel Majestic, to consider the results 
of the first session of the Peace Conference at the Quai d'Orsay yester- 
day; also representatives of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Trans- 
vaal and India." 



The Second Armistice Renewal 155 

which would emanate those expressions of lofty political 
morality which delight the liberal public opinion of the 
world. 42 By February 14th the real business of the 
Supreme War Council would be well advanced. There 
ought to be no great difficulty then in taking the third 
armistice hurdle. 

The German Armistice Commission arrived at 
Treves, and the armistice convention was prolonged for 
one month. Commenting upon the proceedings at 
Treves, and protesting against the continued incarcera- 
tion of eight hundred thousand German prisoners, the 
Vorwerts said, "By this armistice they attempt to choke 
us into unconsciousness". 

Definite organization of the new inter-allied council 
for control of the Peace Conference was achieved on 
Wednesday, January the 15th, but, instead of being 
composed of eight members, it was now composed of 
ten, and was thereafter popularly known as the Council 
of Ten. 

The two new members were the Japanese Ambassa- 
dors at London and Paris. 

Japan had not signed the armistice: She had not 
been a party to the compact signed in the Trianon Pal- 
ace Hotel. She was not morally committed to a peace 

^Le Temps, on January 12th, in these guarded words gives the 
French public some inkling of peace developments: 

"Today begin the deliberations from which will come the peace. 
They at first take the restrained form of an Inter-Allied Council. They 
will then have the appearance of a plenary conference, conpleted by 
the discreet work of commissions. The public, in its good sense, will 
attribute to these distinctions only a relative importance." 



i $6 Lex Talionis 

of moderation, nor to the principle of a league of 
nations. 

The only practical interest of Japan was in the dis- 
position of German possessions in the east. Her inter- 
est in the phychological contest between President Wil- 
son and the Supreme War Council was academic. But, 
the Supreme War Council saw in Japan an invaluable 
ally in the contest with President Wilson, as Japan 
could consistently advocate hard peace terms, and de- 
mand a high price for entering a league of nations to 
which she was not morally committed. From the 15th 
of January, therefore, the new inter-allied council be- 
came the Council of Ten. It would take cognizance 
of all matters requiring settlement among the allies 
themselves ; the Supreme War Council would continue 
to handle all matters concerning the enemy nations and 
the terms of a peace settlement. 

Diplomatic secretaries had now an opportunity to 
become busy, and the formal opening of the Peace Con- 
ference in a Plenary Session, to be held on Saturday 
afternoon, January 1 8th, in the Salle de La Paix at the 
Foreign Office, was arranged. 

A gathering of delegates and staffs "in commemora- 
tion" was held on the 17th. It was in the nature of a 
social function, and an occasion for felicitations and ex- 
pressions of good feeling. The atmosphere in which 
the Peace Conference was to meet was severely demo- 
cratic. The pomp of other days was banished, as be- 
fitted a settlement in which it was understood the prin- 
ciples and methods of democracy should dominate. 

But, for one day, the Old World insisted on throw- 



The Second Armistice Renewal 157 

ing off its democratic restraint. All the Military and 
Naval officials in Paris were present, covered with 
orders and decorations, and wearing their swords. 
Every civilian having the ribbon of an order wore it. 
President Poincare, with the tri-color across his shirt 
front, presided. Inter-allied harmony was emphasized. 
It was made plain that the Peace Conference would 
proceed to the adjustment of mutual interests among 
the allies, and that the making of the peace with Ger- 
many would come last on the agenda. The next day, 
decorations, side arms and ribbons were permanently 
put aside, and the atmosphere of democratic simplicity 
again enveloped Paris. 

There were represented at the First Plenary Session 
thirty-two delegations, with sixty-four delegates present. 
The correspondents have described the scene and the 
setting of heavy crimson silken curtains, gorgeous furni- 
ture and rich gildings of the Louis XIV period. "No 
applause, dim light, not a King present. No European 
present had a title except Sonnino. Poincare, Wilson, 
George and Sonnino nominated Clemenceau for per- 
manent chairman. Through all, there was evident a 
spirit determined upon a peace in which the clash of 
interests should be subordinated to the harmony of 
peoples". 

Clemenceau, in his speech of acceptance said, "We 
enter this chamber as friends; we hope to leave it as 
friends and brothers." 

President Poincare, in his opening speech, had said: 
"You will, in conformity with the fourteenth of the 
propositions unanimously adopted by the great allied 



158 Lex Talionis 

powers, establish a general league of nations, which 
will be the supreme guarantee against any fresh assault 
upon the rights of peoples." 

The League of Nations was by unanimous agree- 
ment given first place upon the agenda of the next 
plenary session, the date for which was not set. Fifteen 
representatives of the press were present in a connecting 
room. They were informed of the qualified privileges 
which would be accorded them at plenary sessions. 

The Peace Conference had begun at last. As one 
intelligent observer said "All is harmony on the surface, 
and no one is anxious to disturb the accord". 

During the week, beginning January 13th, there was 
a perceptible strengthening of confidence between the 
American and English delegates, coincident with a con- 
dition of constraint which was beginning to grow up be- 
tween the Americans and the French. Ever since the 
armistice the British press had speculated, from time 
to time, upon the American attitude on the question of 
the freedom of the seas. It had not been without 
apprehension that this question might become trouble- 
some. But, it was now becoming evident that the 
President's view upon this subject was not inconsistent 
with British principles. Under a league of nations, 
such as the President was working out, in conjunction 
with Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts, there 
would, in time of war, be no neutrals, and it was around 
the rights of neutrals that the knottiest problems involv- 
ing the freedom of the seas had always centered. 48 As 

"The political "correspondent of the London Times in Paris cabled 
his paper on January 15th: 



The Second Armistice Renewal 159 

the conception of the league took shape, therefore, the 
importance of the question of the freedom of the seas 
lessened, and soon ceased to be a matter of preoccupa- 
tion in the minds of the British negotiators. Of this 
drawing together of the Americans and the British one 
American correspondent wrote; "Wilson's position is 
immensely stronger than when he arrived. It is now 
realized that the reading of the phrase 'the freedom of 
the seas' contains nothing incompatible with British 
traditions." 

The outstanding incident of the three days preced- 
ing the formal opening of the Peace Conference on 
January 18th was "the revolt of the journalists," as 
they themselves called it. They had been unable to 
obtain information of what had happened at the meet- 
ing of the Supreme War Council on January 12th. They 
knew the deliberations had been important, but they 
had not been informed of their nature. The Peace 
Conference was opening in an environment of secrecy, 
and they had expected to see "open covenants openly 
arrived at." 

Consequently, on Tuesday, the correspondents pre- 
sented a memorial to the Council of Ten, setting forth 
their grievances. It was considered by the Council, 
and the requests of the journalists denied with no great 

"It was not known precisely how far the United States was prepared 
to jettison its traditions of isolation, and undertake with us the re- 
building of the world. He (President Wilson) has shown beyond 
doubt that American policy is inspired by the same ideals that brought 
us, and our allies, through the war. No amount of long-distance 
diplomacy could have done as much to bridge the Atlantic as Mr. 
Wilson's presence in Europe for a month." 



160 Lex Talionis 

ceremony. But, the American newspaper men, sup- 
ported by their British colleagues, refused to let the 
matter drop. They kept it before the Council on 
Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, and compelled that 
body to take serious notice of their representations. 
How rapidly the Supreme War Council was attaining 
moral dominance over the proceedings of the Peace 
Conference is proven by the decision reached in this 
momentous matter. The written decision of the Coun- 
cil of Ten, handed the correspondents at the First Plen- 
ary Session, on January 18th, was somewhat lengthy, 
and informed them that representatives of the press 
would be admitted only to plenary sessions, and that 
the Conference reserved the right to hold executive 
plenary sessions from time to time, at which the press 
would not be allowed to be present. 

The American peace delegates themselves were in 
favor of a large measure of publicity, but this was 
flatly opposed by the French. In explanation of the 
conclusions reached, the journalists were informed that 
the conversations of great powers were analagous to 
the meetings of a cabinet, and not to the deliberations 
of a parliament; that within a nation many things could 
be given publicity without prejudice to the public wel- 
fare, but that in dealings between nations, preliminary 
discussions must necessarily be in private, although the 
results of those deliberations could be given broad pub- 
licity. 44 

"The reply to the journalists read in part: 
"Conversations of great powers are far more analagous to meet- 
ings of a Cabinet than to those of a Legislature. Differences among 
men may be reconciled and agreements reached before the stage of 



The Second Armistice Renewal i6t 

The decisions taken at this time to restrain publicity 
of Peace Conference proceedings were of a two-fold 
nature. They denied the journalists access to the pro- 
ceedings of the Council of Ten, where all business of 
importance would be transacted, and imposed upon 
them a voluntary agreement for secrecy; and they pro- 
vided a strict censorship over the transmission by 
cable of press dispatches to the United States. 

With great difficulty American correspondents se- 
cured the privilege of transmitting dispatches by wire- 
less, but this privilege proved to be of no value, as, at 
the same time, a strict censorship over the publication 
of news was maintained by the Secretary of the Navy 
in the United States itself by complete suppression of 
wireless dispatches. 

In this way it was brought about that the elaborate 
machine which Mr. George Creel, of the Committee 
on Public Information, had boasted to Colonel Reping- 
ton could get the news of one day's proceedings at 
Paris into every important town in the world within 
twenty-four hours, remained idle and silent from the 

publicity is begun. The essence of democratic government is not 
that deliberations of government should be conducted in public, but 
that its conclusions should be subject to the consideration of popular 
chambers, and to free and open discussion on the platform and in the 
press. Premature public controversy between parties is serious enough 
within a state, but it is extremely dangerous to have controversies 
between nations. * * * Settlement should not only be just but 
speedy." 

The French opposition to publicity in the proceeding is revealed 
in Le Temps of January 17th: 

"Moved by the indiscretions of various journalists, the Five Great 
Governments have decided to severely restrain the publication of 
their debates. The censorship will be severe. It will be very em- 
barassing to apply this censorship to the American and English 



1 62 Lex Talionis 

opening of the Peace Conference until its close. Not a 
wheel turned; no hand pulled the lever which would 
have emitted from it a world-wide light of publicity. 

Having already created in England and in Italy a 
public opinion unsympathetic to the American Peace, 
The Supreme War Council had thus shut off the only 
avenue through which the President might hope to 
reach them once more. The French press became in- 
accessible to the Americans as an agent of publicity in 
Europe, while remaining entirely responsive to the 
promptings of the French Government itself, and, what 
carried with it still more far-reaching consequences, 
muted cables and antennae would henceforth leave the 
judgment of a hundred million Americans uninformed 
by their own agents, and misled by those of the Su- 
preme War Council. 

During this week an American mission of military 
officers was sent to Berlin to investigate political, 
economic and social conditions in Germany. 

journalists. A conference of the journalists will therefore be called 
to reach a voluntary understanding. * * * Jules Cambon once 
said: 'One doesn't carry on a diplomatic conversation as one would 
buy a cow in market.' " 

On the same day the Temps said: 

"One is scandalized to learn that an American correspondent was 
able to telegraph to New York false information, which denied the 
intentions of President Wilson, and which also denied the moral 
authority which he is entitled to exercise over his co-citizens. Let us 
Jiave no party differences. It is not an hour for Byzantine quarrels. 
Let us not forget the enemy!" 

The fallacy in the European position on the question of secrecy in 
negotiations is that the chief issue involved in the peace was kept 
secret. Delegates have the right to privacy in negotiation in order 
to facilitate conclusions on publicly known issues, but not as a 
means of deceiving entire populations upon questions that are vital 
to their interests. 



CHAPTER VI. 

The Peace Conference. 

COMPLETE failure for the American Peace, and 
all that it meant to Europe and the world, was 
almost sure when the belated organization of an un- 
wieldy congress was effected on January 18th. 

Let us recapitulate the measures which Europe had 
taken to wreck it : 

i. The fraudulent British elections, committing the 
English people to a peace of vengeance, December 14. 

2. Delegation to the Armistice Commission Decem- 
ber 14 of the Supreme Council's power to negotiate 
with Germany, placing Germany in the hands of a 
military commission for thirty days more, or until 
January 16. 

3. Extension of the operation of the Naval Block- 
ade to the German Baltic Coast December 4, legalized 
by Orders in Council, preventing entrance of sea-borne 
food supplies. 

4. Demonstration to the enemy of apparent partici- 
pation of the United States in these measures, and di- 
version of the attention of public opinion from them by 
receptions to President Wilson in France, England and 
Italy until January 7. 

5. Three weeks of lip-service to the principles of 
President Wilson, which successfully masked the real 
purposes of the Supreme War Council. 

6. Victory of European will over American will in 
the meeting of the Supreme War Council in Paris, Janu- 



164 Lex Talionis 

ary 12, where it was determined, against American 
protest, that the Supreme War Council should continue 
to dictate the attitude of the Peace Conference to Ger- 
many, and hold dealings with the German Government 
only through a military agency, at least until February 

14. 

7. Two months pressure of starvation upon the 
German people, successfully carried out, reducing their 
morale and will to resist. 

8. Creation of a Council of Ten which, under the 
Supreme War Council, would retain absolute control 
of the Peace Conference. 

9. Complete secrecy attained in the Paris negotia- 
tions; muzzling the correspondents; censorship over 
cables and wireless. 

10. Destruction of President Wilson's control over 
public opinion in England, and in Italy; and his isola- 
tion from American support by the censorship upon 
news. 

The European program therefore was well under 
way when the Peace Conference was officially opened. 
Perfect teamwork in the contest with the Americans 
had been made possible in an otherwise discordant 
camarilla by unity in one great motive — the imposition 
of a peace of vengeance upon Germany, and the acquisi- 
tion of vast revenues which might be made to flow from 
an industrially enslaved state. 

This perfect teamwork had been successful in con- 
cealing the plot, in preserving good personal relations 
with the American negotiators, in disarming their sus- 
picions, in affording collateral issues to occupy their 



The Peace Conference 165 

minds, and in preventing the organization of a respon- 
sible congress, which would supersede the Supreme 
War Council in authority, and set itself to the honest 
task of establishing a peace upon the bases of the 
Trianon Hotel agreement. 

Europe had remained in exclusive control of the 
war settlement, and, thanks to the Triangular Frame- 
work which it had constructed while President Wilson 
was on the high seas, had been moulding the peace to 
fit the framework for thirty days without interruption. 
The meeting of the Supreme War Council on January 
12 had settled the issue involving the Triangular 
Framework. That massive structure survived un- 
shaken. Having been twice approved, it was taking on 
a certain prescriptive authority. It had been neither 
demolished nor weakened. Like the ancient com- 
prachicos, the Entente Governments would be able to 
force whatever new political organism that was grow- 
ing up within the German borders into a rigid and fan- 
tastic mould. 

There was no longer much question, therefore, that 
the Americans would have to permit the Europeans to 
continue the pressure of the blockade throughout the 
period in which the Peace Conference sat, and that 
after several more months of starvation, the German 
Government, through sheer exhaustion, would have to 
sign any treaty, no matter what its contents, that might 
be offered it. 

All the bases of the American Peace were now swept 
away but one. The President still held in Paris that 
"punitive damages" could not be imposed; that the 



1 66 Lex Talionis 

honor of the associated governments was involved in 
the obligation of the contract signed in the Trianon 
Palace Hotel; and in this matter he had not shifted his 
ground when the Peace Conference opened on Janu- 
ary 1 8. 

This question remained the very essence of the issue 
between the Entente and America, although it was the 
one about which the press and public heard least. This 
it was that made the rigid press, cable and wireless 
censorship necessary in order that President Wilson 
should not have the support of public opinion in Amer- 
ica. It was the reason of the impenetrable secrecy with 
which the negotiations of a few men were surrounded. 
Further eastward, on the banks of the Rhine, the same 
issue of "punitive damages" was being argued with the 
courage of desperation by a defenseless people, in a 
court in which there was no jury, and whose sanction 
was the power of might alone. The Entente had long 
ago jettisoned all restraints of moral obligation inher- 
ent in the pact of the Trianon Palace Hotel. Their 
appeal was to the principle which Bethman-Holwegg 
had once invoked "necessity knows no law." Their 
adhesion to codes founded upon the laws, pandects and 
institutes of Justinian was replaced by the philosophy 
of the Lex Talionis, and under this more ancient stand- 
ard of moral conduct they did not propose to com- 
promise with the Western Republic. 

The period of less than four weeks that ensued, be- 
tween the opening of the Peace Conference on January 
1 8 and the departure of President Wilson for the 



The Peace Conference 167 

United States on February 15, affords an extraordinary 
example of the resources of disingenuous European 
statecraft. 

There is a limitless welter of issues, all of burning 
importance, all pressing for immediate solution (except 
those concerning Germany), discussions proceeding in 
a halting way because there is divergence as to the 
principles which shall form the basis of settlement. The 
Americans insist upon the establishment of a league of 
nations first; then concrete decisions can be made in 
accordance with principle. The Europeans are willing 
to applaud principle, but purpose to make settlements 
on the basis of expediency. Not for an instant do they 
consider binding themselves under the principles of a 
Wilson League until the Wilson peace with Ger- 
many is renounced and the Entente Peace accepted. 
After this is accomplished they will be willing to adhere 
to a league of nations, for a league of nations superim- 
posed upon the Entente Peace will meet the full ap- 
proval of the Supreme War Council. 

These four weeks, therefore, are a period of dead- 
lock, of advance and retreat, of forced manifestations 
of personal harmony, of suppressed irritations, increas- 
ing indirection, growing intrigue and unrelenting pres- 
sure; of vain efforts to reconcile essentially hostile 
ideas. Both contestants have the determination to 
prevail, but the struggle is unequal, for President Wil- 
son, with no organization behind him, knowing his 
purposes and trained to further them, faces alone a 
camarilla of Europe's ablest, united in will, politically 
unscrupulous, and supported by perfectly trained staffs, 



1 68 Lex Talionis 

which furnish them without effort every weapon and 
resource the use of which may be demanded by the 
exigencies of negotiation. 

Through the fog of secrecy which settled over diplo- 
matic Paris the real purposes of all but the American 
President were only obscurely disclosed. The Peace 
Conference appeared to open with President Wilson 
on the offensive, demanding the immediate creation of 
a league of nations, and the subsequent settlement of 
issues in accordance with its principles, the Europeans 
being on the defensive. Before the 14th of February 
it was being made clear that every single principle to 
be incorporated in the covenant of the League of Na- 
tions must be obtained by a substantial concession to 
the spirit of the Entente Peace. Before the 14th of 
February the offensive shifted to the Europeans, who 
never lost it again until the Entente Peace was signed 
in June. 

After the first Plenary Session the daily meetings of 
the Council of Ten were crowded with discussions of 
territorial disputes, which the exigencies of the moment 
thrust forward. The menace of bolshevist invasion 
in Poland, Roumania and Hungary was imminent. The 
French continued to advocate the military invasion of 
Russia, or at least to give military assistance to the 
border populations that were non-bolshevist. Presi- 
dent Wilson advocated a policy of conciliation, and pro- 
posed that the warring elements in Russia be invited 
to send delegates to a conference. The French press 
was greatly scandalized by this suggestion. 



The Peace Conference 169 

The Jugoslavs, quietly supported by the French, were 
keeping the Adriatic issue in the foreground, and 
President Wilson, by reason of his definite stand against 
the Italian claims, was deeply involved in a controversy 
with one of the allied nations. Poland was fighting the 
Bolshevists on one side and the Germans on the other. 
The French were for the instant dispatch of American 
and allied troops to its assistance. The President 
wanted a commission of investigation sent. The French 
considered the Polish Executive Committee, which had 
appointed Ignace Paderewski as Premier, to be the 
element properly in control of Poland; the President 
believed that the Polish Executive Committee repre- 
sented imperialistic elements, and favored support of 
General Pilsudski, whom the French regarded as 
socialistic. 

Hostilities broke out between the Czecho-Slovaks 
and the Poles over control of the coal lands of Teschen. 
The Czecho-Slovaks on the north of Hungary, the 
Roumanians on the east and the Jugoslavs on the 
south, impatient of restraining advice from Paris, were 
fixing their own boundaries, not without violence, at 
Hungary's expense. 

There was always talk of occupation of German 
territory by the French as guarantees. It was incessant 
in the press and in the conversation of hotel corridors. 

President Wilson held continuous informal meetings 
with Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts and Leon 
Bourgeois, and out of these meetings grew the plan 
for the covenant of the League of Nations. The prin- 



170 Lex Talionis 

ciple was soon established that some nations were to 
be excluded. 

When the involved political philosophy dominating 
these meetings reached this point, Lord Robert Cecil 
announced for publication in the French press, that 
"German Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey could not be 
admitted to the League of Nations at present, nor 
until they had become trustworthy nations". 

Thus the important principle was established in the 
Conference that some nations were trustworthy and 
some were not. The Conference was taking cognizance 
of this as a political phenomenon. This fantastic pro- 
nouncement having been adopted as a rule of action; 
having put a common cliche upon German Austria, Bul- 
garia and Turkey, the approach to the discussion as to 
Germany was facilitated. If German Austria was un- 
trustworthy, how much more true this must be of 
Germany! The generalities of an earlier day were not 
to be allowed to stand in President Wilson's way. Un- 
trustworthy nations manifestly must be treated as such, 
and excluded from fellowship in a league of moral 
nations. It was in this way that the United States 
reached agreement with the Entente Governments that 
Germany should be excluded from the League. 

President Wilson's original purpose had been to stay 
but a short time in Europe. His determination to 
return to Europe to see the Paris proceedings through 
was made a few days after the meeting of the Supreme 
War Council on January 12 for the renewal of the ar- 
mistice. It was stated that this intention should not be 
interpreted to mean that serious differences had de- 



The Peace Conference 171 

veloped among the delegates, but that the magnitude 
and complexity of many questions had been unforeseen 
in mapping out the original program. There had been 
many unavoidable delays. 

The immense financial considerations involved in 
such a peace settlement as that at Paris, which under 
different circumstances would have been by no means 
primarily a matter of intrigue, began inevitably to 
work themselves into the discussions of the Council of 
Ten. It was to this phase of the peace settlement that 
is attributable all of the disingenuous and insincere 
characteristics which marked the general proceedings. 
Financial considerations were of the very essence of the 
Entente Peace, and that Peace could not be consum- 
mated until agreement was had upon them. 

There are few evidences of conversations between 
the Europeans and the Americans on European finances 
at any period. before the 20th of January. Then, in 
connection with President Wilson's suggestion of a 
peaceable working agreement with the Bolsheviki, the 
fact developed that the French held Russian Czarist 
bonds to the value of thirty-seven billion francs which 
it was the unmistakable intent and purpose of the Soviet 
Government to repudiate. It was a primary purpose 
of the French to protect this claim. 

The financial advisers whom President Wilson had 
chosen to aid him at Paris were Messrs. Baruch, Hur- 
ley, Lamont, Davis and McCormick. About the 20th 
of January a conference was held with Messrs. Baruch, 
Hurley and McCormick at Colonel House's apartment. 
These advisors were primarily financiers and not states- 



172 Lex Talionis 

men, and they proved to be a broken reed upon which 
the President had to lean. 

A week passed crowded with great and ever-growing 
perplexities. The Council of Ten considered the exist- 
ing Danube and Rhine conventions, and agreed upon 
plans for extending their provisions to the Vistula, 
Pruth, Elbe and Scheldt. (To regulate the Elbe in 
German territory was a decidedly advanced step in the 
principles of international law.) 

The claims of the Hedjaz, and the Anglo-French 
secret treaties, came up for discussion. Before the 
week was over the French were making open demands 
for special settlements. The French Colonial Party 
boldly demanded of Clemenceau that France be given 
the ,Saar Valley and more extended rights in Syria. 
There was much agitation, supported by Foch, for 
permanent occupation of the left bank of the Rhine. 

Not to be outdone in patriotism by the French Co- 
lonial Party, the French Franco-Slav Society made it 
known that Italy ought not to have Dalmatia or Fiume. 

These territorial controversies were thrust into 
greater prominence than the League of Nations. It 
seemed doubtful indeed whether there would be any 
league of nations at all unless progress were made in 
settling them. 45 They prevented discussion of the 
Covenant in the Council of Ten, but Cecil and Smuts, 

45 "The fundamental vice of the method of work adopted by the 
Conference is plain to all eyes, in the decisions taken yesterday, on 
the subjects of Poland and Russia. These decisions are, to start in- 
quiries. For two and one-half months, since the armistice was signed, 
the governments have not been able to form an opinion on Poland 
and Russia. If they are not better edified upon the other countries 



The Peace Conference 173 

in consultation with President Wilson, were making 
considerable progress. They were effecting the neces- 
sary compromises between the Hotel Crillon and the 
Quai d'Orsay, which would make the final adoption of 
the hard peace possible in accordance with the wishes 
of Europe, and of a league of nations, not inconsistent 
with it, in accordance with the wishes of the Americans. 

Toward the end of the week the Americans and the 
English grew perceptibly still nearer together, and both 
became decidedly cool to the French policies. As the 
French attitude grew progressively more indifferent to 
the League of Nations, the English grew warmer in its 
support. The Japanese delegates had not yet expressed 
themselves, but through English channels it was infor- 
mally understood that the Japanese were favorable. 

The Second Plenary Session of the Conference was 
held on Saturday, January 25th. It was again devoted 
to the expression of lofty aspirations, and to the prom- 
ise of new and better things. The appointment of five 
commissions was announced as follows : 46 



whose lot they must regulate, the preliminaries of peace will not be 
signed for many months. In November they spoke of February, now 
they speak of June. * * * 

"Under these conditions but one resource remains for us- that of 
imposmg on Germany, at each monthly renewal of the armistice of 
November u, supplementary conditions which procure for the allies 
certain advantages they are expecting from the preliminaries."-Jour- 
nal de Debats, January 24. 

48 In appointing the League of Nations Commission it was announced 
that; (a) It is essential to create a League of Nations (b) The 
League part of the Treaty of Peace shall be open to all civilized 
nations which may be trusted to favor its designs; (c) It shall have 
a permanent organization for periodic international conferences. 



X 



174 Lex Talionis 

i. League of Nations Commission. 

2. Commission on Responsibility for the War. 

3. Commission on Reparation for Damages. 

4. Commission on Labor Legislation. 

5. Commission on Transportation, Waterways, etc. 
Felicitous speeches were again made by President 

Wilson, Lloyd George and Orlando. Once more Presi- 
dent Wilson sought to urge upon the delegates the 
necessity of consulting the general welfare and the gen- 
eral wishes. "We represent peoples," he said, "not 
merely governments. It is necessary to satisfy the 
opinion of mankind. The select classes are no longer 
the governors of mankind." In December these state- 
ments had had the grave attention of the Supreme War 
Council; on the 25th of January such considerations no 
longer had weight in the minds of negotiators, who 
were securely entrenched behind the wall of a world- 
wide censorship. 

The Reparations Commission was directed to fix the amount the 
Central Empires ought to pay, the amount they are capable of paying, 
and the method, form and time. 

A sub-committee on Violation of the Laws of War was to deter- 
mine the responsibility of its authors, their degree of responsibility, 
suggest a tribunal to judge crimes, etc. 

Its membership was as follows: 

For United States: Lansing and Miller. 

For Britain: Sir Edward Hewart and another. 

For France: Tardieu and Larnaude. 

For Italy: Scialoja and Raimondo. 

It met February 3 at 3 p. m. at Ministry of Interior. Tardieu 
opened the session, stating that the first steps were to get the facts, 
take testimony of the victims, establish responsibility, culpability, pre- 
meditation, violation of treaties, violations of the rights of peoples 
and the laws of war, and to fix responsibility and the rules by which 
the sanctions were to be applied. Proposed Lansing for President. 



The Peace Conference 175 

The President's speech went unnoticed in the 
French press. The fact that he had not spoken directly 
of France and her sufferings in the war was noted. 
Lloyd George and Orlando had both taken occasion to 
do so, and both were accorded friendly comment in the 
press. The nearest devastated regions lay only thirty 
miles away from the Quai d'Orsay, and the French 
never ceased to comment until the President made a 
visit to Rheims to see them. 

Before the Second Plenary Session was over, it sud- 
denly passed from the contemplation of philosophic 
principles of political harmony to an exhibition of 
honest national selfishness and greed. No sooner had 
the creation of a Commission on Reparations been 
announced, than the representatives of state after state 
arose to request representation upon it. One observer 
describes the scene as follows : 

"The minds of the small nations concentrated on the amount 
of tribute possible to collect from the Central Powers, and upon 
nothing else. One spokesman after another came forward with 
demands for representation on the Commission to determine 
Reparations. They were mildly interested in other problems, 
but were vitally interested in that body, and said so. 

The size of the bill will stagger the imagination. Only 
magic or a miracle can satisfy the demands. Canada, Australia, 
Poland, Belgium, China, Serbia, Greece, Venezuela, Portugal, 
Czecho-Slovakia, Brazil, Roumania and Siam, all wanted repre- 
sentation. 

"Clemenceau put an end to the discussion by making it plain 
that it was the great nations that had fought the war and had 
won the war ; that if they had so chosen they could have made 
a peace without undertaking the formation of a league of 



176 Lex Talionis 

nations, and in which other nations would not be represented ; 
and that other nations would be given such representation on 
the Reparations Commission as the great nations saw fit." 47 

This was the only attempt of the nations to throw 
off the yoke fastened upon them by the Five-Power con- 
trol of the Conference. 48 It had been in contemplation 
to give to nineteen nations, other than the Great 
Powers, five places upon the Reparations Commission, 
where the Great Powers were represented by ten places. 
Within a few days, however, Belgium, Servia, Greece, 
Poland and China, upon combining in protest, were ac- 
corded special representation, but not in a way to 
jeopardize Five-Power control of the Conference. 

After the appointment of five important commissions 
at the Second Plenary Session, some of the confusion 
in the Council of Ten was reduced, and the President 
felt that he would now be able to sail for the United 
States knowing that the work in Paris was progressing. 

The Second Plenary Session, by appointing a Repara- 
tions Commission, brought the question of reparations 
(and consequently of punitive damages) momentarily 
into the light of day — momentarily, because the pro- 

47 Clemenceau, avoc beaucoup de tact, de fermete et de verve, brought 
out these facts: that the role of the "Bureau" of the Conference was 
to make the peace; that the allies at the end of the war had twelve 
million soldiers. C'est un titre ; We had the losses, and if we did 
not have the great question of a league of nations before us, we 
might consult only ourselves. It was our right. Then the vote was 
taken by a show of hands. — (Paris Temps.) 

48 "Uniting in great pomp the representatives of a multitude of 
powers to be told they will be admitted to be heard only a titre con- 
sultant." 



The Peace Conference 177 

ceedings of that commission were instantly shrouded 
in the deepest mystery. Pari passu with the creation 
of the Reparations Commission, the League of Nations 
Commission was permitted to take concrete form. 

The only remaining hazard which the Supreme War 
Council faced in planning the consummation of the 
Entente Peace was that involved in the organization 
and control of the Commission on Reparations, and 
in keeping its proceedings secret. In the scheme of 
things which the Supreme War Council had devised 
this Commission was the core. In comparison all else 
was husks and rubbish. When the Second Plenary 
Session, sitting in the light of day, created this body, 
a certain critical point in well laid plans had been 
reached; there was now a visible, tangible^ official body, 
whose function was to determine how much Germany 
ought to pay, and how much Germany was capable of 
paying — a body which must construe and interpret the 
meaning of the pact of the Trianon Palace Hotel. 

The entire Entente Peace, the Triangular Frame- 
work; the long steps already successfully taken by the 
Armistice Commission; the work of the food blockade 
in depressing German civilian morale; all would be 
jeopardized if the Reparations Commission took the 
wrong view of "reparations". The Reparations Com- 
mission was not officially organized until February 3. 
Its proceedings from February 3 to February 14 will 
be adverted to later in this chapter. 

After the Plenary Session of the 25th, the Council 
of Ten resumed its daily sittings. In informal conver- 
sations the great powers were coming to be spoken of 



178 Lex Talionis 

as the "Big Five," Belgium, Poland, Greece, Servia and 
China as the "Little Five," and sometimes all nations 
except the Big Five were spoken of as the "little na- 
tions." The Council of Ten was becoming a sort of 
court for hearing the controversies between the little 
nations. It listened gravely and made few decisions; 
the judges were not yet in harmony as to the juridical 
standards which should be applied. 

The abolition of conscription, economic reconstruc- 
tion, credits in order to start industrial activity, and 
other important matters of general and common inter- 
est found their way into the discussions only to be thrust 
aside by some territorial controversy which, in turn, 
received only tentative treatment. Exigent matters 
continued to be acted up by the Supreme War 
Council. 

In the week following the Second Plenary Session, 
the distribution of the German colonies (agreement 
having already been reached that they no longer be- 
longed to Germany) was thrust into the foreground 
for decision. President Wilson flatly refused to con- 
sent to a division of the Pacific Islands between Britain 
and Japan under the mere right of conquest; it would be 
a fatal blow to the principles of the League of Nations 
and the right of self-determination. At the same time 
the Japanese, who a week before were informally un- 
derstood to favor the League of Nations, let it be 
known that their adhesion to the League depended 
upon the dispositions made in the Pacific. The English 
remained ostentatiously in sympathy with the American 
viewpoint. 



The Peace Conference 179 

The ingenuity of the members of the League of Na- 
tions Commission (who had carefully avoided as yet 
the formal organization of that body) found the way 
out of the impasse. The theory of mandates was 
evolved under which an allied state already in posses- 
sion of a German colony would retain possession of it 
as a mandatory, holding it under a tenure of "perma- 
nent trust," with supervisory authority in the League 
of Nations. This permitted the immediate distribution 
of German colonies among the allies in the same pro- 
portion as to territory as would have been made under 
the principle of the right of conquest. 

The Anglo-American understanding grew closer each 
day. In the vexatious matter of secret treaties, English 
magnanimity suggested to the Americans that Britain's 
position would not be unreasonable with reference to 
the secret treaty with Roumania, the Pact of London 
and the Anglo-French convention concerning Syria. 
The English were in accord with the American negotia- 
tors in the opinion that the Covenant of the League of 
Nations should be adopted first, and that concrete set- 
tlements should be made afterwards in accordance with 
its principles. Manifestly the opposition which Presi- 
dent Wilson was encountering was coming from other 
than English sources. "An unwritten Anglo-American 
entente was taking form under which California would 
assuredly be safe." 

Late in January the Poles and Czecho-Slovaks, for 
both of which states the associated nations had done 
so much, were in open hostilities for possession of the 
coal lands of Te'schen. It was extremely trying for 



180 Lex Talionis 

the negotiators at Paris, especially those who advocated 
the reduction of military forces, and Teschen was only 
one of Europe's sore spots. Wireless warnings were 
sent against anticipations of decisions to be made at 
Paris. 

The Bolsheviki continued to push westward, the 
Italians and Jugoslavs remained at the point of hos- 
tilities, and in Paris Orlando, Cellere and Diaz, in 
monotonous unison, were demanding that Fiume remain 
Italian. The Germans and Poles were fighting in West 
Prussia; Montenegro was bitterly resisting inclusion in 
the Servian state, Roumanian armies were invading 
Hungary, and the Ukrainians were defending them- 
selves against the Bolsheviki. 

Agitation in the French press for the annexation of 
the Saar Valley and for occupation of the left bank of 
the Rhine was increasing. Apprehensions concerning 
the German menace were breathed from the pages of 
every journal ; the imminent union of Germany and Aus- 
tria must be prevented; Germany was recovering by 
leaps and bounds. Japanese and Chinese delegates 
were arguing heatedly over Shantung. 

Under these circumstances the organization and ini- 
tial activities of the Reparations Commission became 
only one of many subjects to divide the attention of the 
negotiators. In the swiftly flowing tide of Peace Con- 
ference activities this significant decision had been 
reached by February first — that the Reparations Com- 
mission should proceed with its work without waiting 
for the organization of the League of Nations. It 
proceeded to organize at once, and never afterwards 



The Peace Conference 181 

was made a part of or connected in any way with the 
League of Nations. Its initial meeting was held on 
February 3 at the French Ministry of Finance. Louis 
Klotz, Minister of the French Treasury, was elected 
president, and Premier Hughes of Australia Vice- 
President. 49 The secretariat comprised Mr. J. D. 
Greene of the United States, Colonel Peele of Eng- 
land, Monsieur Lasteyrie of France and Signor Foberti 
of Italy. 

During its early meetings written memoranda set- 
ting forth the views of the respective governments on 
the question of reparations were filed with the secre- 
tariat. 

Beginning with the fourth meeting the issue became 
clearly drawn between the Americans on the one hand 
and the representatives of the European Governments 
on the other. It was gravely argued in a legal manner. 
Mr. Hughes outlined the position of the British Govern- 
ment, which was clearly understood to be that of the 
French and Italians. 

At the Fifth Meeting the American position was set 
forth by Mr. J. F. Dulles; and Lord Sumner of the 
British Empire replied at length. 

49 "At the first meeting of the Reparations Commission, M. Klotz 
was elected President. He said, 'Merci, au travail, pour la justice, 
voila notre program.' " — (Paris Temps.) 

Its other members were: 

For United States: Baruch, Davis, McCormick. 

For Britain: Hughes, Simons, Lord Cunliffe, (a Director of the 
Bank of England). 

For France: Klotz, Loucheur, Lebrun. 

For Italy: Salandra, d'Ameglio, Chiesa. 

For Japan: Moki, Majapka, Frikin. 



1 82 Lex Talionis 

At the Sixth Meeting, which was held on February 
14, (the day President Wilson left Paris for America) 
Mr. Dulles finished his argument, and Mr. Hughes 
replied. 

The sole question argued during these three meet- 
ings was whether the Fourteen Points and other ad- 
dresses of President Wilson, and their acceptance by 
the associated Governments and Germany, constituted 
a limitation on the extent of reparations or compensa- 
tion which the Associated Governments might demand 
in the final terms of peace. 

The American delegates held that the extent of re- 
parations was so limited by the agreement of November 
191 8 with Germany (the Trianon Hotel Pact) ; the 
British delegates took the opposite view. 50 

The League of Nations Commission held its first 
official meeting on January 3 1 at the Hotel Crillon. 
It was participated in by President Wilson, Colonel 
House, Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts. The 
six other members representing France, Italy and 
Japan, were Bourgeois, Larnaude, Orlando, Scialoja, 
Chinda and Otchiai; they appear to have taken a less 
active interest in its proceedings. 

The major decisions which the Treaty of Versailles 
embodies took practical form and became concrete dur- 
ing these last ten days of the President's first sojourn 

60 With reference to German indemnities it was now of common 
report in the ante-rooms and hotel corridors that the total allied bill 
would be an amount "sufficient to make all Germany realize the 
futility of militarism" (The Reparations Commission was at work). 
To the Americans the sums talked of seemed staggering, but there 
was nothing tangible for general or public discussion. 



The Peace Conference 183 

in Europe. The agreement to take Germany's colonies 
over bodily was reached. Under the principle of "per- 
manent trust" France was to take Togoland and the 
Cameroons, Japan the Caroline and Marshall Islands 
and to remain in occupation of Shantung with control 
of its railroad; Australia, New Guinea; the South Afri- 
can Union, German Southwest Africa. Britain was to 
have the mandate over Mesopotamia. France would 
probably have Constantinople, as the Turk manifested 
hostility to the British. There was to be a Kingdom 
of the Hedjaz, in which much of Syria would be in- 
cluded. Armenia was urged upon the United States 
but not definitely accepted. 

The proportionate distribution of vast territories 
had thus been tentatively agreed upon, and it was pos- 
sible to bring the settlements within the purview of a 
league covenant. Its clauses now rapidly took form, 
and by working day and night a draft of the Covenant 
was finished early in the morning of February 14, in 
time to be read at the Plenary Session arranged to 
be held that afternoon, at which session President Wil- 
son hoped to have the Covenant formally adopted by 
the Peace Conference. 

When the Plenary Session convened it appears that 
all the governments represented were willing to sign 
the covenant except France. Clemenceau refused. It 
was stated that France was unwilling to become a party 
to it because there was no international army or police 
force provided for to guarantee the safety of the mem- 
ber states. 

The bearing of the proceedings in the Commission on 



184 Lex Talionis 

Reparations which have been set forth above upon the 
action of the French Government in refusing adhesion 
to the League of Nations is entirely obvious. In the 
meetings of the Reparations Commission the issue as to 
the significance of the Trianon Hotel Pact had been 
clearly met and decided against the Americans. But be- 
fore the Reparations Commission could proceed its de- 
cision must be approved by the Council of Ten, where 
decisions if made at all must be unanimous. Here 
President Wilson refused to participate in a decision 
which denied the obligation of the Trianon Hotel Pact. 
Simultaneously Clemenceau refused for France ad- 
herence to the Covenant of the League of Nations. 

If at this time the American delegates had brought 
themselves to the point of joining in the repudiation of 
the Trianon Hotel Pact, and accepting the decisions of 
the Reparations Commission there is no possible doubt 
that the Covenant of the League of Nations would 
have been unanimously adopted at the Plenary Session 
of February 14th. What effect the unanimous adop- 
tion of the Covenant of the League at this early date 
might have had upon subsequent history is a matter of 
interesting speculation. 

Up to the moment when the Plenary Session of Feb- 
ruary 14 was held, however, America and Europe 
remained in profound disagreement upon the one vital 
issue of the Peace Conference, and President Wilson 
sailed the next day r bearing with him a draft of a 
covenant which had been given no validity or legal 
significance whatever. 51 

51 The Reparations Commission proceeded exactly as it would have 



The Peace Conference 185 

One other event (recurring with the regularity of 
the astronomical procession), action upon which could 
not be displaced, no matter how numerous and pressing 
the issues before the negotiators, was the renewal of 
the armistice, which must be signed by the Germans 
again on February 14. 

The Supreme War Council took up the question on 
February 10th in the midst of a veritable frenzy of 
apprehension in French public opinion, artfully stimu- 
lated by the government, over the German menace and 
of demands for the neutralization of the left bank of 
the Rhine. 52 

done had there been unanimous repudiation of the Trianon Hotel 
Pact. On February 5 it had appointed three sub-committees as 
follows: 

1. Evaluation of Damages. 

2. Capacity to Pay. 

3. Means of Payment, measures of control, guarantees. 

B2 The program of the meeting of the Supreme War Council for 
renewal of the armistice, February 10 was: 

1. Occupation of German territories. 

2. Occupation of Turkish Asia. 

3. Renewal of armistice; 

Right bank of Rhine. 

Execution of clauses previously signed. 

Action in case of German refusal. 

4. Execution of Naval armistice; submarines. 

5. Food for Poland. — (Paris Temps.) 
Journal des Debats, Feb. 14: 

"Bon gre, mal gre, the Supreme War Council had to adopt the 
only combination which remained open until the signing of prelimi- 
naries. It had to insert in the armistice convention essential clauses 
which normally would figure in the preliminaries of peace, and of 
which the execution could not be put off longer without danger. 

They therefore decided yesterday to demand the immediate execu- 



1 86 Lex Talionis 

For days there had been veiled and open criticism of 
the English and of President Wilson, with whispered 
accusations of pro-Germanism. So offensive had the in- 
euendo and gossip become, and so dangerous to the 
progress of negotiations, that the Americans and Eng- 
lish began to confer upon the advisability of moving 
the conference to some other place than Paris. 

The meeting of the Supreme War Council for the re- 
newal of the armistice opened with plain speaking and 
a clear-cut statement of issues. The French stated the 
allied terms, which they proposed be included in an 
extension of the armistice. They avowed their de- 
termination that German industry should be throttled in 
order that their own might not be subjected to its compe- 

tion of a certain number of conditions, and have authorized Foch to 
summon the German commissioners to Treves to accept this sort of 
ultimatum with a very short delay. The Supreme Council does not 
publish today the conditions arrived at yesterday but we know they 
are in three categories: 

i. Executing the clauses of November u and the two renewals. 

2. Poland, the frontier of 1772. 

3. Military conditions, complete disarmament. 

"Nous appliqueront dans l'execution de l'oeuvre de reparations 
les methodes rigoreusement scientifiques qu'ils ont employees pour 
leur oeuvre de destruction." — Gauvain. 

In response to President Wilson's demands a civilian commission 
was appointed to be present at the renewal of the armistice with the 
Germans. It had no powers except to observe and to report to the 
Supreme Economic Council. Its members for the United States were 
Norman Davis and General Bliss. The Supreme Economic Council 
was created February 8. 

Foch, Petain, Haig, Diaz and Pershing were present at the meet- 
ing of the Supreme War Council February 13. 



The Peace Conference 187 

tition. The President had no sympathy with this 
position. 

On the contrary he demanded that the authority of 
General Foch and the Armistice Commission be super- 
ceded by the civilian authority of the Peace Conference, 
and that the blockade be lifted to permit food sup- 
plies to enter Germany. 

These demands were met by a storm of indignation. 
Again Clemenceau and Wilson were plunged in fiery 
verbal war. (Lloyd George was not present at this 
meeting having been conveniently recalled to England 
on account of domestic questions. Britain was repre- 
sented by Balfour.) 53 The debate continued on suc- 
ceeding days. The French would not agree to the lift- 
ing of the blockade— if it were lifted the other allies 
had ships with which to resume commerce and France 
had not; Germany ought to be held back until France 
was on her feet. On the day following the last debate 
the French press was censored. 

It is said that Marshal Foch was bold enough to re- 
peat his assertion of a month before, that Germany 
had an army of three million men, and that it was neces- 
sary to occupy Essen and the Krupp works; that for 
military reasons power should not be withdrawn from 
the Armistice Commission, and that in the final terms 
of peace France should have the Rhineland, German 
coal and an enormous indemnity. 

M On February 13 Lloyd George revealed in the Commons the 
enormous victory which the European negotiators conceived they had 
already won: 

"The German colonies will not be returned (applause).^ We 
have also clearly indicated that 'reparations' comprise 'indemnities.' " 



1 88 Lex Talionis 

The discussion continued until February 12 when the 
Supreme War Council renewed the armistice for an in- 
definite period, and with concessions so broad to be 
signed by the German Armistice commission as to cover 
those financial provisions which were afterwards writ- 
ten into the Treaty of Versailles. (These decisions 
greatly facilitated the efforts of the Reparations Com- 
mission to arrive at the principle under which the word 
"reparation" was to be construed.) 

The new armistice convention was signed by the Ger- 
mans on February 17 at the point of allied bayonets; 54 
the Armistice Commission continued to supervise the 
execution of the convention; the Blocade continued to 
exclude food cargoes and fishing-boats from German 
ports. The Triangular Framework of the Entente 
Peace had successfully withstood the second and last as- 
sault that was destined to be made upon it. It re- 
mained thereafter invulnerable, and stood triumphantly 
until the 28th of June when the extorted signatures were 
affixed to the Treaty of Versailles. 

American intelligence officers returning from Ger- 
many had reported that Ebert, Scheidemann and Noske 
were striving honestly to perfect an organization 
capable of giving Germany real democratic government, 
and that the masses of the German people recognized 
defeat. Germany had become a legally organized re- 
public on February 9, and the National Assembly, sit- 
ting at Weimar, had adopted the constitution on Feb- 
ruary 11. The terms of armistice, as drawn by the 

"Erzberger received two sharply worded notes — one from Paris and 
one from London. They demanded cessation of hostilities with the 
Poles. 



The Peace Conference 189 

Supreme War Council, were presented to the Na- 
tional Assembly for immediate ratification. They 
caused consternation and dismay. When it was sug- 
gested that President Wilson could not have given his 
assent to them, the delegates were informed that he 
had been present when they were drawn up, and had 
approved of them. The last hope of a moderate peace 
was gone. Germany was surrounded by an iron ring 
which would not be relaxed until the bond was signed. 

It is necessary to advert once more, before closing 
this chapter, to the state of public opinion in Europe 
with reference to the principles which President Wilson 
had brought to Europe with him. 

After the meeting for the renewal of the armistice 
on January 12th, the good-will which French opinion 
had theretofore manifested rapidly cooled. The 
French Government knew that President Wilson's pur- 
poses were in fundamental antagonism to its own. 
As the breach widened, it permitted the press to reflect 
its own irritation, and this irritation in turn was com- 
municated to French public opinion. The invitation 
to the warring factions in Russia for a conference on 
Prinkipo, insisted on by President Wilson, over the 
bitter opposition of Pichon, seemed to the French to 
be a step in the direction of the recognition of a regime 
which threatened to repudiate the French claims of 
thirty-seven billion francs against the Czarist Govern- 
ment. 55 The President had vetoed Marshal Foch's 

^Lloyd George, through Reuters agency disavowed responsibility 
for the Prinkipo invitation. He had only suggested, he said, that 
representatives of all sections of Russian public opinion should come 
to Paris. 



190 Lex Talionis 

plan for the military occupation of Germany. He was 
opposing the just claims of the French for reparations. 
All these things became known to French public opinion, 
and it became bitterly hostile. The Franco-Slav so- 
ciety let it be publicly known that it did not approve of 
a league of nations. Franklin Bouillon and Andre 
Cheradame, the publicist, were said to be seeking a 
liaison with the political opposition now voicing itself 
in the American Senate. The brilliant political jour- 
nalists who were at their best only when their pens 
were dripping gall, were beginning to speak of Mr. 
Wilson as a party leader, not a President. There were 
whispered accusations of pro-Germanism. 56 

When President Wilson sailed, government propa- 
ganda among the French people, through the instru- 
mentality of the French press, had done its work. The 
plain people, upon whom the President had counted, 
had failed him. Public opinion in France regarded 
President Wilson as an impractical idealist, a Four- 
teenth Century dreamer, and believed him to be what 
was inexpressibly shocking to French consciousness — 

C6 The crow of the Gallic cock at this time was at its shrillest. The 
following lines illustrate its mood: 

"The allied countries should cease encouraging public and private 
excitations against France. French public opinion is calm and patient. 
But it will not tolerate that responsibilities be shirked nor that the 
atmosphere of the Conference be poisoned with asphixiating gasses 
emprunte in the German arsenal." 

Auguste Gauvain, Journal de Debats, February, 6. 

Feb. 17. "Des nuages a dissiper. We don't like the utterances of 
the World, the Times, the Washington Post; they accuse us of 
retarding the peace. They serve the interests of the enemy like all 
the propaganda to bring about division -among us." 



The Peace Conference 191 

pro-German. One American newspaper man summed 
up this sentiment: "Two months ago Wilson could 
have been elected President of France — today he could 
not be elected a justice of the peace." 

This reversal of sentiment in France presents the 
same political phenomenon which marked the over- 
throw of President Wilson as a leader of public opinion 
in Italy. In both instances a great moral leader, but 
an alien, had voiced the wishes of liberal and progres- 
sive elements everywhere, and quickened the hope that 
a formula had been found under which the acerbity of 
international misunderstanding would be assuaged, and 
international settlements reached in the spirit of true 
fraternity. In both instances this new leadership quick- 
ly demanded the sacrifice of cherished national aspira- 
tions of a kind which neither people was willing to give 
up, and in both instances reactionary chancelleries 
availed themselves of the opportunity to poison the 
minds of the people with the belief that protestation 
of liberal principles was only a veil which covered real 
hostility to their national welfare. 

In England popular sentiment is not so mercurial as 
among the Latin peoples and, except in times of nation- 
al exhaustion, has to be reckoned with. English popu- 
lar decisions when once made, bear some analogy to 
the grip of the British bull-dog. Such seemed to be 
the character of the decision to which the Ministry had 
committed English opinion while the George Washing- 
ton was steaming eastward. The presence of Mr. Wil- 
son in England at a later date, therefore, could not 
disturb the equanimity of the members of the Privy 



192 Lex Talionis 

Council, assured as they were that English public opin- 
ion was with them and not with President Wilson. On 
this point they could relax mental tension, while they 
observed with interest the wizardry by which the Quai 
d'Orsay and the Consulta exorcised the Pied Piper, 
whose music was luring the children of public opinion 
from them. 

The last forty-eight hours of that period of the peace 
negotiations in Paris, which ended with President Wil- 
son's departure for the United States on February 14, 
have that significance which the following concatenation 
of circumstances seems to give : 

1. The Supreme War Council renewed the armistice, 
extending the life of the Armistice Commission until 
the Treaty should be signed, and giving it unlimited 
power of oppression. 

2. The Reparations Commission overwhelmingly 
voted that the Trianon Hotel Pact did not constitute a 
limitation upon the right of the allies to impose in- 
demnities. The American members disagreed. 

3. The League of Nations Covenant was read in 
the Plenary Session of February 14. No action was 
taken and it was not adopted. 



CHAPTER VII 

Germany. 

BEFORE proceeding with the evolution of the 
Peace Treaty, it is advisable to inquire into the 
political and social developments which were taking 
place in Germany, behind the thick veil of secrecy which 
the Armistice Commission and the Naval Blockade 
maintained. 

It must not be forgotten that what transpired within 
the boundaries of that nation was interpreted to the 
peoples of the Entente and of the United States by 
agencies whose channel of communication with Ger- 
many passed through the Armistice Commission and 
the Naval Blockade Commission. Cables to America 
were controlled by the associated governments, and 
naval censorship on wireless messages was complete. 

At Paris, information of a most circumstantial and 
voluminous character came continuously to President 
Wilson and the Americans, but nearly all of that which 
was pressed on President Wilson's attention came 
through the intelligence agencies of the Entente govern- 
ments. The American intelligence service was far 
more trustworthy; it brought reports which represented 
conditions correctly, but its personnel was small, and 
its voice was not listened to at Paris, when the far more 
voluminous reports of the Entente agents, of a different 
tenor, corroborated each other completely. In Decem- 
ber, January and February everything indicates that 
the official American view of developments in Germany 
was founded almost entirely upon the representation 



i94 Lex Talionis 

of events and their meaning received through Entente 
channels. 

Press reports in America were, of course, subject 
to the same influences. During the winter of 191 8-19, 
the information concerning Germany given to the Amer- 
ican people was colored to suit the purposes of the 
Supreme War Council, and was not of a character to 
further the purposes of the American Peace. 

Hence, today, Americans see in retrospect a Ger- 
many during that winter, unrepentant, vengeful, treach- 
erous and dangerous. During that winter the French 
and British propaganda, directed to the dissemination 
of this belief in America, was more active and deter- 
mined than it had been during the war. Little respect 
was paid to the historical verities, and it is quite gen- 
erally believed in America today that a German revolu- 
tion in October and November caused a military col- 
lapse, which resulted in unconditional surrender, and 
that in the imposition of a very hard peace the asso- 
ciated governments were performing an act of retrib- 
utive justice. 

It has been set forth in Chapter III that the war, as 
a matter of fact, ended in a compromise agreement, 
providing for limited indemnities, and a peace of mod- 
eration compatable with German national honor. The 
agreement reached in the Trianon Palace Hotel on 
November 4th fixed irrevocably the terms and the 
standard of obligations that must govern both sides. 

A study of developments in Germany following the 
armistice discloses the honest conviction that the mutual 
rights and obligations growing out of the peace must 



Germany 195 

be based upon the agreement concluded at the Trianon 
Palace Hotel. 

Before the armistice was signed, all authority in 
Germany was relinquished by the Imperial Government 
to a cabinet of Peoples' Commissioners, headed by 
Friederich Ebert, and representing the Majority So- 
cialists in the Reichstag. The Majority Socialists were 
democratic in their principles and moderate in their 
tendencies. The Independent Socialists, a smaller 
group, were radical, and tended toward Bolshevist 
action. The Spartacists, after the armistice, led by 
Leibnecht, were indistinguishable in their principles 
from the Bolshevists of Russia, and sought to oust the 
Majority Socialists from power by methods of vio- 
lence. They undertook to institute at once a reign of 
terror in Berlin, and, by seizing the agencies and in- 
strumentalities of government, to paralyze the efforts 
of the Majority Socialists to call a constitutional con- 
vention and to maintain public order; and in the re- 
sulting chaos to establish the authority of the prole- 
tariat. 

Outside of Berlin simultaneous movements by Spar- 
tacists took place at the sea-ports, where sailors on 
many ships mutinied and joined the Spartacist cause, 
and in the industrial regions of Westphalia, Essen, 
Silesia and other places. Municipal agencies and 
police headquarters were seized, and the red flag 
raised. Everywhere the people had the opportunity 
to establish and support a permanent soviet regime if 
such were their inclination. 

The first Socialist cabinet consisted of Friederich 



196 Lex Talionis 

Ebert, Hugo Haase for foreign affairs, Philip Scheide- 
mann for finance and colonies, William Ditmann de- 
mobilization, transport and health, Landsburg for 
publicity, art and literature, and Richard Barth for 
socialist policy. 

The personnel of this cabinet, with the exception 
of the President Ebert, changed rapidly from day to 
day, as the Independent Socialists and radicals forced 
or lost greater representation; but the fundamental 
principle for which it stood, orderly democratic gov- 
ernment, was never overthrown, and President Ebert 
remained at the head of the governmental organiza- 
tion throughout. 

In its dealings with the Armistice Commission the 
Cabinet was unremitting in its efforts to obtain modifi- 
cation of the armistice terms by emphasizing the genu- 
ine democratic character of the new government, and 
showing how the armistice was in fact directed against 
the German people and not the government. The 
growing realization among the people that the armistice 
and blockade were to be used as instruments of oppres- 
sion tended to produce panic, and the Ebert cabinet, 
in communications to the people on that subject, sought 
to present the situation in a hopeful light. 57 

The new democratic government itself knew, within 

^The German Armistice Commission announced, November 15th: 
Alsace-Lorraine will not be considered "occupied territory;" it will 
not be considered a reason to cancel the armistice if the Germans fail 
to carry out the terms for evacuation ; German troops in East Africa 
will not have to make an unconditional surrender; Germany may 
determine its own war indemnity. 



Germany 197 

thirty-six hours of the signing of the armistice, that if 
the militarist element dominated the counsels of the 
associated governments, the spirit of the compact of 
the Trianon Hotel would be repudiated. 

The armistice commission almost immediately 
charged that the armistice terms had been violated 
by acts of destruction and plundering committed by 
German troops, and assumed the right to impose 
additional exactions on this account. On November 
20th the German High Command replied to this 
charge, that "The execution of the unheard of and 
technically impossible conditions would 'unavoidably 
bring about transgressions, and blame falls already, 
and will in future fall, exclusively on the Allied High 
Command." 

The Peoples Commissioners consistently urged that 
American newspaper correspondents be permitted to 
come to Germany. "Germany," they said, "is seeking 
to devise a method of getting news to America without 
passing through the hands of the British censor." 

"Free America," said the Tages Zeitung "should 
consider whether a league of nations can be built if 
eighty million people enter the league with fresh re- 
membrances of deeds of violence." 

The Berlin Zeitung am Mittag on December 5 said, 
"Public opinion in Germany has never ceased to believe 
in the sincerity of President Wilson. On the extent 
to which he carries through his ideas at the peace 
negotiations depends the solution of the question, 
whether at last universal peace returns to Europe, or 
whether the present terrible misfortune of Germany, 



198 Lex Talionis 

which casts its shadow on the whole world, is to be 
perpetuated." 

Berlin was full of discharged soldiers; they were 
sedulously sought by the adherents of Liebknecht. In 
Berlin, as elsewhere, under the spartacist impulsion, 
Workmen and Soldiers Councils (or "arsols," as they 
were called) were rapidly organized. The test of 
whether the democratic government of Ebert was to 
prevail or fall depended upon whether the arsols finally 
supported it or the Spartacist leaders. On November 
20 the Berlin Arsol, leaning to the Bolshevist principle, 
declared against the constituent assembly, and for the 
establishment of the council system. The influence of 
Ebert and the Majority Socialists was exercised in vain 
to alter this attitude. 

Thereupon the Berlin Arsol asserted its superiority 
to the Ebert Cabinet or "Peoples Commissioners," as 
some now termed this body. But the Berlin Arsol 
represented only the City of Berlin, while the Peoples 
Commissioners represented Germany. Word came 
from Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden, that if the na- 
tional assembly was not convened, south Germany 
would form an independent republic. Outside of Ber- 
lin it was only in the industrial sections that the council 
system met support. 

Imperial Germany had been a union of federal states. 
These federal states were still conscious of their sepa- 
rate governmental organization, and their representa- 
tives in Berlin were insisting upon the convening of a 
national assembly, while Liebknecht, through the col- 



Germany 199 

umns of the "Red Flag," was advocating the calling of 
a revolutionary tribunal, the trial of the Hohenzollerns 
and the confiscation of their property. 

The wireless station at Hamburg, in the hands of re- 
volted marines, was receiving daily communications 
from Moscow, which were promptly printed in the 
issues of the "Red Flag." Two of Berlin's largest 
industrial plants were in the hands of the workmen, 
and being operated under their control. Kurt Eisner, 
in Munich, was agitating for revolution. Hugo Haase, 
the Independent Socialist in the Cabinet of Peoples 
Commissioners, late in November seemed about to for- 
sake Ebert and join forces with Liebknecht, whose in- 
fluence in Berlin was growing daily. There was fre- 
quent street fighting and disorder. What the men who 
had formed the German armies would ultimately do, 
as to the issue of a national assembly or a government 
by arsols on the Russian plan, would determine the 
character that the German government would have. 
A mass-meeting of four thousand non-commissioned 
officers, held in Berlin on November 30, adopted a 
resolution calling on the government to end the bol- 
shevist agitation of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg, 
and to demand the convocation of a national assembly. 

In its dealings with the Armistice Commission, the 
German Government had protested against the com- 
plete surrender of locomotives and rolling stock as 
demanded, alleging the impossibility of assembling them 
on account of the lack of firemen and of oil. Its urgent 
pleas that food be permitted to enter Germany were 



200 Lex Talionis 

unremitting. Early in December, however, General 
Foch sent an ultimatum, demanding stricter compliance 
with the armistice demands, and threatening instant 
termination of the armistice and the occupation of Ger- 
many by allied troops. At the same time, Admiral 
Beatty, in reply to an appeal for mitigation of the naval 
blockade, refused any concession under the regime by 
which coastwise commerce was prohibited and fishing 
in the Baltic had been refused. 

The Liebknecht forces were collecting machine guns, 
rifles and ammunition. His supporters went about the 
streets of Berlin in gangs, and there were frequent 
riotous demonstrations. Civilian morale seemed to be 
deteriorating, and there was political bewilderment. 
There was shortage of food everywhere, particularly 
in the northern seaports, where industry was dislocated 
and where there was a general feeling of desperation. 

But, there were two great forces working against the 
success of the Spartacist's cause. The overwhelming 
mass of the people, everywhere except in the industrial 
districts, instinctively sought a regime of law and order, 
and the army was no less firm in its attitude on this 
subject. A representative convention of workmen and 
soldiers' delegates was called to convene in Berlin on 
December 16th, where the vital question of holding 
elections for a national assembly, or of establishing a 
council form of government, should be decided. 

It was the firm purpose of the Spartacists to prevent 
the convening of a national assembly at all costs. It is 
said that the Spartacist's program, concerted with Mos- 



Germany 201 

cow, was to prevent the calling of a national assembly, 
overthrow the Ebert government, and force a condi- 
tion which would lead the Allies to occupy Berlin; then 
to spread bolshevism among the allied troops. The 
desperate shortage of food, created by the operation 
of the land and sea blockade, was the Spartacists strong- 
est ally in this plan. 

The Convention of Workmen's and Soldiers' Dele- 
gates, representing councils from everywhere in Ger- 
many, assembled according to plan in Berlin. It met 
in the Prussian House of Deputies, and its proceedings 
occupied five or six days. The Armistice Commission 
had refused to permit delegates from the Rhineland to 
attend the Convention. It appears that the Armistice 
Commission seriously contemplated steps to prevent 
the assembling of this Convention. Some days before 
it opened, the Berlin papers warned that an ultimatum 
might be received from the Entente, demanding the 
immediate dissolution of all Workmen and Soldiers 
Councils, under the penalty of an advance into Germany 
if the demand were not met. "The spirit of the En- 
tente" says one paper, "shows no trace of willingness 
to erect a peoples league on a foundation of mutual, 
peaceful, neighborly relations." 

The columns of the Paris papers, at this period, un- 
mistakably revealed a deep solicitude on the part of 
the French Government and press that a government 
having sufficient strength to function in an orderly way 
should not arise in Germany. Such a government could 
not but hamper the Supreme War Council and the peace 



202 Lex Talionis 

structure which it was preparing to fit into the Triangu- 
lar Framework. 58 

One of the reasons alleged for the refusal, by the 
Supreme War Council, to deal with the Ebert Govern- 
ment, is almost incredible, because of the logical incon- 
sistency upon which it was based. History bears out 
the fact, however, that it was given. It appears that 
in response to an appeal by the Germans, made before 
the renewal of the armistice on December 14th, for the 
early convening of the Peace Conference and the recep- 
tion of German plenipotentiaries, the reply was made by 
the Armistice Commission, that the Entente Govern- 
ments could not recognize the Ebert regime as a de 
jure government, that it would be necessary for the old 
Reichstag and the Bundesrath to be convoked before 
the Allies would deal with the Germans. Simultane- 
ously, the French press was inveighing against the for- 
mation of a German national assembly, and calling for 
"La paix d' abord." 

These bodies were instrumentalities of the old Im- 
perial regime. They could have been summoned only 
by the Imperial will of a power which no longer had 
legal existence. That power had been overthrown to 
meet the demands of the associated governments, set 
forth in the October-November interchanges, and had 
been replaced by the republican regime of Ebert, which 
was legally responsive only to the will of the people. 

^Le Temps, Dec. 25: 
"Germany is hastening toward a republic of the Scheidemann type, 
that is toward a regime which will enforce German unity and prepare 
military revenge." 



Germany 203 

The demand of the Supreme War Council for the con- 
vocation of the Reichstag and Bundesrath was one 
which could not possibly have been met by the German 
Government, without violation of its obligations to the 
associated governments. 

So solicitous, however, was the German Government 
that German plenipotentiaries might be received in 
Paris, that an attempt was made to convoke these de- 
funct agencies. Constantin Fehrenbach, the President 
of the old Reichstag, issued a summons to the old mem- 
bers, but without setting place or time. Fehrenbach's 
action, as was to be expected, was accompanied by a 
storm of protest from all parties and the attempt was 
abandoned. 59 

In the Convention of Workmen and Soldiers Dele- 
gates, which opened on December 16th, the soldiers 
largely predominated. The Spartacists made per- 
sistent attempts, in the early sessions, to dominate the 
Convention. After some disorder they were put down. 
Ebert and Scheidemann declared, amid demonstrations 
of approval, "Berlin is not Germany". This Conven- 
tion represented the will of the entire army, and of all 

69 Fehrenbach addressed the Chamber December 12th. In defense 
of his action in undertaking to summon the old Reichstag, he called 
attention to the fact that the Entente refused to deal with any other 
agency in Germany, and that it was necessary to procure a prelimi- 
nary peace as soon as possible, in order to escape worse evils. He 
also said that Peoples Commissioner Ebert would not permit him 
to summon the Reichstag, and that he could not convince Ebert that 
it should be done. The Peoples Commissioner spoke in reply, declar- 
ing that what Fehrenbach advocated would be a violation of the 
peace accepted by the Allies at the Trianon Palace Hotel. 



204 Lex Talionis 

workers who were not Spartacists, and when, before 
adjourning, it declared for the convening of a national 
assembly, the question as to whether Germany would 
become Bolshevist or not was settled in the negative. 60 

Making no further effort, therefore, to take on 
artificial, imperialistic characteristics at the behest of 
the Supreme War Council, the government of the 
Peoples Commissioners proceeded with its plans for 
the convocation of a National Assembly, and for main- 
taining itself in authority in the face of Bolshevist dis- 
orders, until a constitution could be legally adopted. 

The morale of the soldiers had never been broken. 
Thousands of troops were now entering Berlin in good 
order and under perfect discipline. Every effort was 
made to show the gratitude of the people toward them. 
General Von Gallwitz issued orders to his army group, 
telling them that they were unbeaten, and had earned 
the gratitude of the people, and urging them to refrain 
from interference with the Civil authorities. At the 
same time Leibknecht and his agents were meeting the 
returning units, and urging upon them the establish- 
ment of a government upon the Soviet model. Amer- 

60 The program adopted by the Convention of Workmen and 
Soldiers Delegates was as follows: 

i. Fixed January 19th for elections of delegates to National 
Assembly. 

2. Endorsed socialization of certain industries and coal mines. 

3. Endorsed Ebert Cabinet, according it legislative and executive 
power. 

4. Created a Central Workmen and Soldiers Council of twenty- 
seven members (to replace the Greater Berlin Council which had 
bolshevist tendencies and which represented only the city of Berlin.) 



Germany 205 

ican intelligence reports at this time dwelt upon the 
great industrial and economic stagnation in Germany, 
and intimated that food supplies were needed at once 
to prevent starvation and anarchy. 

While the Ebert Government represented primarily 
the Majority Socialists, to whom Prince Max of Baden 
had relinquished authority on November 9th, its poli- 
cies were being supported by all other parties except 
the Independent Socialists and the Spartacists. A new 
Democratic Party, organized by Theodore Wolff, was 
adhered to by many people of the middle classes. Its 
meetings were crowded and were addressed by Dern- 
berg, Neumann and other liberal leaders. 

As the Christmas holidays approached, disorders in- 
creased in Berlin. The Spartacists distributed arms 
and urged strikes by workers in the larger industries 
and in the public utilities. They made special effort to 
prevent the publication of newspapers. There was 
general gloom. Little travel was possible on account 
of lack of trains. Shops displayed flimsy substitutes 
for Christmas wares. Thousands of unemployed work- 
men, and many discharged soldiers, were begging on 
the streets. 

The French press was denouncing the socialist 
leaders, and Brockdorff-Rantzau succeeded Solf as 
Foreign Minister, on the theory that the Entente might 
distrust a bourgeois less in that office than it would 
a socialist Foreign Minister. 

The Monday before Christmas, sailors who had 
been on guard duty, and were to be paid off and dis- 
charged, started to riot. Aided by volunteer "public 



206 Lex Talionis 

safety guards," composed of radicals, they blockaded 
the Foreign Office and invaded the Palace. Twelve 
were killed and seventy wounded before the disturbance 
was put down. 

This riot ushered in a campaign of violence by the 
Spartacists, who realized that if they could not gain 
control of the instrumentalities of government before 
the national convention was held, there would be no 
hope of Bolshevism in Germany. An armed mob 
seized the Prussian Ministry, took over the Vorwaerts 
printing office and announced that that paper would be 
published thereafter as the "Red Vorwaerts". They 
called for the overthrow of the Ebert Government for 
having called in Pottsdam troops against the sailor 
guard, and the replacement of Ebert and Haase by 
Liebknecht and Ledebour. There was apprehension 
among moderates that the Majority Socialist members 
of the cabinet might withdraw, leaving control in the 
hands of its members who were Independent Socialists, 
unless the latter dissociated themselves more completely 
from the Spartacist agitation against the Government. 
But the Executive Committee of the National Work- 
men and Soldiers Council (created at the convention 
which met on December 16) was now organized, was 
a body having national authority, and was non-Bol- 
shevist. It stood squarely behind Ebert and the mod- 
erate parties which were supporting him. It consulted 
daily with the Cabinet, and the result of these consulta- 
tions was that the Majority Socialists remained in the 
Cabinet, while the three Independents Haase, Ditmann 
and Barth, resigned. Their places were filled by three 



Germany 207 

Majority Socialists, among them Gustave Noske, a 
former editor and member of the Reichstag, and who 
since November had been Governor of Kiel. The 
apportionment of portfolios was made at a meeting 
of the new Cabinet on December 29, Scheidemann tak- 
ing the portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Noske Mili- 
tary Affairs. 61 

Sunday, December 30 was a day of some anxiety, as 
Spartacist outbreaks were apprehended, but only mass 
meetings were held. 

A Spartacist congress of one hundred delegates from 
all parts of Germany convened in Berlin on the first 
of January. Radek, the Moscow propagandist, myste- 
riously appeared, and delivered a fiery appeal for the 
introduction of Bolshevism. The congress voted to 
sever all connection with the Independent Socialists, 
whom they had been unable to control. In the session 
of January 2 a violent quarrel between Liebknecht and 
Rosa Luxemburg introduced dissessions. Liebknecht 
favored participation by Spartacists in the coming elec- 
tions for a national assembly. Luxemburg declared 
that the meeting of a national assembly must be pre- 
vented at all costs. Her position was supported by a 
vote of 63 to 23. 

Ten days of spectacular violence in Berlin followed. 
It could have been put down at an earlier date, but the 

61 These were the political developments which were taking place 
in Germany when it was falsely reported in London, on December 
28 (during President Wilson's sojourn in England), that the ex- 
tremists had seized power in Berlin, and that Herr Ebert's govern- 
ment was virtually no longer existent. 



208 Lex Talionis 

Ebert Government feared that a display of military 
power might provoke a military occupation of Ger- 
many by Allied forces. 

During these ten days there was much intermittent 
violence, and in the Entente countries and the United 
States elaborate and exaggerated accounts of revolu- 
tion followed the daily developments. On Sunday, 
January 5 the rioters again occupied the Vorwaerts 
building and the Wolff News Agency, and a revolu- 
tionary committee undertook to issue the Vorwaerts. 
Liebknecht harangued the crowds. During the next 
few days the Spartacists occupied Police Headquarters 
in the Alexanderplatz and the Royal Stables. From 
here they made sallies down Unter den Linden against 
the troops who were guarding the Chancellor's Palace 
in the Wilhelmstrasse. The Russians, Radek and Joffe, 
were active, and many Independent Socialists joined 
the Spartacists. On Monday, January 6th only three 
newspapers appeared, and banks and the Bourse were 
closed. It was said that the Government might go to 
Frankfort. But on the next day Peoples Commissioner 
Ebert issued an order against street gathering, and, for 
the first time, directed the troops to defend the Gov- 
ernment. By January 10th they had driven the Spar- 
tacists from all their strongholds, cleared the Wilhelm- 
strasse and other thoroughfares, and broken the organ- 
ized power of the revolutionists. In the disorders, 
both Liebknecht and Luxemburg were killed and before 
the 1 2th of January the attempt to introduce Bolshe- 
vism into Germany had definitely failed. All over Ger- 
many preparations were steadily going forward for 



Germany 209 

the elections on January 19th for delegates to the Na- 
tional Assembly. The elections were completed on the 
20th and proved that the development of a republican 
form of government was the primary motive through- 
out the nation. 

Out of a total of about four hundred and twenty 
delegates, the Majority Socialists elected about a hun- 
dred and sixty-five. Other conservative parties, includ- 
ing the Democrats, Centrists, and the National Party, 
elected nearly two hundred members. The Independ- 
ent Socialists elected twenty-four delegates, and a few 
delegates were returned by other parties. With the 
support of the other conservative elements, which now 
outnumbered the Majority Socialists, the Ebert Cabinet 
remained in power. 

The National Assembly was summoned to convene at 
Weimar on February 6th. Weimar was selected at 
the instance of the South German States and the West 
Prussian Provinces, who distrusted the leadership of 
Berlin. The opening of the National Assembly was 
impressive for solemnity, earnestness and simplicity. 
David was elected President of the Assembly, and 
Ebert President of the German Reich. In his speech 
of acceptance, which was frequently interrupted, he 
warned the Allies, saying that Germany might refuse 
to make peace if pushed too far. On February nth a 
constitution was adopted and Germany was a de jure 
republic. 

Germany was now under a legitimate and fully organ- 
ized republican form of government. By reference to 
the preceding chapter, it will be seen that the elections 



210 Lex Talionis 

for delegates to the National Assembly were held the 
day after the Peace Conference was formally opened 
at Paris, and that the National Assembly was engaged 
in the orderly transaction of its legislative business on 
February ioth, when Marshal Foch was insisting, be- 
fore the Supreme War Council, upon a military occupa- 
tion of Germany on the ground that that state was a 
prey to Bolshevism and reaction. 62 

Neither during the period before President Wilson's 
departure for the United States, on February 15th, nor 
afterwards, was the German Government permitted to 
have any direct dealings with the civilian delegates to 
the Peace Conference at Paris. The associated gov- 
ernments dealt with it only through the Armistice Com- 
mission. 

Under these circumstances, every effort of the Ger- 
man Government had to be directed to meeting the 
continuous and increasing demand of that body, in 
order to save Germany from the occupation which 
might follow a violation of its decrees, and to demon- 

82 0n February 8 the French press (Journal) gave much of the 
speech of Ebert at the opening of the Weimar Assembly. It is 
interesting, and a matter of some wonder, that the Americans in 
Paris had ample opportunity to read and ponder this speech. 

The speech stated how, in the German view, the war actually 
ended. It told of the food distress in Germany, due not only to the 
war, but to the blockade. It declared that the principle of spoliation 
was in the peace which the allies were imposing, that its purpose 
was vengeance and violence, and deserved the most energetic con- 
demnation. But it expressed confidence in the principles of President 
Wilson. The conditions of the armistice were of an unheard of 
severity, and their execution "sans pardon." The German people 
demand entry to the society of Nations. 



Germany 211 

strating the good faith of the new government, in the 
hope that the Entente Governments might relent in 
their purpose sufficiently to relieve the menace of star- 
vation, by permitting the importation of food. 

The full meaning of the British Orders in Council, 
which had extended the blockade to the Baltic Coast 
in December, had gradually become clear to the Ger- 
man Cabinet. It had been followed almost imme- 
diately by the termination of all communication between 
the west bank of the Rhine and the rest of Germany. 
Germany was hermetically sealed. So long as the will 
of the Armistice Commission was resisted, so long 
would the German people be dependent solely upon 
their internal resources. If starvation became pro- 
gressive, and was unrelieved, there would be no de- 
mand put forth by the Armistice Commission which 
the German Government would be able to resist. 63 

B3 The French contemplated a state of starvation in Germany with 
complacency. At a dinner at the Foreign Press Club on March 12th, 
Secretary Lansing had courageously spoken in behalf of a more 
merciful policy toward Germany, and the immediate amelioration of 
the widespread starvation there by the lifting of the food blockade. 

The following are typical comments of the representative French 
press upon his remarks: 

La Democratic Nouvelle: Andre Cheradame, quoting Mr. Lans- 
ing's statement that Germany must be able to obtain food, if she is 
to resist anarchy says, "As a matter of fact, supplying the Berlin 
Government with food is merely consolidating pan-German tendencies. 
Neither can it be proved that the supply of food will stop the spread 
of bolshevism, which is not necessarily a result of hunger. In Russia 
the hungry are not bolshevists; it is only when they are fed that they 
become bolshevists." 

Le Siecle: "Mr. Lansing asks us not to oppose the revictualing of 
Germany. The Peace Conference has at last taken up this important 



212 Lex Talionis 

question, and it is clear that when the provision ships enter German 
ports, the German question will be settled. German debts will be 
recognized and pledges given." 

Journal des Debats: "Mr. Lansing spoke of the well merited 
sufferings of Germany, but said that we risked losing the fruits of 
victory if we did not help to establish order there. We must supply 
food and raw materials, but industrial conditions must first be re- 
established by the conclusion of peace. If the present chaos continues, 
there will be no government left fit to treat with or capable of carry- 
ing out its undertakings. Mr. Lansing is right in saying that the 
Germans must be made to work to pay their debts. Only so, can 
German militarism be destroyed." 

Le Temps says that food and raw materials are not at the bottom 
of the problem. "Germany is passing through a moral crisis that 
cannot be overcome by food supplies or bales of cotton. Until October 
1 8th Germany lived on the idea of her invincibility. Everything is 
now changed, and she is waiting for guidance from the victors. What 
have we done that will lead her towards an organization which will 
be in the interest of peace? If we do not supply Germany we risk 
compromising our credit. If we supply the Germany of the Scheide- 
mann's and Brockdorff-Rantzau, we merely fall out of the frying pan 
into the fire." 

The Gaulois, on March 14th, commenting on proceedings in the 
Chamber of Deputies, regards the question of punitive damages as 
finally solved, and speaks a bit unguardedly; 

"Mr. Klotz managed the situation very well. The Chamber was 
unusually clear-sighted, and refused to be carried away by the 
socialists. The Government must not, however, delay to let the 
country know how many thousand millions are to be demanded from 
Germany." 



CHAPTER VIII. 

The Interlude. 

PRESIDENT Wilson was absent from Paris one 
month, returning there on March 15th. He was 
released for a time from every physical influence of the 
environment in which he had found himself since De- 
cember 14th, 191 8. In the peaceful isolation of a ten 
day ocean voyage, it would be possible to review and 
appraise the forces with which he had been in contact, 
to determine what had been the resultant of the impact 
oT those forces with the force which he himself repre- 
sented, what measures his experiences now recom- 
mended, and what changes of policy or tactics were 
demanded. 

During two months in Europe, the President had 
been treading on strange ground, and had, in fact, been 
led far astray. He had been lured deeper and deeper 
into a Sirbonian bog of perplexities, where there was 
no time for thought, except of measures of self-preser- 
vation. 

The almost unconquerable difficulties of his situation 

may be reviewed briefly. 

All power in western Europe was centered in the 
camarilla behind the Supreme War Council. This 
camarilla was united, in a perfect union of the wills, 
that the American Peace should be rejected; that the 
Trianon Hotel contract should be repudiated; and that 
a peace of vengeance, and of protracted industrial servi- 
tude, should be imposed upon Germany. Behind the 



214 Lex Talionis 

Supreme War Council were the serried ranks of highly 
trained and obedient bureaucratic organizations in Eng- 
land, France and Italy, thoroughly aware of the pur- 
poses of the Supreme War Council, and desirous and 
capable of furthering its every measure. 

This camarilla had been in intimate contact with 
President Wilson for two months. It had paid unre- 
mitting homage to his principles; it had proclaimed his 
leadership in public, but it had refused to follow it in 
private. 64 On the contrary, it had driven steadily for- 
ward toward the execution of a peace whose nature was 
repugnant to him. The measures it had insisted upon 
taking before his departure, and to which his assent 
had been obtained, violated fundamental principles of 
justice, and made the establishment of a real society of 
nations, such as he had contemplated, a vain and im- 
practical ambition. In his efforts to concert the con- 
structive thought of the world upon the framing of a 
great charter of world law and liberty, he had encoun- 
tered only indirection, deceit and hypocracy, and found 
himself exposed to the menace of a personal hatred, 
the like of which he had never encountered in America. 

In Paris there were no wise and benevolent sages, 
contributing their common store of wisdom to the ad- 
vancement of the world's welfare. On the other hand, 
there was a desperate struggle for supremacy; the law 
of the jungle prevailed, the law of the tooth and the 

"After the meeting of February 12th, for the renewal of the ar- 
mistice, Clemenceau granted an interview to correspondents of the 
Associated Press, in which he stated that he was in entire accord 
with the principles of President Wilson. 



The Interlude 215 

claw, under which there is no code to hamper methods, 
and under which no quarter is given. It was new to 
the American psychology, and it was terrifying. 

Nevertheless, during those two months, the Presi- 
dent had spoken as a liberal statesman to liberal states- 
men, urging a forward movement in world govern- 
ment, for which the people were now spiritually pre- 
pared. His words had fallen on arid and stony ground. 
He was dealing with forces which could be made to 
yield only to some form of compulsion. 

Thus far, the camarilla had beaten the President at 
every point. He had been taken by surprise. Their 
methods were secret and stealthy, their conspiracy never 
in danger of betrayal. 

Their power was enormous; the Triangular Frame- 
work assured success for the Entente peace, so far as 
Germany was concerned. The steady pressure of star- 
vation was extorting from the German Government and 
the German people the necessary renunciations of 
colonies, territories and industrial freedom. 

The camarrilla had only one vulnerable point. If 
the moral foundations of the Entente peace were made 
a subject of public discussion; if lawyers and journalists 
throughout the world were given the essential docu- 
ments to construe, the Entente peace would assuredly 
be overthrown, because no honorable tribunal of jurists 
anywhere could say that it bore any resemblance to the 
peace agreement by which hostilities were brought to 
an end. If public opinion became convinced that the 
Trianon Hotel pact bound the Associated Governments 
to make a peace of moderation with Germany, the Tri- 



216 Lex Talionis 

angular Framework would fall apart and release the 
throat of a prostrate people from the Entente clutch. 

If, on the other hand, the significance of the Tri- 
angular Framework, and the work of destruction which 
it was doing, continued to remain secret, and if the true 
significance of the pact of the Trianon Palace Hotel re- 
mained undisclosed, neither President Wilson nor any 
other influence could prevent the successful consumma- 
tion of the Entente peace. 

When President Wilson sailed for America, he was 
bound in the chains of secrecy. Unless he could strike 
them away he would remain powerless until the end, 
and would be compelled to witness the triumph of de- 
structive forces. Only if the shackles of secrecy were 
struck away would the President be able to marshal the 
irresistible forces of public opinion, and lead them to a 
victory in the cause of the healing peace, which the 
Americans had gone to Europe to make. 

The necessity of secrecy then was the Achilles heel 
of the camarilla, and of this it was fully aware. It 
had no fear that secrecy could not be maintained in 
Europe. All who knew the embarassing facts were of 
the bureaucracies, and loyal to the cause. Public opin- 
ion was lulled and successfully deceived; upon the state- 
ment of facts that had been presented to it by the gov- 
ernments, public opinion heartily supported them in the 
making of the Entente peace. The camarilla held 
Europe in the hollow of its hand. The developments 
which followed Mr. Wilson's departure betrayed a 
confidence on the part of the Supreme War Council 
that President Wilson would now be unable to burst 



The Interlude 217 

the shackles of secrecy with which he was bound. If 
they were right, in this confidence, their plans were as- 
sured of successful fruition. 

They proceeded, therefore, with the making of the 
peace by precisely the same methods which they would 
have followed had the President adhered to the prin- 
ciple of punitive damages, and given his specific consent 
to it before his departure. It is said that, immediately 
after the President sailed, the Peace Conference defi- 
nitely adopted the principle of punitive damages, and 
that a message by wireless, in the nature of an ulti- 
matum, was sent to the President on the George Wash- 
ington. The reply, also, is said to have been accepted 
by the Supreme War Council as a consent to the adop- 
tion of the principle. 

The Reparations Commission immediately began a 
work which bore ultimate fruit in what are known as 
the reparations clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. 65 

Secrecy then was the Achilles heel of the Entente 
peace, where alone it could be given its death blow. 

It would seem that these considerations, pondered in 
the long hours of repose on the George Washington, 
might have pointed the way of exit from the Sirbonian 
bog, and indicated the road back to high ground where, 

^The French press, which was entirely sympathetic with the ap- 
plication of the principle of secrecy to the proceedings of the Repara- 
tions Commission, was informed by Sir George Hewhart, member, 
and English Attorney-General, on February 6th, as follows: 

"Discretion is not less important than rapidity. It is not opportune 
to discuss these questions publicly. It is not good to mention the 
details of these labors or publish the results, but a great quantity of 
matter is assembled and being examined." 



218 Lex Talionis 

upon the President's return to Europe, victorious battle 
could have been waged. 

The new course of action, which the posture of 
events seemed to recommend, would have been as fol- 
lows: 

To send an ultimatum to Paris by wireless from the 
George Washington that the United States would make 
no peace that did not honor the Trianon Hotel signa- 
tures. There should be liberal reparations, but no 
punitive damages or arbitrary confiscation of territory. 
The blockade should be lifted immediately to permit 
the entry of food into Germany, and the eight-hundred 
thousand German prisoners in the Camps at Carasonne, 
Orleans and Rouen be repatriated. 

Having sent this ultimatum to Europe, the President 
would have turned his attention to that great home- 
land which was waiting to know how his fortunes had 
fared in Europe; and upon whose decision he was now 
about to stake all. 

Upon his arrival in Boston, he would have disclosed 
to the American people, without reserve, the whole 
sinister scene through which he had passed in Europe. 
He would have reviewed the contents of the Peace 
notes of October and November, with their clear im- 
plication, and the final and unmistakable agreement of 
the Trianon Hotel. 

He would have revealed the purpose of the cama- 
rilla to repudiate its binding obligation, its conscious de- 
ception of the Entente populations, the careful and 
secret erection of the Triangular Framework, the sig- 
nificance of the blockade which was even then choking a 



The Interlude 219 

prostrate enemy into insensibility, and the inhuman 
greed of an invisible financial power, which had its hand 
in every secret measure of the Supreme War Council. 

He would have shown that the ban of secrecy was 
being laid upon the deliberations of the newly created 
Reparations Commission, because the things which it 
was doing could not bear the light of day. Placing all 
the evidence before them, as to the manner in which 
the war had come to an end, he would have asked the 
American people to choose between the American Peace 
and the Entente Peace. 

It would have been a situation to which American 
public opinion would have given instant response. The 
hearts of his auditors would have responded in unison 
to his appeal, and the people throughout the country 
would have met the summons with equal enthusiasm. 
Domestic politics could not but have been subordinated 
to the magnitude of the importance of the juncture. 
There would have been no successful republican oppo- 
sition. 

With the American people behind him, the President 
would have awaited the response from Europe. What 
the peoples of the Entente had never learned from their 
governments they would have learned from the dis- 
closures made in America. When they knew they had 
been deceived, and that the people of the United States 
would make no Entente peace with Germany, public 
opinion in Europe would no longer be the inert and 
docile thing which had so failed President Wilson dur- 
ing the two months he had spent in Europe. Cabinets 



220 Lex Talionis 

would have fallen and the camarilla would have been 
dissolved. 

"Allied stocks," which Clemenceau had warned 
President Wilson, just before his departure, would be 
"affected" unless the principle of punitive damages was 
applied in the peace settlement, would have been very 
greatly affected. There would have been a financial 
crash, and the financial crash would have been salutary; 
for it would have meant the disappearance of hundreds 
of millions in absolutely fictitious values. The financial 
gamblers, governmental and private, would have been 
put to rout, and an honest reconstruction, which was 
absolutely essential for recovery in Europe, would have 
begun to take place. The obscure and dishonest fi- 
nancial intrigue that accompanied the making of the 
peace, the desperate efforts to give an appearance of 
balanced budgets which have since been made, and the 
specious arguments of experts for the stabilization of 
currencies by arbitrary conventions, and for their ac- 
ceptance by the Government of the United States, 
would have been spared a weary world. 

There is no point in the long negotiations, which 
ended in the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, at 
which the insufficiency of American agencies, public and 
private, for aiding the President of the United States 
in carrying out his executive function, is so apparent as 
during this interlude, when the opportunity was af- 
forded for stock-taking and appraisal of fact and mo- 
tive. 

The political phenomena of which the situation of 
February 15th was the resultant, all lay before the 



, The Interlude 221 

American agents for their observation and analysis. A 
few days of intelligent reflection on board the George 
Washington might have brought the true situation to 
light, but there were none there with the wisdom or 
the courage to be of real assistance to the President. 

Mr. Wilson's mind was not elastic. He could not 
cast off the effects which the nervous stimuli of the 
environment of the past two months had produced. He 
could not again become the Wilson that the east-bound 
George Washington had carried. His spirit still lin- 
gered in the Sirbonian bog of Paris. 

The truth of the matter was that during those two 
months the President had shifted his ground. Day by 
day, and hour by hour, he was under attack. Every 
utterance he let drop was irrevocable. Statements 
made in an informal and unpremeditated way com- 
mitted him to important decisions. Inch by inch he 
was forced to shift his ground on a hundred issues. 
Like the king on a chess board he had repeatedly 
escaped from check only to reach checkmate at last. 

How many admissions may the President have made 
in those crowded hours at Buckingham Palace, in 
Downing Street, where he lunched informally with the 
Imperial War Cabinet, or at Guild Hall, where the 
motive for establishing personal harmony was so 
strong? A Paris newspaper, in late January, told of 
an agreement between the British Imperial War Cab- 
inet and President Wilson, reached in December, that 
the German colonies should be disposed of under the 
right of conquest, and that Britain should have the 
South Sea Islands and German East Africa; the Paris 



222 Lex Talionis 

newspaper argued that under the same claim of right 
France should have Togo and the Cameroons. 66 

Yet, up to February 15th, everything that had been 
done was merely tentative and contingent upon other 
decisions. The President had not made an admission 
that he did not have the right to withdraw, for they 
were all made upon the condition that a league of 
nations was to be adopted, and that the word repara- 
tions should not be construed to mean "punitive dam- 
ages." 

But, neither in his negotiations with the Europeans 
nor in his relations at home, was the President willing 
to retrace his steps. 

In the United States he wanted to prove himself to 
be in the right. In the elections on the eve of his de- 
parture the country had returned a hostile Congress to 
power. The Republican opposition was even now 
watching eagerly for flaws in his policy and conduct, 
and might be able to place a false construction upon 
his words if, upon his arrival at Boston, he disclosed his 
need for the mighty help that the united support of 
America's citizens would give him in Europe. If he 
staked all upon the probability that the rectitude of his 
position would reunite the people behind him, regard- 
less of party affiliation, only to find that his appeal had 
fallen upon deaf ears, then his position as a negotiator 

""On January 29 the Journal de Debats contained a statement that 
"at the end of conversations between President Wilson and Lloyd 
George in London, Mr. Wilson admitted the principle of absolute 
possession of the German colonies, and sans entrave by England of 
those which are attributed to her." The Journal went on to say that 
this being so, France should have Togoland and the Cameroons. 



The Interlude 223 

in Europe would have become untenable and hopeless, 
and the chance which he still possessed of gaining some 
concessions in Paris would have been lost. 

He, therefore, determined to go forward from his 
position on February 15, and not to retrace his steps 
to the position of November 11, 191 8, and from there 
begin again. 

Upon reaching Washington, nothing was done that 
thawed the coldness existing between the Executive and 
the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, and the 
mutual understanding, absolutely essential under the 
circumstances, was not attained. It could not be at- 
tained unless essential information were given to the 
Foreign Relations Committee, and this information 
the President would not give. The Committee were left 
in as complete ignorance of the real issue at Paris as 
was the American public. The President was becom- 
ing, what the French journalists had described him to 
be, u a party leader, not a President." 

President Wilson's declarations in the United States 
told, in effect, of successful negotiations in Paris. They 
held out the promise of the establishment of a league 
of nations which would have the genuine support of 
Europe. They revealed nothing of the savage retribu- 
tion which was being visited upon the fallen foe. Just 
before sailing again President Wilson delivered an 
extended address before a great audience in the Metro- 
politan Opera House, New York, on the evening of 
March 4th. Former President Taft, by his presence 
on the platform, lent support to the President's cause. 
The address was optimistic "The League of Na- 



224 Lex Talionis 

tions" he said, "is nothing more nor less than a cove- 
nant that the world will always maintain the standards 
which it has now vindicated by some of the most pre- 
cious blood ever spilled. Europe is a bit sick at heart at 
this very moment, because it seems that statesmen had 
no vision and that the only vision has been the vision 
of the people". 

"These gentlemen do not know what the mind of the world 
is just now. Everybody else does. I do not know where they 
have been closeted. I do not know by what influences they 
have been blinded ; but I do know that they have been separated 
from the general currents of the thought of mankind, and 1 
want to utter this solemn warning, not in the way of a threat ; 
the forces of the world do not threaten, they operate. The great 
tides of the world do not give notice that they are going to rise 
and run; they rise in their majesty and overwhelm might, and 
those who stand in their way are overwhelmed. Now the heart 
of the world is awake and the heart of the! world must be 
satisfied. 

"The uneasiness in the European population is not due en- 
tirely to economic causes or motives'. They see that their gov- 
ernments have never been able to defend them against intrigue 
or aggression, and that there is no force of foresight or of 
prudence in any modern cabinet to stop war. This is because 
nations are divided. This nation (United States) was set up 
for the benefit of mankind. It cannot desert the world. It 
would be thrown back into blackness and despair if we deserted 
it. - ■ ■ 

"I have tried once and again, my fellow citizens, to say to 
little circles of friends, or to larger bodies, what seems to be 
the real hope of the people of Europe, and I tell you frankly 
I have not been able to do so because when the thought tries 



The Interlude 225 

to crowd itself into speech the profound emotion of the thing 
is too much ; speech will not carry. I have felt the tragedy of 
the hope of those suffering peoples. 

"The critics have not observed the spirit of the boys in khaki 
who went to show that America would go anywhere where the 
rights of mankind were threatened. Having felt their crusad- 
ing spirit, I am not going to permit myself to slacken. I do 
not mean to come back until it's over over there. If the states- 
men of Europe used to be cynical, they are not that way now. 
They have been subdued by the awful significance of recent 
events and the awful importance of what is to ensue. Every 
man in that Conference knows that the treaty of peace will be 
inoperative without the constant support and energy of a great 
organization, such as is supplied by the League of Nations. 

"Under the League of Nations, nations promise not to have 
alliances. Nations promise not to make combinations against 
each other. Nations agree that there shall be but one combina- 
tion and that is the combination of all against the wrong-doer. 

"And so, I am going back to my task on the other side with 
renewed vigor. I have not forgotten what the spirit of the 
American people is. But, I have been immensely refreshed by 
coming in contact with it again. 

"We can look forward to the future with great confidence. 
Settlements will begin to be made rather rapidly in the Con- 
ference from this time on. The men engaged in these confer- 
ences are gathering heart as they go, not losing it. Amidst all 
the interplay of influences, there is a forward movement that is 
running toward the right. The only permanent thing is right. 
A wrong settlement is bound to be a temporary settlement. 
The spirits of men will rebel against it, and the spirits of men 
are now in the saddle." 

This speech put the President in a false position ; it 



226 Lex Talionis 

marked the fatal turning which was to lead to defeat 
and disaster. It did not reveal the fact that America 
was to become a party to a peace of vengeance, of a 
cruelty and malignancy unknown to modern standards. 
It did not indicate that American honor was at stake. 
It pictured the settlement going forward to the sure 
triumph of right and justice, and as marking the dawn 
of a new era, which would usher in new and better 
principles for the settlement of international disputes, 
and guarantee the safety and security of men and na- 
tions in their future dealings with each other. 

There was nothing definite for intelligent American 
citizens to take hold of. Instead of focusing the eyes 
of Americans on Paris, and letting them see that for 
which their President was striving, it tended to lessen 
interest in Paris and enthusiasm for the President's 
course, and to fix interest on the breach which was fast 
widening between a Democratic President and a Re- 
publican Congress. They were willing now to hear 
what the Republican Senators had to say. 

The President returned to Europe without the sup- 
port of the American people, because he had not given 
them an issue upon which they could mass themselves 
behind him. When he reentered the deliberations at 
Paris, he did not bring back with him the prestige and 
power of leadership. He spoke with no greater author- 
ity than if he had been a private citizen. 

None had observed with greater interest and curios- 
ity the utterances of the President during his short stay 
in the United States, and the manner/ in which they 
were received, than the little group in Paris whose 



The Interlude 



227 



arbitrary will was now fixing the destinies of Europe. 
None knew better than themselves, that if the will of 
America should be aroused to challenge their preten- 
sions, there would be no alternative for them but 
speedy and complete capitulation. The result of their 
observations in America during the interlude calmed 
their apprehensions. "We can look forward to the 
future," President Wilson had told the people, "with 
great confidence". 

American public opinion had undergone no psychosis, 
it was demanding nothing from Paris. The Supreme 
War Council could now eliminate from the political 
complex the hazard that latent forces across the Atlan- 
tic might overthrow its power. 



CHAPTER IX. 

The Final Six Weeks. 

THE treaty-making processes of the Peace Confer- 
ence, after President Wilson's return to Paris, ex- 
tended from March 15 to May 7, when the completed 
Treaty of Versailles was handed to the German pleni- 
potentiaries to sign. They present not a single new 
psychological aspect. The triumphant march of the 
forces which were moulding the Entente Peace moved 
with the same cadence, and employed the same tactics, 
as before February 14th. They were confident now 
that no obstacle of a formidable nature intervened be- 
tween them and their destination. 

With the lapse of the years the glass which history 
focuses upon the Peace Conference presents a less 
cloudy and confused image. The groups of masses of 
form and color and of light and shade which have 
seemed to bear little reference to each other are seen 
to be parts of a single picture, and, as the focus becomes 
adjusted, they merge into an image which has clearness, 
definition and meaning. When in this way time has 
given objectivity to the Peace Conference, and its dra- 
matic aspects are understood, February 14th will be 
seen to be the moment of dramatic climax. 

Three times the armistice had been renewed; the 
food blockade had lasted for more than three months; 
the allied purpose to impose a peace of vengeance was 
no longer disguised; and its consummation was already 
more than half attained. In the mass of activities going 



The Final Six Weeks 229 

forward with ever-increasing momentum the attitude of 
the American delegates had been permissive. 

There had been protest, but not refusal to participate. 

In the earlier negotiations at Paris there was one 
eventuality, the possibility of which in the American 
consciousness, was non-existent. This eventuality was 
a breach between the United States and the Entente. 
These nations were our tried and faithful friends. 
Standing shoulder to shoulder with them in their hour 
of peril, we had made their cause our own, and it was 
our resources and man-power that had decided the day 
upon the field of battle. All of those elements which 
engender in the mind a sense of true comradeship had 
been present in abundance in the day of peril, and the 
Americans who went to Paris to make the settlement 
were confident of negotiating in an atmosphere of 
mutual good faith, generosity and loyalty. 

In the two months of negotiation just closing they, 
themselves, had manifested these qualities in abundant 
measure. In the earlier weeks the Europeans had 
seemed to meet them fairly on this high ground, but 
during the four weeks that brought this period of the 
peace conference to an end, good faith and confidence 
were shaken rudely, and negotiations which had been 
begun in the harmony, which marks a common founda- 
tion and a common point of departure, were terminat- 
ing amidst heated altercations, suppressed antagonisms, 
and irreconcilable misunderstandings. The mercury 
that marks degrees of friendship had fallen quickly 
from summer heat to freezing. 

But the eventuality of a breach between the United 



230 Lex Talionis 

States and the Entente continued to be an impossibility, 
in the minds of the American negotiators. They could 
not visualize it as developing under any circumstances. 
It would be a preposterous thing. 

On the other hand, the Supreme War Council had 
cooly weighed the considerations which might bring this 
eventuality about. With shrewd wisdom, they per- 
ceived that the American spirit of accord would stand 
almost any strain, if the strain came gradually. Hence 
the secret erection of the Triangular Framework of 
the Entente Peace. The Fourteenth of February 
marked the moment of maximum strain. The Amer- 
ican-Entente accord remained unbroken. 

Between the 10th and the 14th of February the 
Americans definitely abandoned the only real issue in 
the Peace Conference — that of "punitive damages," 
and shifted their ground to a factitious issue, that of 
"the League of Nations." This issue the Europeans 
regarded as an absurdity, for they would under no cir- 
cumstances be members of a league of nations which 
included Germany, and they knew that without Ger- 
many and the other enemy states, and without Russia, 
there could be no comprehensive association of nations, 
and the best that could be hoped for would be an alli- 
ance of the western powers. Absurd as this issue ap- 
peared to them, the Europeans accepted it. Privately, 
in secret council with President Wilson, they would 
trade the League of Nations for the Entente Peace. 
Publicly the League of Nations would be praised and 
advocated; it could be made to appear an issue of 
world-wide importance; it would throw dust in the 



The Final Six Weeks 231 

eyes of the uninformed and curious who, but for this 
matter of transcendent interest, might be inclined to in- 
quire about the character of the terms of peace with 
Germany. 

From Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts the Su- 
preme War Council learned how high a price Presi- 
dent Wilson could be made to pay for the League. 
Hence the severity of the terms of the armistice renewal 
of February 14 (to which the delegates in the German 
National Assembly protested President Wilson could 
not have agreed) ; hence the insistence of Lord Sum- 
ner, in the meeting of the Reparations Commission on 
February 14, that the Trianon Hotel Pact was not a 
limitation on the right of the allies to impose indemni- 
ties; hence Clemenceau's refusal, in the Plenary Session 
of February 14, of French adhesion to the League of 
Nations. 

In the interlude, during his short stay at home Presi- 
dent Wilson led the people of the United States to 
accept the League of Nations as the paramount issue. 
During the remainder of the Peace Conference, there- 
fore, this was held out to world public opinion as the 
great object and purpose of the Peace Conference. By 
accepting it the Supreme War Council had drawn a 
red herring across their own trail, and were thereafter 
safe from a public opinion which had been thrown off 
the true scent. 

The drafting of the treaty embodying the Entente 
Peace went on rapidly during President Wilson's 
absence in March. His utterances in America were a 
blanket endorsement of the proceedings in the Peace 



V 



232 Lex Talionis 

Conference, and could be used by the Europeans as 
evidence of his approval of what was being done at 
Paris. 

On the President's return to Europe he resumed, in 
the secret councils, his role of protest. With his will 
still cumbered by the chains of secrecy, his bitter and 
determined protests found voice only within the confines 
of a council that had now shrunk in numbers to four 
men. The period is one of anti-climax. French public 
opinion has become more calm; the war scare and 
frenzy of apprehension over the German menace, that 
had so opportunely accompanied the negotiations in 
February for the renewal of the armistice, has partially 
subsided. The inspired French press is less irritable 
and more confident. 67 The Echo de Paris informed its 

"Editorial sentiment about the middle of March was expressed as 
follows : 

Petit Journal. The absence of President Wilson marks the divi- 
sion of the Conference into two periods, a period of preparation and 
one of realization. * * * Events in Central Europe show that 
Pan-Germanism is as rampant under the form of socialism as it 
was under the form of imperialism." 

Le Siecle. "The Council of Ten is awaiting the arrival of Presi- 
dent Wilson to discuss the eastern and western boundaries of Ger- 
many. Probably the rapidity with which they will then be determined 
will astonish the people. A week hence the German frontiers will 
have been determined. Let us hope there will still be a Germany 
behind them." 

Le Petit Parisien: "But above all let us welcome him as the sup- 
porter of the League of Nations, who has combatted opposition and 
suspicion and returns with the added prestige of the speech in the 
Metropolitan Opera House and the support of men like Taft who, 
though not of his party, wish to collaborate with him in a work of 
vast significance to humanity." 

La France: "How often have men rejected the opportunities 



The Final Six Weeks 233 

readers that the indemnity would be extended over a 
period of thirty years, and that the League of Nations 
would probably have to govern Germany during that 
period. The Gaulois began to grow impatient over 
Peace Conference procrastination — "The Government 
must not delay to let the country know how many thou- 
sand millions are to be demanded from Germany." 

The issue of "punitive damages" was, indeed, all 
but settled and the reduction of its voluminous terms to 
writing was well under way. But at Paris indemnities 
and punitive damages continued to be spoken of 
euphemistically as reparations. 

The armistice renewals had enormously extended the 
scope of the demands which Foch was able to impose 
at the point of the bayonet. In all the territorial and 
economic renunciations of title, and in the assumption 
of continuing industrial penalties, the breaking of the 
German will to resist was accomplished at Spa and 
Treves, and not at Paris. 

Besides the armistice conventions of December 14, 
January 16 and February 17, there were numberless 

offered by destiny to settle their differences ; we will be another 
example if we do not establish the Society of Nations. German in- 
demnity should have been settled first; the Conference would then 
find its work simplified, and unrest in Germany would cease. The 
Russian problem next; then the Society of Nations." 

Echo de Paris: "Followers of Senators Poindexter, Borah and 
Reed wish the American Government to remain aloof from European 
affairs. Another party, led by Senator Knox and Senator Lodge 
accepts the League, but regards it as an alliance, not as a super-state. 
One thing at a time, let the League settle the German question and 
the rest will follow." 



234 Lex Talionis 

concessions exacted in the intervals between those dates. 
Copies of these additional conventions were never made 
a part of the records of the Peace Conference : they are 
not on the files of the American State Department to- 
day. The Supreme War Council made the peace with 
Germany at Spa and Treves; at Paris it concerned itself 
merely with the task of securing American assent, and 
with the proportionate distribution of the plunder 
which the Armistice Commission had extorted. 

Closeted again with Lloyd George, Clemenceau and 
Orlando, the President found these gentlemen wran- 
gling heatedly over the distribution of the spoils which 
they now felt assured lay within the allied clutch. Called 
upon to act as moderator in these controversies, the 
President was put in the position of having recognized 
the existence of the spoils by implication. 

As to the League of Nations, it had become more 
doubtful than on the day of the Third Plenary Session, 
whether Europe would become a party to it at all. It 
would not do so if America refused adhesion to the 
principle of "punitive damages," furthermore France 
would indemnify herself with the left bank of the Rhine 
and the Saar Valley unless agreement was reached. If 
a satisfactory agreement were reached by the Big Four 
France might show greater moderation in the matter 
of the Rhine and the Saar settlements. 

In order to keep the final text of the League Cove- 
nant incomplete until acquiescence in the principle of 
punitive damages was secured, the Europeans pushed 
controversy to excess upon two amendments to the 
League of Nations Covenant, in both of which cases 



The Final Six Weeks 235 

President Wilson was on the defensive. These were 
the Monroe Doctrine Amendment proposed by the 
Americans, and the Racial Equality Amendment pro- 
posed by the Japanese. In both cases an involved and 
speculative political philosophy, worthy of the talents 
of Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts, dominated 
the discussions. When the intellectual confusion in the 
counsels of the Big Four was ultimately ended, by agree- 
ment upon the principle of punitive damages, both of 
these amendments had served as useful tools of the 
Supreme War Council. The Monroe Doctrine was 
defined in the Covenant as a "regional understanding," 
and the Racial Equality Amendment (Shantung hav- 
ing been apportioned to Japan) was dropped. 

It was about the first of April that President Wilson 
yielded upon the fundamental issue; saying that he 
would agree to the principle of punitive damages, pro- 
vided Lloyd George and Clemenceau could come to 
agreement upon the proportionate shares of France 
and Britain. The President was worn out physically 
and mentally. The pressure of enormous forces had 
been relentless. 

It is said that in the final struggle of the wills with 
Clemenceau, the President threatened to make public 
the American position on reparations. It was a weapon 
that no longer had value. If in December Wilson, the 
acknowledged leader and master of world public opin- 
ion, had publicly announced "the American position on 
reparations," the Peace of Versailles would have been 
a different kind of peace from that which was imposed. 
But in April, world public opinion was no longer united 



236 Lex Talionis 

behind the President. The Supreme War Council had 
isolated the general from his reserves, and had met and 
defeated them separately. It is said that Clemenceau 
boldly met the challenge of the President to "make pub- 
lic the American position on reparations," and instantly 
agreed that the President should do so, declaring that 
if he, Clemenceau, should appeal to the world for the 
justice of the French position, public opinion would 
overwhelmingly support France. And Clemenceau was 
right. The golden period when the American Peace 
could have been made to prevail had come in December 
and faded in March. 

Bolshevism was now rampant in Hungary, anarchy 
threatened Western Europe, and all who were not 
under the influence of the French militaristic philoso- 
phy, began to be apprehensive of the Bolshevist influ- 
ence upon Germany, now writhing under the pressure 
of the food blockade. This was no doubt a consider- 
ation which further influenced the President's capitula- 
tion in April. 68 

B8 The Denmark "Politiken" contained the following on April 26: 

"On Wilson's return, a quick peace was expected, as the committees 

had been busy during his absence. But he insisted on completing the 

League of Nations and incorporating it in the Treaty. He was 

strongly supported by England. 

"Then at the end of March came Bolshevism in Hungary. Paris 
was panic-stricken. The voices from Germany now had their effect. 
Wilson and Lloyd George considered it necessary to reduce the condi- 
tions. They sent General Smuts to Buda Pesth. Violent French 
reaction. Ill-will at constantly seeing her claims put aside. 

"Then the French voice met a response in England. The French 
press reprinted Lloyd George's pre-election promise of a hard peace. 
George bowed before the storm in England. The English delegates 



The Final Six Weeks 237 

The long stubborn and obscure struggle between 
Europe and the Western Republic had now come to 
an end. The Peace Conference exhibits a new phase. 
There is no longer any uncertainty as to what sort of 
a peace shall be made; Europe shall have its way. The 
months of May and June are dedicated to one single 
important enterprise — uniting and converging all avail- 
able forces to break the desperate resistance of the 
German Government and people against a peace involv- 
ing ruin and slavery. 

This brings us to an episode which marks the tri- 
umphant consummation of the purpose of the Triangu- 
lar Framework — the Brussels Conference which con- 
vened on March 23. 

At this conference the Supreme War Council nego- 
tiated with the German Government for the lifting of 
the blockade and the regular shipment of food — the 
first bona-fide negotiations upon this subject since the 
Armistice of November n, 191 8. 

Germany was now facing actual starvation. In all 
beleaguered countries during the war, the months of 
April and May was the period in which the pinch of 
hunger was sharpest. It was the period when winter 

swung around and supported France and the Italian delegates joined 
them. 

"Wilson, who had sent for the George Washington, had suddenly 
to face an English-French-Italian coalition. To have the League he 
must compromise on his Fourteen Points. 

"It resulted in a semi-official statement of the Rhine as the frontier 
of Germany, the Saar district to France, and extraordinarily heavy 
indemnities. Europe had overthrown American control of European 
affairs." 



238 Lex Talionis 

stores had been exhausted, and the spring crops were 
not yet available. Everywhere, except among the rich, 
there was under-nourishment. Children went about in 
paper clothing. 

Information about the Brussels Conference is 
meagre, but there is enough to show that the signing 
of the food contract was conditioned upon the signing 
simultaneously of financial terms to be incorporated in 
the Treaty of Versailles. An allied Financial Commis- 
sion (the first civilian representatives of the Inter- 
Allied Peace Conference to deal directly with the Ger- 
man Government), upon which Thomas Lamont and 
Norman Davis were the American representatives, met 
a German Financial Commission, and signed an agree- 
ment which covered in substance the property clauses 
of the Versailles Treaty. Germany renounced con- 
tractual rights in various parts of the world, worth 
not less than a billion dollars a year — among them her 
control of Algerian phosphates, Australian zinc and 
bauxite, and her monopoly of coal-tar products. 

The consideration which Germany received in return 
was a definite contract for the regular importation of 
food into Germany. By the terms of this contract Ger- 
many was to deposit immediately as a guarantee of pay- 
ment the sum of 200,000,000 marks in gold, at the 
National Bank of Belgium; Germany was to be per- 
mitted to purchase 350,000 tons of food in April, and 
to purchase the same quantity each succeeding month 
thereafter. 

Upon the convening of the commission on March 23, 
the Germans submitted a list of securities which they 



The Final Six Weeks 239 

were willing to exchange for the food. When this list 
was approved by the allied delegates, and the gold de- 
posit made as security, and when the financial agree- 
ments had been signed by Germany, the food contract 
was signed by the allied delegates. The deposit of 
gold marks was effected between March 26th and April 
3d- 

When the Brussels convention was signed famine in 
Germany was approaching the point of culmination. 
Never since the Entente had instituted the blockade had 
the poor so suffered for want of potatoes, fat and 
meat. Cotton and linen were lacking. 69 

So skillfully had the combined agencies of the En- 
tente Governments concealed or distorted the truth as 
to conditions in Germany, that the entire American dele- 
gation in Paris appears to have been deceived. They 
were kept in ignorance of conditions which, had they 
known them, would surely have disturbed their equa- 
nimity. 

The capitulation of the German Government coin- 
cided with the capitulation of the Americans on the 
issue of punitive damages. ,So long as a ray of hope 

89 A French writer in the Revue d'Economie Politique, who as long 
afterward as January, 1922, manifests the uncompromising Gallic 
spirit, commented as follows upon the effect made upon some of the 
Americans when they came face to face with German negotiators 
for the first time: 

"The Germans succeeded so well in their propaganda of misery 
that certain Americans declared that if they had known what ravages 
the blockade had produced they would never have tolerated it. 
Articles published in England maintained that the German sufferings 
were fully comparable to the ruins of France in the north." 



240 Lex Talionis 

existed that America would prevail over Entente ruth- 
lessness, the moral courage of the Germans had not 
deserted them. When this hope faded the German 
resistance gave way. 

The Brussels Convention having been signed and the 
gold deposited, it would seem now that the regular 
flow of food supplies into Germany would begin at 
once. But it must be borne in mind that the Treaty of 
Versailles was not yet signed. Too quick a release 
from the pains of famine might renew the German will 
to resist. 

It was found, therefore, that there was a great short- 
age of shipping, which would entail some delay; and 
surplus and available grain stocks were so short that 
it would be impossible to spare more than 180,000 tons 
of grain before May. The motive that devised the 
Triangular Framework actuated the Supreme War 
Council to the last, and through one or another un- 
avoidable cause only a trivial proportion of the food 
paid for at Brussels, under a contract for proportionate 
deliveries in April and May, was delivered in German 
ports before the Treaty of Versailles was signed late 
in June. 

In the last week in March the steamships Cleveland, 
Patricia and Cape Finisterre, carrying food, left Eng- 
land for Hamburg. It is said that the first food cargo 
to enter Germany from England consisted of "con- 
siderable quantities of bacon which, while unpalatable, 
was still perfectly usable; also a quantity of beans." 

There was food at Rotterdam, waiting for shipment 
to Germany, when the Brussels credits were fixed. In 
late March some German ships, under allied control, 



The Final Six Weeks 241 

sailed from German ports for England, where German 
crews were to be replaced by American crews ; they were 
then to go to French ports to transport American 
troops to New York, and return to Germany with food. 
An American transport loaded with food, the steam- 
ship West arrived at Hamburg on April first. On 
March 27, when the Brussels conference had arrived 
at certain agreements, the first American flour to reach 
any German city was distributed in Hamburg. It was 
sufficient to give each inhabitant one half-pound a week 
for four weeks. Out of this 3,000 hundredweight was 
sent to Berlin. 70 

70 News items in America at this time refer to this subject as follows: 

"The chief of the British commission at Spa announces in a note 
that approximately $30,000,000 worth of American, and $20,000,000 
worth of British food-stuffs await immediate delivery in fulfillment 
of the Brussels agreement. When gold for payment reaches Brussels, 
as it will do almost immediately, transportation can begin. 

"A report from Switzerland that the value of foodstuffs deposited 
there for Germany is over one billion francs; but these can be taken 
over only after the signing of the preliminary peace." — (Christian 
Science Monitor, March 27, 1919.) 

"The first shipment of foodstuffs, including lard, bacon and flour, 
left Rotterdam to-day for Germany in accordance with the agreement 
reached at Spa on February 8." — (New York Times, April 2,1919.) 

"Distribution of American wheat flour began in Hamburg Thurs- 
day, April 3rd. Berlin has received 3,000 zentners, and on arrival 
of further consignments will begin distribution." — (Christian Science 
Monitor, April 7, 1919.) 

"The Supreme Blockade Council, having authorized the Swedish 
Red Cross to export fish to Germany, 200,000 barrels of herring are y 
now available. 

Experts anticipate this year's German harvest will be only half 
as good as normal, even in the most favorable circumstances, owing 
to prolonged shortage of artificial fertilizers." — (Christian Science 
Monitor, April 7, 1919.) 



242 Lex Talionis 

The plans of the German Food Administration, after 
the regular flow of food imports should begin, was to 
give priority to industrial communities ; the ration was 
one-quarter pound of bacon and fifty grams of fat, and 
one-half pound of flour per person. 

The first evidence of the relaxing of the food block- 
ade in the Baltic (which had been instituted after hos- 
tilities ceased and maintained for five months), is per- 
mission for the exportation by the Swedish Red Cross 
in the first week in April of 200,000 barrels of herring 
to Germany. At the same time Ambassador Morris, 
at Christiania, was telegraphically informed that the 
Supreme Blockade Council had cancelled all prohibi- 
tions on exportation of fish from Scandanavia to Ger- 
many. This action was taken pursuant to a provision 
in the Brussels convention that "restrictions on German 
fishing in the Baltic are to be removed at once." 

Shortly afterwards the German Government was of- 
ficially informed that permission would be granted for 
negotiation and doing business with firms in neutral 
countries, even should these have been on the blacklist, 
provided this was done with the approval of the Block- 
ade authorities; notice of approval was to take place 
through the Inter-Allied Commercial Committee, at 
the Hague, Java Straat 58. 

The cautious steps taken by the Supreme War Coun- 
cil for lifting the blockade, some of which have been 
detailed above, reveal how directly this action was made 
to depend upon the acquiescence of the German Gov- 



The Final Six Weeks 243 

ernment in the punitive clauses of the Treaty of Ver- 
sailles. They also furnish sufficient evidence of the 
drastic character of the five months food blockade. 

The Brussels conference made it possible to draft 
the financial clauses of the Treaty; the agreement of 
the Europeans and the Americans upon punitive dam- 
ages as a principle of action, and upon the clauses of 
the League of Nations made the drafting of the entire 
treaty possible. The draft was completed toward the 
end of April and the Germans were directed to send 
their plenipotentiaries to Paris to execute it. 

Some consideration of the state of Germany while 
the Peace Conference was sitting is essential in order 
that the proceedings at Paris may be understood. When 
President Wilson left Europe on February 15, the 
German Government was standing out, as has been set 
forth in the seventh chapter, for terms of peace involv- 
ing the immediate conclusion of a preliminary peace 
based on the Wilson principles, the repatriation of the 
German prisoners, the retention of the German colonies, 
and mutual disarmament of the combatant nations. 

The National Convention had assembled at Weimar, 
adopted a republican constitution, and elected Friedrich 
Ebert President of the German Reich. The bourgeois 
parties in the Convention equaled or exceeded the Ma- 
jority Socialists in strength, and the combined represen- 
tation of these two elements greatly exceeded that of 
the Independent Socialists and radicals. The Majority 
Socialists, by common consent, continued to conduct 
the administrative branches of the government. 



244 Lex Talionis 

The crushing terms upon which the armistice was re- 
newed in February were debated and accepted by the 
National Assembly, and it was under its instructions 
that Erzberger signed them. Although Foch's state- 
ment that President Wilson knew and approved of 
them was received with incredulity and consternation, 
the debate brought out the fact that the alternative 
for refusal to accept the terms was military occupation 
of Germany by allied armies. This alternative was 
one which the delegates wished to avoid at any cost, 
and the compelling motive of keeping the foreigner out 
of Germany actuated them to ratify the armistice con- 
vention. 71 

Realization of the full consequences soon spread 
through Germany. Fear of the future agitated the 
population, and was particularly strong among the 
working classes. 

Following the shooting of Kurt Eisner, the radical 
leader, Munich was in chaos, and the central soviet 
council proclaimed a proletarian dictatorship in Ba- 
varia. Brunswick, Baden, Gotha, Manheim and 
Plauen experienced radical disturbances. 

In late February negotiations proceeded rapidly for 
the union of German Austria with Germany. When 
the movement reached serious proportions the French 
interfered, and through the varied activities of the 
Allize Commission in Vienna the movement was 
stopped. 

71 On Sunday, February 16, the German cabinet sat from 10 to 4 
discussing the armistice terms. Finally decided to accept uncondi- 
tionally. 



The Final Six Weeks 245 

Early in March the German Government denounced 
terrorist attempts against the National Assembly. "The 
economic distress," it said, "is greater than the political 
danger. Every strike brings us a step nearer to the 
abyss. Only work can save us." Some of the socialist 
members of the Cabinet favored a provision in the con- 
stitution for representation of the Arsols (workmen 
and soldiers councils) in the Government. The demand 
of the radicals for the adoption of the Moscow Council 
System manifested itself in repeated strikes in the in- 
dustrial districts. 

The Independent Socialists held a four-days conven- 
tion in Berlin, beginning March 2, and demanded the 
retirement of Scheidemann and Landsberg from the 
Cabinet. Hugo Haase declared for the soviet principle, 
denounced the National Assembly and asserted that 
"the proletarian revolt is wide awake and marching, 
independent of its leaders." This meeting was accom- 
panied by strikes and disorders in Berlin. The trams 
stopped running, and for some days the city was with- 
out water, electricity or gas. 

Noske, Minister of War, assumed executive power, 
and the telegraph and telephone offices, the Reichsbank, 
the food depots, and the railway stations were guarded 
with troops from the Army Corps of General von 
Luttwitz. 

On Monday, March 3, the Cabinet was hastily 
called together, for a conference with the German Ar- 
mistice Commission and representatives of the German 
shipping interests, following a telegraphic demand from 
General Foch for the immediate delivery of the Ger- 



246 Lex Talionis 

man mercantile fleet, irrespective of the question of 
the supply of food. The repeated assurances since the 
armistice of speedy food relief had been a persuasive 
influence in securing German acquiescence in armistice 
demands, but had been honored by the Entente only in 
their breach. At this meeting the Cabinet refused to 
sign away the mercantile fleet unless a definite guarantee 
of food relief was afforded. 72 

Under radical pressure, and in view of conditions 
in Berlin, the National Assembly adopted a resolution 
that "the control of industry by bodies of self-adminis- 
trative character under National supervision, is of uni- 
versal importance. Scheidemann, reversing his posi- 
tion, announced his adhesion to the principle of incor- 
porating the arsols in the constitution and of socializ- 
ing the coal mines and power-development agencies. 

On March 7 Berlin was under martial law, and four 
hundred, chiefly revolutionaries, had been killed or 
wounded. Order was restored and the public service 
utilities were again in operation. 

Food conditions everywhere were becoming more 
and more deplorable. The population in general was 
insufficiently nourished and clamoring for food assist- 
ance from the allies. By the middle of March thirteen 
thousand miners were on a food strike in the Ruhr 
district. The political situation in upper Silesia, where 
the last armistice convention had given the Poles the 
frontier of 1772, was tense. Hindenburg declared 



i 



72 "On March 7 the Germans broke off the parley at Spa over their 
merchant fleet, refusing to agree to hand it over to the allies until 
they should be guaranteed food supplies." — (World Almanac, 1920.) 



The Final Six Weeks 247 

that Danzig should not be annexed to Poland. Reports 
were coming from Paris that a buffer state was to be 
formed along the Rhine, and aroused bitter opposition 
in the press. The tendency was to cast prudence aside 
in public utterances, and to declare that Germany was 
being economically ruined, but that her army had not 
been defeated in the field. 

On March 13 the National Assembly passed a bill 
for the socialization of the coal industry, and adjourned 
to reassemble in Berlin on March 25. Erzberger, in 
a public speech said; 

"The German people trust Wilson entirely, and leave their 
fate in his hands. Recent proposals for the League of Nations 
contradict President Wilson's program. Germany will be 
disgraced if she loses her colonies. The unconditional annexa- 
tion of Alsace-Lorraine and Polish claims on Danzig are both 
unreasonable. The Entente, by prolonging the war, is both 
directly and indirectly responsible for damage in the war zones. 
We have no obligation except to Belgium, which we will fulfill. 
Germany is no more to blame for the war than other nations. 
Our eyes and hopes are fixed on Wilson." 

When in March the soviet regime of Bela Kuhn was 
established in Hungary, many competent observers 
believed that Bolshevism would get the upper hand in 
Germany unless a speedy improvement as to the supply 
of raw materials for the resumption of industry, and 
general relief in the food situation, were soon secured. 73 

73 "March 16, 1919. He (Sir W. Robertson) tells me that all the 
reports concur that the poorer Boches are terribly short of food. 
The whole of Germany is fed up ; fed up with the late government, 
fed up with their press deceiving them, and with the present govern- 
ment for being unable to make peace." — (Colonel Repington's Diary.) 



248 Lex Talionis 

The loyalty of some of the troops stationed in Berlin, 
especially the Sailors Division, was wavering. The 
Executive Committee of the Berlin Arsol was active, 
and the Bolshevist agitators, pointing to the successes 
in Hungary, were hopeful of establishing a commune 
in Berlin. 

Bela Kuhn's rise to power in Hungary, as the Foreign 
Commissary of a proletarian dictatorship, marked the 
climax of the Bolshevist menace to Europe. It had 
no real repercussion in Germany, although Scheidemann 
said "Hungarian Bolshevism results from the imperial- 
istic policy of the Entente. Germany, deprived of 
Danzig and the Saar basin would be ripe for Bol- 
shevism, and Bolshevism in Germany means Bol- 
shevism throughout Europe." Bolshevism did not su- 
pervene in Germany and the red tide began to recede. 

By the end of March the terms of peace began to 
overshadow all other considerations. The Government 
had made concessions looking to the socialization of 
coal mines; it had sufficient loyal troops to protect 
itself, and sufficient volunteers to keep its military forces 
properly recruited. The systematic disarmament of 
civilians was possible, and the government control over 
depots, arms and arsenals was complete. In spite of 
industrial misery there was national unity and a com- 
mon interest in the fate of the nation. 

The spirit of protest against the peace terms was 
strong throughout Germany. On Sunday, March 23, 
there were mass meetings in Berlin, and crowds gath- 
ered before the Adlon Hotel singing "Deutschland 
ueber alles." 



The Final Six Weeks 249 

The Armistice Commission increased its pressure for 
the relinquishment of the German mercantile fleet. 
This convention was signed about the middle of March, 
and by the end of that month eighteen steamers had 
sailed from Hamburg. There was much difficulty in 
getting crews, the sailors fearing that the alienation of 
the German shipping would result in destroying their 
means of livelihood. In Bremen and some other ports 
they obstinately refused to sail. 

The agitation in Germany against the occupation of 
Danzig by General Haller's divisions was continuous. 
Under the armistice agreement access to Poland by 
the Entente and "their allies" was provided for. The 
Germans did not admit that Poland could legally be 
regarded as an Entente "ally" during the war, and on 
this ground resisted the entry of Polish troops through 
Danzig. Demonstrations in Danzig were continuous; 
"Danzig is Prussian," declared the German citizens, 
"and will always remain so." Against this demand of 
the Armistice Commission the German resistance was 
so strong that it resulted in the signing of a con- 
vention on April 4, by the terms of which Haller's 
divisions would not go to Danzig at all, but would be 
transported by rail across Germany to Warsaw. 

The developments in Paris, which reached their 
culmination about the first of April, and the negotia- 
tions concerning food relief in the Brussels Confer- 
ence, brought final disillusionment in Germany as to 
the meaning of the Wilson promises. The Vossische 
Zeitung, on the third of April, said: 



2£o Lex Talionis 

"France desires to pursue an independent continental policy, 
which is opposed by England and America. This is the last 
attempt of the American representatives to hold a leading posi- 
tion at the Conference. Germany would fare much better by 
making an agreement with France than by trusting to the empty 
promises of America." 

Among the conservative elements, there were a few 
who advocated the immediate acceptance of Bolshevism, 
rather than assumption by the nation of the enormous 
Entente indemnities, but this was a counsel of despera- 
tion, which found small support. 

In early April the misery among the Ruhr miners 
was great. They took as a watchword "No work until 
food is furnished," and threatened to stop all work 
after April 9, including the emergency work of keep- 
ing the pumps going. The promises of the Govern- 
ment of a speedy improvement in the food situation, 
based upon expectation of immediate food importations 
under the provisions of the Brussels Conference, lost 
their effect as the expected relief failed to arrive in 
April as agreed, but the realization that food relief de- 
pended in part upon continued coal production for de- 
livery to the allies prevented the sabotaging of the 
mines by flooding. 74 

74 In the Prussian Diet the Minister of Foreign Supplies had an- 
nounced, on March 29, the Government's plan for distribution of the 
food, which it was announced would immediately be made available 
under the Brussels Convention. 

At the same time Dr. Gustave Bauer, German Minister of Labor, 
urged the miners not to insist on a six hour day, as Germany ex- 
pected to pay for food with coel. Strikers were also urged not to 



The Final Six Weeks 251 

When the general food relief, publicly announced, 
which the signing of the Brussels convention was ex- 
pected to bring at once, failed to be experienced as the 
month of April passed, and information as to the char- 
acter of the peace treaty was disseminated, bitter hos- 
tility to the Entente showed itself among all classes. 
Bolshevist agitators spread reports that the first cargoes 
of flour and bacon received from England were unfit to 
eat, and cited this as proof that Germany must look to 
Russia and not to the allies for help. 

The entire press of Germany, socialist and conserv- 
ative, which was now aware of much that the com- 
pleted treaty would contain, advocated refusal to sign. 
So overwhelming was the sentiment against it that the 
Ebert Government privately consulted General Hinden- 
burg at his headquarters at Kolberg as to the character 
of the military resistance which Germany might make 
if hostilities were reopened. The only alternative to 
signing, however, was an alliance with the Moscow 



make the fulfilment of the Brussels agreement concerning food im- 
possible. 

An ingenious British observer's views of the influence of the food 
shortage on the Spartacist movement were as follows: 

"The Spartacan leaders, having no food or work to offer, are v 
being deserted by their followers. The marines have deserted, aa 
there was not enough money to pay a regiment. Only the military 
party profits by the conditions, because only by joining the volunteer 
army can a German workman obtain the necessaries of life. Wages 
paid during the war, plus five marks daily, and an additional 300 
marks if he produces his old uniform, and war-time allowances for > 
his family, are his immediate rewards for joining." 



V 



252 Lex Talionis 

Soviet, and this was repugnant to the overwhelming ma- 
jority of the German people. 75 

The German delegates, therefore, in response to the 
summons of the Supreme War Council, departed at 
the end of April for Paris. 

7B After the war the weak neutral countries of Europe feared the 
Entente and its military power. Nevertheless their press denounced 
the treaty in unmeasured terms and with considerable daring, as 
may be seen by the following editorials: 

From the Haagsche Post, May 17, 1919: 

"Criticism of the long document handed to the Germans must of 
necessity revert to the solemn promise which was made, and which 
it was thought would have been fulfilled. The more passionately 
the Entente cause has been supported the greater must be the 
disappointment. It is no longer a question of pro-Entente or pro- 
German. It is now a question of the future of Europe in which the 
peoples of the Allies have as great an interest as those of the neutral 
states and the conquered powers. 

"Even a superficial reading of the draft treaty leaves the impres- 
sion that there is no trace whatever of statesmanship to be discovered. 
It is the product of the party politicians, bound by election promises 
given in haste, and under the influence of the election. 

"The lawyers are simply astonished at the monstrosities contained 
in the document in the judicial sphere. The writer considers that 
the compulsions for the Centrals to sign the constitution of the League 
of Nations, of which they form no part at the moment of signing, is 
like making someone sign articles of association of a joint-stock com- 
pany who is not a shareholder. 

"To compel Germany to rescind treaties with third parties who 
have not signed the peace conditions, without their permission, is an 
equally great offense against the basic principles of justice. * * * 

"The treaty, if signed in its present form, will make it impossible 
for the coming generations, and the present also, to live a peaceful 
life in Europe. It is abject slavery under the tyranny of the fear 
of war. * * * 

"The danger of dissensions among the allied states is greater than 
that of German aggression." 



The Final Six Weeks 253 

From "Politiken", May 8th. (Denmark.) 

"A merciless peace, hard as iron. With regard to territory Ger- 
many loses about 100,000 square kilometers, (as much land as Holland, 
Belgium and Switzerland together), about 10,000,000 people, the iron 
of Lorraine, the coal of the Saar, and upper Silesia. All the markets 
of Asia and Africa go to her conquerors. Her ships disappear. She 
builds ships for the Allies. Immense indemnities. 

"The western border of Poland will not be more than 100 kilo- 
meters from Berlin. Germany will extend only to the eastern borders 
of Brandenburg and Pomerania. It is unheard of in military and 
diplomatic history." 

The following comments from the German press in the interval 
between May 5, when the Treaty of Versailles was handed the 
German plenipotentiaries, and May 20, when their signatures were 
demanded, throw light on the state of German public sentiment at 
that time: 

"In the speeches in the Assembly there was a general complaint 
of disappointment in Wilson. After the military defeat, Wilson was 
suddenly transformed from the servant of English capital into a pure 
idealist and the savior of Germany. We have never shared either 
view. We know that with all his good will he cannot overcome the 
capitalistic, imperialistic facts. Not Wilsonian idealism but inter- 
national socialism alone can bring true peace among nations." — 
(Freiheit, May 5.) 

"The peace treaty is a German victory, for it shows the enemy's 
invincible fear of German strength. They are robbers and black- 
mailers, who would rob our country and bring a curse upon it. Bol- 
shevism would be the lesser evil. What a Gambetta could do a 
German may be able to do in still greater need."— (Hamburgscher 
Correspondent, May 13.) 

"Wilson has been defeated at Versailles. He, himself contributed 
toward soiling his high ideals of justice and tearing up his principles. 
If the financial and economic demands of the Entente are forced upon 
us it means that we cannot spare a penny for our invalids, our widows, 
and our orphans; that the whole structure of our social legislation 
collapses, and that everything is destroyed that has been done in 
Germany to protect the weak against human disasters. If the Gov- 
ernment refuses to sign, a wave of enthusiasm may sweep through 
the German people, but when the hunger is sharpened, and the block- 



7 



254 Lex Talionis 

ade sharpened anew, the Government will be held responsible for 
everything." — (Vorwaerts, May 14.) 

"The peace treaty is a plan aiming, not at the reconstruction of 
devastated France, but at the establishment of a new and greater 
France, for which all of the building stones of the valuable ruins of 
collapsed Germany are to be used. Capitalistic imperialism, which 
was combatted under the pretense that it was the organizer of the 
war, never celebrated greater orgies than at the organization of this 
peace. Having secured political and military preponderance, France 
wants to become Germany's heir as the first Continental industrial 
state. Its jealousy of Germany's economic development is perhaps 
greater than its hatred." — (Berliner Tageblatt, May 14.) 

"The prophesied reduction of Germany to an Anglo-American 
province becomes daily more probable, and is almost unavoidable. 

"The most bitter after taste which in any case will remain is the 
realization of the discrepancy between promises and fulfilment, which 
is the curse especially of those persons in whose morality the van- 
quished believed."— (Same.) 

"Wilson, to this very hour, is a constant puzzle. We neither place 
him as a selfish servant of Wall Street capitalism nor a second Solon 
or Aristides. We shall consider it possible Wilson intended bringing 
about a just peace. But he cannot have read the Paris concoction 
very carefully, else he would not have declared to the Italians, but 
a few days before, that the peace with Germany was to be according 
to the principles of right and justice. * * * It was Wilson's 
pledge which led Germany to lay down her arms, and enabled her 
to bear the six months martyrdom of the armistice." — (Hamburger 
Fremdenblatt, May 19.) 

"It is certain that we cannot continue living as a nation if we 
accept this peace, but must prepare for our national death. We must 
reckon with the possibility that the enemy governments remain in- 
curable, and the feeling for justice and compassion remain blunt in 
the whole world. It is our duty to resist such possibilities. The 
policy of a peaceful settlement of political and military differences 
with Russia, and withdrawal of German troops In Lettland and 
Lithuania in order to have them at disposal on the Polish and Czech 
borders, is one of necessity. If it turns out that we cannot pro- 
ceed further in the way of reasonable peace, we must ask ourselves 
the question whether peace with Russia is a means to force another 



The Final Six Weeks 255 

peace with our Western enemies, and thus counteract the fate in- 
tended for us." — (Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, May n.) 

"It was conscious deception when the enemy asserted it was only 
fighting militarism and Kaiserism, and the enemy has now proved to 
the world that they started and waged the war solely for their world- 
supremacy and capitalism, in whose way the military and economic 
strength of the German people stood. The nation must be en- 
lightened as to the peace conditions. They mean famine and economic 
ruin, and that the well-to-do classes will have to work for the En« 
tente just as much as the unprotected classes." — (Deutsche Tageszei- 
tung, May n.) 

"Unless democratic Germany insists on a peace of justice and in- 
ternational conciliation, imperial and national egoism, the source of all 
wars, will prevail. The very manner of preparing and presenting the 
treaty gives the lie to Wilson's promises and to the demands of rea- 
son." — (Berliner Tageblatt, May 6.) 

"The Entente prestige among neutrals, and even among its own 
peoples, has been shattered through its procedure in the armistice, 
and it remains to be seen whether it will condemn a defenseless people 
to starvation. As our policy of might went bankrupt, so will theirs 
too."— (Barth.) 

"English and American counselling words about helping us cannot 
be taken seriously if the Wilson promises are brutally broken. If 
Germany concludes a might peace of political and economic slavery, 
there can be no German future whatever. Utter moral collapse is 
inevitable if our last hope of a new life through hard work is taken 
from us. Our only weapon is justice. A new and better world can 
only come about now if Germany takes up the banner — should Wilson 
drop it — and regardless, reject any other than a peace of justice." 
— (Same.) 

"France fears vanquished Germany in the same way that Ger- 
many fears vanquished Russia. Despite all fettering, the permanent 
fear that the prisoner will break out at the first opportunity. There 
is but one genuine security for France — real peace, not a peace of 
might."— (Same.) 

"German disarmament is demanded to such a degree that it sinks 
down to the complete insignificance of a minor state." — (Germania, 
May 7.) 

"Wilson's principles are as roughly handled in the Polish settle- 



256 



Lex Talionis 



/ 






ment as in that of South Tyrol. The same applies to East Prussia 
and to the indemnities. The surrender of almost the entire mercantile 
marine and of our colonies is outright theft. The spirit of revenge 
has won. Lloyd George has capitulated to the Nationalists, and in 
league with Clemenceau has forced the American President step by 
step from his peace principles." — (Same.) 

"There is only one prospect for success: if the German Republic 
is seen to be fighting, not for national advantages or modification of 
threatened indemnities, but for the new universal principle that justice 
can never come of sheer might. * * * 

"The German proletariat cannot comprehend the Independents' 
claim for immediate signing. This would deprive us totally of the 
world's sympathies we so dearly need, and break the backbone of the 
foreign opposition to the peace of might, and would only mean the 
resumption of the war on the basis of Germany's non-fulfilment. The 
Government and working people must insist on Wilson's Points up 
to the very end. No militarism can solve this world crisis, and the 
world revolution can only be retarded through signing. Give the 
peoples a chance to converse and the solution will come soon enough." 
— (Vorwaerts, May 17.) 

"The American attitude and that of Wilson were influenced by 
the all-powerful Anglo-American financial group." — (Reventlow.) 

"The peace terms are a bitter disappointment for all who believed, 
all too early, in the victory of right and reason in the life of the 
nations, but they are nevertheless no surprise. The long war has 
prepared the soil for hate and dispair, yet for the German people no 
psychosis could be more fatal. We must learn to look at the terms 
from the European and international point of view. The terms con- 
cern all mankind, and the question, whether Europe can survive the 
economic burdens of the war, comes ahead of the question whether 
Germany can. The terms must be regarded as a consolidating attempt 
on the part of America, the future banker of the whole world ; as an 
attempt to sidetrack the bankruptcy of Europe. It seems doubtful 
whether the plan will succeed, but this does not alter the fact that 
the European members of the Entente are in the same financial dif- 
ficulties as we are." — (Germany after the Peace. — G. E. Graf.) 

"As soon as Germany signs, she becomes a slave to her former 
enemies. The malicious spirit of the draft is nowhere so brutally 
revealed as in the provision that Germany must submit to all future 



The Final Six Weeks 257 

decisions of the enemy, even though they concern vital problems. 
* * * Time itself is fighting for reason. The elemental laws of 
evolution will turn out stronger than the giants, Clemenceau, Lloyd Y 
George and Wilson. Revenge cannot endure." — (Hamburger Frem- \, 
denblatt, May 17.) 

"A sharpening of the blockade and occupation of the Rhenish-West- 
phalian district would bring the starving workmen to despair, and 
force Germany to accept within a very short time. By signing, the 
chance of economic reconstruction is afforded, as well as that of form- ., 
ing a joint socialistic government." (Same.) 



CHAPTER X 

The Signing of the Treaty. 

THE Peace Treaty was handed to the German 
plenipotentiaries on May seventh and they were 
given fifteen days to present written observations. 
There followed six weeks of bitter controversy, recrim- 
ination and desperate resistance. On June 16th the 
German delegates left Paris and on June 20th the Ger- 
man Cabinet resigned. The question was thrown into 
the German National Assembly and on June 22d that 
body voted to sign the Treaty, having been notified by 
the Supreme War Council that the German acceptance 
must be unconditional. Some difficulty was experienced 
in finding two citizens who would act as delegates. After 
some days this was accomplished, and on June 28 the 
solemn scene in the Salle de Glace at Versailles, in 
which the signatures were attached, brought the long 
and remarkable post-war drama to a close. 76 

By turning to the World Almanac for 1920 one may 
read a succinct but enlightening chronology of the im- 

76 A New York Times correspondent interviewed President Bauer 
of the Assembly, June 25. "Has any decision been reached as to 
who is to sign the treaty," the correspondent asked. "That will be 
decided tomorrow afternoon," was the answer. "It is not easy to find 
the right man, because the Entente has made certain conditions limit- 
ing our choice, but I hope to find a man by tomorrow who will be 
willing to sacrifice his own feelings for the sake of the Fatherland. 
You may imagine that none of our friends is anxious to perpetuate 
his name by the signing of such a document as the Versailles Treaty." 



The Signing of the Treaty 259 

portant events leading up to the signing. It serves bet- 
ter than many pages of narrative to make the course of 
events clear and I therefore take the liberty of quoting 
it here : 

"April 12. Peace Conference gave out summary of League 
of Nations draft. 

April 16. The Big Four revealed the terms of peace to the 
smaller allies. 

April 16. The Chamber of Deputies' sustained the plan to 
keep the peace terms secret until signed by Germany. 

April 17. The British released a cable to the New York 
World from H. B. Swope, a correspondent at the Peace Con- 
ference, after holding it five days. It had contained exclusive 
news of the text of the reparations sections of the Treaty. 

April 25. The first of the German Peace Delegates arrived 
at Versailles. 

April 28. Peace Conference adopted League Covenant with- 
out a dissenting vote. Amendments offered by Japan for racial 
equality and by France for international police force were with- 
drawn. 

April 29. Main German delegation reached Versailles. 

May I. Germans presented their credentials. 

May 6. Secret Plenary Session. Communicated the terms 
to all the powers represented at the Conference. Foch made 
a speech in which he said that the security given France by the 
Treaty was inadequate ; that it was his personal conviction that 
the treaty should not be signed, that France should hold the 
bridge-heads, and that fifteen years occupation of the Rhineland 
was not sufficient. Pichon was elected Chairman of the pro- 
visional organization of the League of Nations. 

May 7. Clemenceau handed treaty to the Germans in the 
presence of the Peace Conference at the Trianon Palace, giving 
them fifteen days to present written observations. 



260 Lex Talionis 

May 9. Brockdorff-Rantzau handed note to Clemenceau 
declaring that the peace treaty contained demands that could 
be borne by no people, and that many of them are incapable of 
accomplishment. 

May 9. Clemenceau informs him that the allies can admit 
of no discussion of their right to insist upon the terms substan- 
tially as drafted. 

May 11. Great demonstration in Germany against signing 
peace treaty, in Berlin, Breslau, Danzig, Koenigsberg, Cassel, 
Bochum and other places organized by German Peoples Party. 

May 13. Scheidemann tells National Assembly that the 
peace treaty is not acceptable and is a 'murderous scheme.' 

May 14. Mobs hoot United States. German note of pro- 
test sent to Paris. 

May 21. Peace Conference gives Germany one week, to 
May 29. 

May 23. Peace Conference, in refusing to modify shipping 
clauses, reminds Germany that only 4,000,000 tons of her 
ships are to be taken, as against 12,750,000 tons she destroyed 
in the war. 

May 29. Germany delivers counter-proposals. "We came 
to Versailles expecting to receive a peace proposal framed ac- 
cording to the agreed basis. We had a firm resolve to do 
everything in our power to fulfill the heavy obligations assumed 
by us. We hoped for the peace of right which had been prom- 
ised us. We were shocked when we read in that document 
the demands which the victorious might of our opponents had 
set forth. The more we studied the spirit of the treaty the 
more we were convinced of the impossibility of carrying it out. 
The demands in the treaty go beyond the strength of the Ger- 
man people." 

June 3. Norway joined Switzerland in refusal to participate 
in blockade of Germany in case of a break in the negotiations. 



The Signing of the Treaty 261 

June 15. Official summary of German reply made public 
in Paris. It proposed disarmament only in exchange for im- 
mediate membership in the League of Nations. It insisted 
that neutrals should try the Kaiser, and his own people impose 
punishment. It demanded plebiscites before annexation. 

June 16. The reply of the allies. Gave seven days to sign 
the treaty as modified. German delegation stoned in leaving 
Versailles for Weimar. 

June 20. German Cabinet, headed by Scheidemann, re- 
signed. 

June 22. German National Assembly voted 237 to 138 to 
sign treaty, reserving surrender of Kaiser and extradition of 
other notables, and declining to acknowledge responsibility for 
war. The Big Four met, notified Germany her acceptance 
must be unconditional. 

June 23. Germany notifies allies she will accept and sign 
peace treaty. Her plea of 48 hours delay of ultimatum is re- 
fused. Armistice ends at 7 p. m. 

June 28. Germany signs through its delegates, Drs. Mueller 
and Bell. A defensive covenant between Great Britain, France 
and United States, signed by Lloyd George, Clemenceau and 
Wilson. 

President cabled peace proclamation. Sailed from Brest June 
29." 

The food blockade was maintained up to the very v , 
day of the ratification of the treaty. An Associated ^ 
Press dispatch from Paris June 29th said: 

"Conditioning the raising of the blockade upon Germany's 
ratification of the treaty is regarded in Conference circles as ^ 
a sure plan for securing a speedy ratification, because of Ger- : 
many's food and raw material needs." 

This dispatch referred to the action of the Supreme 



262 Lex Talionis 

War Council on June 26 in directing the Supreme 
Blockade Council to base its arrangements for rescind- 
ing restrictions on trade with Germany on the assump- 
tion that the blockade is to be raised immediately on 
the receipt of information that the treaty of peace has 
been ratified by Germany. 

The consummation of the activities of the forces 
which, following the war, met in the Paris Peace Con- 
ference, was attained when the Treaty of Versailles 
was signed on June 28, 1919, and there the chronicle 
which these chapters have attempted to incorporate 
comes to an end. To complete the chronicle, it remains 
only to make briefly a final capitulation of motive, in- 
tent and deed. Tracing swifty the course of the drama 
from November to June we find that : 

1 . The Supreme War Council in November secretly 
repudiated the obligation of the Trianon Palace Hotel 
contract with Germany, and concerted plans for impos- 
ing the entire war cost upon that nation. These plans 
directly contemplated ruthless spoliation and industrial 
servitude — the elimination of Germany as an inde- 
pendent power. As they involved breach of faith, des- 
perate moral resistance by the disarmed enemy was to 
be expected. This was to be overcome by the threat of 
military occupation, and the pressure of starvation by 
means of a wartime blockade. 

2. The Entente Governments knew themselves to 
be hopelessly bankrupt. They concealed this fact from 
the United States Government and people from whom 
they hoped to secure credits sufficient to save their 
tottering financial structures. The German signature 



The Signing of the Treaty 263 

to a treaty imposing the obligation of enormous tribute 
would enable them to enter these prospective assets as 
credits upon their books, and thereby maintain an ap- 
pearance of solvency. This was a counsel of despera- 
tion, financially dishonest, which involved conscious 
duplicity on the part of every Entente cabinet in its 
attitude to the United States and its Executive Branch. 

3. By a dishonest political issue in general elections, 
the British Government committed the English people 
to the principle of plunder; in concert with the Con- 
tinentals delegated peace-making power to the Armis- 
tice Commission; and, to further the purpose of extor- 
tion, established the hunger blockade (the Triangular 
Framework) . 

4. These measures were concerted secretly. In 
order that the American Executive might not know of 
them they were instituted simultaneously while he was: 
on the high seas. 

5. Nothing of the purposes of the Supreme War 
Council was disclosed to the American President upon 
his arrival in Paris on December 14. No information: 
of importance concerning Germany reached him except 
through the Supreme War Council. He was permitted 
to believe that the Entente Governments adhered to 
his agreement with Germany for a peace of moderation, 
and the establishment of a league of nations, based 
upon the principle of international good-will, and in- 
cluding enemy nations, to which also the Entente cab- 
inets were legally committed. For three weeks this 
illusion was unremittingly sustained. The President 
brought whole-hearted trust and good faith toward the 



264 Lex Talionis 

Entente Governments, and believed that these senti- 
ments were reciprocated. 

It was a cardinal principle of the Supreme War Coun- 
cil to preserve this state of mind as long as possible; 
an open breach with the United States would be fatal 
to their purposes. While protesting adherence to his 
principles they used the Bissolati incident in Italy to 
deprive him of influence over Italian public opinion, 
having already deprived him of leadership in England 
by the general elections. 

6. On January 12 the President's consent to re- 
newal of the powers of the Armistice Commission for 
thirty days must be obtained. Here the effort was 
made by surprise to stampede him into acquiescence in 
a Napoleonic reconstruction of Europe. In the con- 
fusion which this vaster plan introduced, the renewal 
of the armistice on their own terms was effected by the 
Europeans. The President was astounded. He began 
to realize for the first time that he was in the presence 
of forces with which he had not reckoned and was not 
familiar. 

7. The necessity of secrecy in the proceedings was 
now urged upon him. Developments in the meeting of 
the Supreme War Council on January 12 had shaken 
his confidence that unity of purpose existed between the 
United States and the Entente. His sense of loyalty to 
the allies of the United States in the war forbade him to 
contemplate a breach. He did not yet suspect treach- 
ery. He agreed to secrecy in the negotiations. 

8. In the proceedings of the Peace Conference 
from January 12 to February 14 the Europeans system- 



The Signing of the Treaty 265 

atically undermined President Wilson's position. The 
President was surrounded with strange and unfamiliar 
forces — a subconscious realization of betrayal was de- 
veloping. There were appalling hazards on all sides. 
Motives which he had thought to be the same as his 
own were growing obscure. The ground on which he 
stood was unstable. 

Punitive damages was unthinkable under the agree- 
ment with the enemy; yet punitive damages were being 
hinted. Even the President's American advisers 
seemed uncertain about this. It obtruded itself daily 
with increasing emphasis. Other important matters 
were constantly being delayed unaccountably. The 
appropriateness of the League of Nations, which all 
had once proclaimed, was beginning to be questioned. 

9. February 14 arrived. The armistice had been 
renewed, in spite of American protest, on shockingly 
harsh terms. The Reparations Commission had over- 
whelmingly declared, contrary to the position of its 
American members, that the Trianon Hotel Pact did 
not constitute a limitation upon the right of the asso- 
ciated nations to impose indemnities. The President 
refused to accept this judgment; on the same day, 
February 14, the French in Plenary Session refused ad- 
herence to the Covenant of the League. President Wil- 
son sailed for America the next day. Government 
propaganda for four weeks in the French press had 
destroyed the President's influence over public opinion 
in France. 

10. The members of the Supreme War Council 
were morally certain by February 14 that President 



266 Lex Talionis 

Wilson would abide by the obligation of secrecy in 
negotiations which he had taken after the meeting of 
the Supreme War Council on January 12, because of 
his aversion to a diplomatic breach, no matter what the 
outcome of the Conference. This removed the only 
menace to the Entente Peace. Hence, during the Presi- 
dent's absence in America they proceeded with the 
preparation of the crushing peace precisely as if he 
had categorically agreed to the principle of punitive 
damages. 

11. In the interlude in America the President, still 
under the spell of secrecy, let the opportunity go by 
to inform the Foreign Relations Committee of the 
Senate (and the people) that a peace of vengeance im- 
pended, and that he needed American support to coun- 
teract it. He had subconsciously reached the decision 
to abandon the fight against the imposition of punitive 
damages upon Germany; this decision was reached be- 
tween the 10th and 14th of February. In America he 
proclaimed the League of Nations to be the real issue 
in the conference negotiations. His sense of values 
had become impaired, and he himself had come to think 
that if the League was established the wrongs which 
Europe was perpetrating could be remedied after- 
wards. But the League of Nations was a matter of 
political controversy in the United States, and he re- 
turned to Europe without the support of his own 
country behind him, even on this new and factitious 
issue. Had he informed American public opinion of 
his position on the issue of punitive damages he might 
have turned defeat at Paris into victory. 



The Signing of the Treaty ■ 267 

12. The Supreme War Council, on the President's 
return, no longer feared the danger of public dis- 
closures. In the Council of Four there was brutal 
frankness. The President had no avenue of escape. 
Reluctant adherence to the principle of punitive dam- 
ages was given, and the practical settlements already 
fully prepared were endorsed. The Treaty was quickly 
drafted; the covenant of a League of Nations not in- 
consistent with the Entente Peace was incorporated in 
it. 

13. As to Germany; the Supreme War Council 
from the outset had represented the German attitude 
as treacherous, and had deceived the Americans into 
this belief. It had exaggerated internal disorders in 
Germany and prevented a movement for a quick pre- 
liminary peace by insisting that there was no govern- 
ment there capable of negotiating, when, as a matter 
of fact, Germany possessed a de jure government ca- 
pable of making peace in February. It had wrung 
German consent to the terms of a crushing treaty by 
unremitting military menace and the terrors of a rigid 
food blockade. When the point of actual starvation 
was reached in April, half the gold in the Reichsbank 
was taken as a guarantee of payment for food to be a 
delivered, and signatures extorted relinquishing Ger- 
man property rights, as recited in the financial clauses 

of the Treaty of Versailles. The German struggle 
against the yoke of slavery continued in the stubborn 
refusal of the delegates at Versailles to sign. The 
delivery of food cargoes in April and May, according . 
to contract, and the privileges of navigation, were sus- 



268 Lex Talionis 

pended by the Supreme War Council until the German 
National Assembly capitulated and sent plenipotentia- 
ries who signed the Treaty on June 28. 

The presence of elements in the foreign relations of 
governments, and peculiarities in the nature of sover- 
eignty itself, are revealed by the Versailles peace settle- 
ment, which have not been understood in the United 
States, by the people or the government, and which are 
new to American psychology. The tremendous changes 
in political environment which are taking place among 
the nations of the world, give warning that international 
conjunctures will arise in the future which may bear 
profoundly upon the peace and security of the United 
States. There are no lessons which can teach so much 
of value to the American patriot as those which the 
Versailles peace settlement have clearly written. 

The United States of America is the only nation in 
which the control of foreign affairs is in the hands of 
the people. Here an administration does not dare 
to commit the people to a foreign policy without their 
consent. In Europe foreign policy is exclusively in the 
hands of a ruling group. In foreign negotiation minis- 
tries run but one hazard — the risk of failure in their 
efforts to attain national advantage. 

In the administration of the British Empire, the 
opinion of the people of England is seldom invoked 
or regarded. Imperial policy is not settled at the polls. 
The King's prerogative is enormous; the House of 
Lords is the body from which all important Imperial 
executive positions are filled; the decrees of the Privy 
Council far transcend in importance any laws passed 



The Signing of the Treaty 269 

by the House of Commons. Foreign policy is a con- 
tinuing thing and is not subject to serious modification 
in general elections. 

In France the establishment of the Third Republic 
did not greatly change French institutions. There re- 
mains a French aristocracy and a French peasantry. 
France is an oligarchy, in which a ruling class dominates 
national policy. Changes in ministry merely transfer 
administrative authority from one group within this 
ruling class to another. Issues of foreign policy are 
never referred to decision at the polls. 

Italy is a constitutional monarchy, the Chamber of 
Deputies is always divided by faction, and the adminis- 
tration of government is thrown back upon the Crown. 
The foreign office is highly organized and foreign af- 
fairs remain continuously, as in France, in the hands of 
a governing group. 

In Europe the theory is not held that sovereignty 
lies in the hands of the people. The capacity of the 
people for self-government, in the American sense, is 
not admitted by the ruling classes or asserted by the 
people themselves. In Europe war and the danger of 
war has conditioned the governmental structure. 

President Wilson's mind was impressed with the 
power of the people, and with their sacred right to 
dominate government. He lived and moved among a 
population of a hundred millions where there was no 
question which a verdict under the Australian ballot 
system did not settle. Under the American form of 
government he knew the power of the popular will. 

The basic error in President Wilson's calculations, 



270 Lex Talionis 

with reference to Europe, was the conviction that the 
will of the people in Europe was capable of controlling 
governments. Acting^upon this conviction, he sought 
through the people to dominate the negotiations, only 
to find that the governments were dominating the 
people. Unable through their peoples to control the 
European negotiators, he found himself constrained to 
adopt the traditional methods of secret negotiation. 

The political impotence of the Entente peoples 
brought bitter disillusionment to the President. In 
England, France and Italy they had responded enthu- 
siastically to his political philosophy. They desired to 
see the vindication of his principles. But they were 
literally incapable of moving their own governments. 

On the 8th of June a Dutch journalist published an 
interview with the President which reveals how greatly, 
in the opinion of the President, the popular will in 
Europe had failed to respond to its opportunities. 

"The writer obtained the impression that besides the establish- 
ment of peace, the President considers the establishment of the 
League of Nations as his great task. It appeared again and 
again in the conversation that the League is his first object and 
purpose, his hope for the future. All peace problems are con- 
verted into terms of the League of Nations and controlling 
war. He hopes and anticipates that when once the work of 
the League is being carried out, the shortcomings in the peace 
plans will come right automatically. 

"The President held to his Fourteen Points as firmly as he 
could without jeopardizing the entire peace. He had remained 
as firm as a rock with reference to Orlando and the Austro- 
Italian frontier. 



The Signing of the Treaty 271 

"Anyone in expressing an opinion with reference to the alleged 
lack of consistency between certain peace conditions and the 
Fourteen Points, and who states that America ought to have 
withdrawn unless all the Fourteen Points were adopted accord- 
ing to the strictest interpretation, may very well ask himself 
what would have happened in that case. 

"The conditions of the peace are hard, but undoing the wrong 
necessitates hard conditions. The intention of the Council of 
Four was to 'etch' upon the political consciousness of the 
world that the peoples are responsible, and shall be held respon- 
sible in the future, for all that their governments do. They will 
no longer be able to relieve themselves of the actions of their 
governments by saying that those governments acted without 
their approval. They may not satisfy themselves with regard 
to the wrong actions of their governments by adopting a passive 
attitude or by mere criticism. They must take care to obtain 
better governments. The world must not only be safe for 
democracy ; the democracies must also feel themselves responsible 
for what their tools, the governments', do. 

"The President made no secret of the fact that he was not an 
admirer of European politics. The European peoples show 
themselves as being rather indifferent to the actions of their 
governments. Even in the democratic countries the people sel- 
dom show continued, timely, leading or preventive initiation 
in the matter of what their governments do. They dd) not 
possess the right means of continually expressing their will anu 
making their influence constantly felt. 

"In President Wilson's view one of the first needs of the Con- 
tinent of Europe is to raise the standard of the political mind 
and the feeling of responsibility of the European citizens. Ac- 
cording to the President the will of the people must continually 
act as the rudder of the ship of State, and cannot be satisfied 
with choosing a captain and crew from time to time." 



272 Lex Talionis 

Thus, in the Paris Peace Conference, two irrecon- 
cilable philosophies of government were in contact, 
and a harmonious settlement could not be reached. 
Overwhelming advantages in negotiation lay with the 
adherents of the old tradition. Had the Entente gov- 
ernments been democracies, with a political and social 
organization like that of the United States, with execu- 
tives and congresses responsive to the popular will, the 
Peace Conference might have taken on the aspects of 
a world parliament, in which the will of the majority 
afforded a sufficient sanction for its decisions. This, 
perhaps, was a condition precedent in the absence of 
which President Wilson's world settlement could not 
have been made to prevail. 

Having in mind the hazardous political environment 
in which the nations of Europe find themselves, it seems 
too much to hope that they will reform their institutions 
upon the American model at an early date. Until that 
time comes, it would seem the part of prudence for the 
people of the United States to familiarize themselves 
with the lessons to be drawn from the Versailles peace 
settlement, in order that in future negotiations there 
may be an adequate understanding of that curious type 
of mentality which the European standard of inter- 
national negotiation produces. 



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